Gaza War Resonates in the South Caucasus

Emil Avdaliani

Professor at Tbilisi-based European University

Tuesday, 31 October, 2023

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The South Caucasus, already reeling from recent significant geopolitical shifts, may be further affected by ripple effects from the current Israel-Hamas war. The armed conflict is particularly relevant for Azerbaijan, whose military cooperation with Israel was key for it regaining control of the Nagorny Karabakh region in late September, after over three decades.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia all have close ties with Israel, albeit of varying intensity, and governments in all three nations have all added their calls to global appeals for an immediate cessation of active hostilities, stressing their condolences over the casualties of Hamas’ attack on Israel. 

“A lengthy Gaza war is likely to diminish Israeli involvement in the South Caucasus, potentially paving the way for Iran’s more active role.”

Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, President Salome Zourabichvili and Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili expressed strong censure for the onslaught on Israel and conveyed their unwavering support for the Jewish state, largely mirroring the country’s overwhelmingly pro-Israeli public opinion.

In Baku, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the harm inflicted on civilians, urging a rapid de-escalation. Additionally, the inter-parliamentary relations group between Azerbaijan and Israel firmly denounced the missile barrages from Gaza and expressed their solidarity with Israel.

Israel’s military engagement could shape two broader scenarios in the South Caucasus, particularly in relation to Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

With Israel consumed by its own military efforts, its defence industry may slow the supply of weapons to Azerbaijan, possibly making Baku more hesitant to pursue hard-line options and encouraging it to lean more heavily on regional powers like Russia and Turkey. 

This could also serve as a further disincentive for Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev from pushing harder on Yerevan to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor, across Armenia’s Syunik southernmost province, which borders Iran. 

If implemented, the land corridor would connect Baku with its enclave of Nakhchivan, sandwiched between Armenia, Turkey and Iran, and a long-sought trade route to Turkey - Tehran's rival and Baku’s key ally. 

Tehran’s opposition to the project remains strong; it seeks to boost its sanctions-circumventing exchanges with Russia, and a trade route crossing its passage to Armenia is a serious bone of contention.

The other hypothesis is that, should the war expand beyond Israel’s border, Baku could feel confident to act boldly as larger scale hostilities in the Middle East divert the attention of the US and its allies. 

“Baku has to tread carefully because of strategic ties it has built over the decades with Israel.”

Azerbaijan might exploit global focus on Gaza - and Iran's potential involvement as a sponsor of Hamas - to push for Armenian concessions around the Zangezur corridor.

Aliyev has previously made veiled claims toward the sovereign territory of Armenia. The US government has allegedly feared potential military moves by Azerbaijan, although this was subsequently denied by the State Department.

Azerbaijan is in a particularly uncomfortable position. About 99 per cent of the population is Muslim and expected to profess solidarity with the Palestinians, but realpolitik dictates differently. Baku has to tread carefully because of strategic ties it has built over the decades with Israel, a relationship driven by mutual interests and shared regional concerns.

Baku is a major importer of Israeli military equipment, including drones and missile defence systems, key in its military offensives against Karabakh in late 2020 and then the defining one of September 2023. Both nations reportedly cooperate on intelligence sharing, in particular concerning regional threats.

For its part, Israel is dependent on energy imports and oil-rich Azerbaijan supplies a significant portion of Israel's needs. In 2022, Baku’s export of crude amounted to 1.67 billion US dollars. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which transports Azeri oil to the Mediterranean, is crucial for Israel's energy security, supplying about 40 per cent of its needs

GEOPOLITICAL THEATRE 

Armenia and Israel have a more chequered history. Israel is home to the world’s oldest Armenian diaspora community and Jerusalem’s walled Old City boasts an Armenian quarter, but relations are complex, both for historical reasons - Israel has never formally recognised the Armenian genocide - and because Israel is a key ally of Azerbaijan, which Armenia considers the main threat to its national security.

Georgia’s ties with Israel are rooted in history; there has been Jewish community in the country for about 2,600 years and it developed the Kivruli, a specific Judeo-Georgian dialect. 

Israel, which has supported Georgian sovereignty since the end of the Soviet Union, also served as a vital source of military intelligence and technologies before the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Although the level of cooperation subsequently fell, the two countries continue joint military cooperation along with extensive economic ties.

The implications for Azerbaijan are also geopolitical. It shares a border with Iran, a country that has adversarial relations with both Azerbaijan and Israel. 

Azerbaijan’s strategic location provides Israel with a valuable regional ally and Israeli weapons offer Baku military and technological capabilities that can act as a counterbalance against pressures from Tehran. Iran is also home to a large Azerbaijani community, which numbers an estimated 20 million people, accounting for about 16 per cent of the overall population of the Islamic Republic and twice of Azerbaijan’s. 

A lengthy Gaza war is likely to diminish Israeli involvement in the South Caucasus, potentially paving the way for Iran to play a more active role in the region.

While Baku is unlikely to concede if pressure comes solely from Tehran, other big actors in the region and allies of the country have likewise held a pro-Palestinian position. 

Turkey and Russia have been vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause and might not be patient with Israel’s growing ambitions in the South Caucasus, adding yet another layer of potential pressure. 

This thinking fits well into the understanding Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been developing that no external or non-regional actor should be present in the South Caucasus region. If before this view applied to EU and US involvement, this concept of “regionalism” likewise applies to Israel. 

The Iranian government has systematically pushed against Israel-Azerbaijan cooperation. It has levelled accusations that Israel was using Azerbaijan’s territory for espionage purposes, with one diplomat accusing Israel of turning “the territory of Azerbaijan into a threat to national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. 

Beyond these longer-term considerations on potential re-alignments around Israel’s presence in the South Caucasus, however, the first scenario is the most probable, with Azerbaijan abstaining from making military moves as the war in the Middle East continues.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at Tbilisi-based European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank Geocase.