How Moldova Defied Russia
The vote was a litmus test of state’s capacity to withstand intense and hybrid pressure.
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Lessons Learned from Moldova’s Elections
Chisinau event hears that “disinformation reached unprecedented levels”.
On September 28 2025, Moldova held what will likely be remembered as one of its most consequential parliamentary elections since independence. Th e country was faced with a stark geopolitical choice between deepening European integration and a re-orientation toward Russia, with democratic resilience in the balance.
Despite deep polarisation and contrary to predictions, President Maia Sandu’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a majority that now allows it to govern alone. Western partners explicitly framed the vote as a litmus test of Moldova’s readiness for further EU integration and of its capacity to withstand hybrid pressure that has intensified since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The Kremlin’s Moldova toolkit has combined covert political financing, orchestrated protests, information operations and cyber-activity, often via networks linked to oligarchs exiled Ilan Șor and extradited Vladimir Plahotniuc, both internationally sanctioned for corruption and malign influence operations. In July 2021, PAS won a parliamentary majority on a pro-EU, anti-corruption platform, with 63 seats in the Parliament. But last year’s contests - a narrow referendum which inserted EU accession into the Constitution and Sandu’s tight presidential re-election - were both marred by allegations of Russian interference.
The 2025 election result is both continuity and correction: PAS retains power with a single-party mandate, but - with 55 of 101 lawmakers - fewer seats than in 2021. Another four competitors enter the new parliament: the Patriotic Electoral Bloc led by Igor Dodon led the opposition with 26 seats and new entrants Alternativa with eight seats, Our Party and Democracy at Home both with six seats.
This result reveals dynamics that explain both the party’s success and the electorate’s determination to maintain a European course despite discontent.
Before the vote, polling consistently suggested that PAS would struggle to secure more than 47 per cent of the vote. These predictions rested on public dissatisfaction with governance and perceptions of corruption as well as frustrations over inflation and the energy crisis.
However, the failure of opposition forces to unite or coordinate effectively proved decisive in the PAS victory. The Patriotic Electoral Bloc, led by Igor Dodon, maintained strongholds in Gagauzia, Taraclia and northern districts, but failed to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional electorate. Alternativa, under Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban, presented itself as a centrist, pragmatic option, but support remained concentrated in urban areas, particularly the capital. Our Party, led by Renato Usatîi, underperformed in its Bălți stronghold, while the unexpected entry of the Democracy at Home party split protest and nationalist votes further.
In Moldova’s proportional system, this fragmentation was decisive: PAS’s 50.2 per cent translated into 55 seats, while opposition votes were dispersed among smaller actors that lacked the capacity to challenge the majority.
Equally important was PAS’s revised ground campaign. In contrast to earlier elections, when the party was criticised for concentrating on the capital and diaspora outreach, in 2025 it invested more systematically in small towns, central districts and rural communities.
Finally, the existential framing of the election as a contest for Moldova’s sovereignty and European future influenced behaviour. International observers assessed the elections as overshadowed by unprecedented hybrid attacks, including foreign interference, illicit financing and large-scale disinformation. Many voters, even those frustrated with governance, felt they had to choose between Europe and Russia.
The election outcome reveals much about the determination of Moldovan citizens to remain on the European trajectory. This was visible also in regional contexts traditionally less favourable to pro-European parties.
It was not surprising that Chișinău delivered an emphatic PAS majority of 52.68 per cent, followed by the Patriotic Electoral Bloc at 21.26 per cent and Alternativa at 14.48 per cent.
But in Transnistria, although the Patriotic Bloc led with more than half of the vote, nearly 30 per cent of voters chose PAS. It showed that even among electorates exposed primarily to Russian-controlled narratives, there is a willingness to consider the European path, especially when the alternative is instability.
In Gagauzia and Taraclia, where pro-Russian narratives remain deeply embedded, the Patriotic Bloc maintained its lead, yet PAS’s share, while remaining very low, still managed to register support levels that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
These results suggest that while Moldova remains deeply divided, the overall electorate is prepared to endure dissatisfaction with domestic governance in order to safeguard the country’s European orientation.
Crucial Vote
The diaspora once again played a critical role as a stabiliser for the pro-EU option, confirming its status as a decisive actor in Moldovan elections. In 2025, approximately 278,000 ballots were cast abroad, representing about 17.5 per cent of all votes. This was a significant increase compared to 2021, when diaspora participation stood at about 14.3 per cent, and also compared to the 2024 presidential election, when around 230,000 diaspora votes were recorded.
PAS dominated the diaspora vote, securing nearly 79 per cent of ballots. Voting infrastructure also expanded, with 301 polling stations in 41 countries, including four for processing mail-in ballots in Washington, Ottawa, Stockholm, and Tokyo. Compared to the 2024 elections, 69 additional polling stations were established for in-person voting. This reflects both the scale of Moldova’s emigration and the determination of the diaspora to shape their country’s direction from abroad.
At the same time, controversy persists. The decision to open only two polling stations in Russia provoked criticism from the Kremlin, which accuses Chisinau of preventing hundreds of thousands of Moldovans in Russia from voting.
International observers described the elections as free and competitive in terms of procedure, but underlined the corrosive effect of hybrid pressure on equal competition. Reports concluded that Moldova succeeded in safeguarding the integrity of the technical process, but that the information environment was skewed and voters were exposed to unprecedented manipulation. The ballot was properly administered, yet a distorted information climate left perceptions fragile and trust easier to erode.
Extensive disinformation campaigns included deepfakes, supposed act-checking portals aligned with pro-Kremlin messaging and systematic narratives portraying the government as illegitimate. Cyberattacks against government infrastructure were reported ahead of the vote, with thousands of attempted intrusions. Bomb threats and hoaxes targeted polling stations in Europe.
Illicit financing was another major concern. Authorities and journalists documented attempts by oligarch Shor and Russia-linked networks to channel funds into agitation and protests. Several parties were deregistered or excluded due to suspected connections with these networks, decisions that, while legally justified, added to the sense of contestation.
Challenges Ahead
The next four years will be decisive and must be about delivery. PAS now faces the greater challenge of governing effectively. The electorate has given the party a strategic mandate, but this is a fragile majority in political terms which will erode if reforms do not translate into tangible improvements in citizens’ lives.
Domestically, the priorities are clear. Judicial reform, anti-corruption measures and institutional strengthening must advance. Investment and services must reach beyond Chișinău to regions that feel excluded. Social policies addressing energy poverty, employment and infrastructure gaps are essential.
Externally, the pressure is no less intense. The EU expects accelerated alignment with the acquis, the opening of negotiation chapters and the consolidation of rule of law. For Moldova’s citizens, integration must produce visible benefits, not only abstract promises.
At the same time, retaliation from Russia is inevitable. Hybrid attacks will continue: covert funding, proxy media and exploitation of discontent over economic shocks. Moldova must therefore strengthen resilience in cyber defence, financial transparency, media literacy and civic engagement.
If reforms falter or discontent grows, the opposition - fragmented today - may regroup tomorrow. The Kremlin will not withdraw, but rather will adapt its strategies. Moldova remains on the frontline, and the contest is far from over.
This publication has been produced with financial support from Norway. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway.
