Economic Crisis Likely to Rekindle Kyrgyz Unrest
By Kumar Bekbolotov
Economic Crisis Likely to Rekindle Kyrgyz Unrest
By Kumar Bekbolotov
It’s become almost a tradition in the past few years for springtime in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek to be a memorable season, with mass protests voicing political discontent.
Last April, it was the United Front, led by a former prime minister, which held street protests calling on President Kurmanbek Bakiev to step down. In May 2006, opposition rallies called for law and order and the curbing of the president’s powers. In March 2005, massive protests shook the state structure to its core, and led to the then president Askar Akaev fleeing the country.
Although public protest has shown itself to be less and less effective as an instrument of change, Kyrgyzstan’s weary public is expecting a new round of demonstrations this spring.
This is partly force of habit, and partly the conclusion to be drawn from recent political developments. The December parliamentary election produced a virtually one-party parliament, and the largest opposition party, Ata Meken, was entirely excluded under a controversial election rule.
The result is that many forces critical of the government have been excluded from the decision-making process and denied even a token measure of political participation.
Against this backdrop, two parallel trends have emerged which are likely to shape the way political opposition is expressed in the coming year.
First, there is the emergence of an alternative “parliament”, bringing together 50 party leaders, politicians and civil society activists, on top of an alternative “cabinet of ministers” that already existed. Second, there is the launch of the first clandestine revolutionary movement that seeks to topple the current leadership.
Alternative structures like the “Public Parliament” challenge the government’s legitimacy and claim to have their own authority, derived from popular support and professional expertise.
Such initiatives amount to acts of desperation, prompted by exclusion from participation in mainstream politics. Yet there is still room for dialogue, as government has much to gain in terms of legitimacy by consulting “rival” institutions, with their small but devoted support-base.
In contrast to this, the options for consultation and dialogue with the newly-formed “Revolutionary Committee” are limited. This body is largely covert - only three of its leading members have made themselves known - and is seeking to redefine the political structure of Kyrgyzstan. From its perspective, the only possible concession is for the current elite, which it believes has failed to deliver, to step aside.
The Revolutionary Committee’s first public outing looks like happening in March, when it has promised to organise mass protests.
It seems doubtful that the Kyrgyz opposition, divided as it is into several camps since the December election, will be able to stage demonstrations on a par with those of recent years in terms of scale and effectiveness.
As the news agenda is dominated by the pro-government mainstream, the ruling elite is rapidly shifting the focus of public debate to the economy, with rhetoric about development, budgets and business interests. This appears to reflect a genuine public mood of exhaustion with political confrontation. Now the discourse is increasingly about economic issues, and less and less about constitutional reform, the fight against crime, party politics, or even fair elections.
The shift has prompted some observers to speak of an increasingly apolitical population. However, it might in fact prove to be economic rather than political issues that are quickest to stir up violent expressions of grievance and dissatisfaction.
All the issues now high on the economic agenda have serious potential for creating trouble. The privatisation of large state-owned monopolies, of which the hydroelectric power industry is the jewel in the crown; the galloping inflation which defies all attempts to curb it; the possibility that Kyrgyzstan will face food shortages; the immense foreign debt burden; and finally a financial- and banking-sector crisis that could come as an unwelcome spillover from the downturn in neighbouring economic giants Russia and Kazakstan – all these factors carry the risk of putting further pressure on the least well-off sections of the population.
There is certainly a chance that things will go wrong in an economy that remains fragile and vulnerable to even the slightest changes in external conditions. There is also chance that if this happens, the Kyrgyz government, which has been merrily increasing expenditure over the last three years, may suddenly find itself short of cash and unable to cushion the population from income and price shocks. In an increasingly unstable world economy, no serious hope can be placed on migrant worker remittances that have helped mitigate the consequences of decline.
Economic crisis could have the effect of widening the number of poor, as those groups already classed as such are joined by others who have been living in relative poverty and are hit hard by a drop in living standards and consumption. This could have profound effects – fuelling a never-ending cycle of the now traditional street protests, and perhaps giving rise to other, more radical methods of political struggle. It is a long-held view that poverty breeds radical religious movements, and Central Asia is clearly a case in point.
Kumar Bekbolotov is IWPR’s Central Asia Programme Director.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of IWPR as a whole.
