Bosnian Serbs Plan Ethnic Cleansing, Cover Up Crimes
Day 235
Bosnian Serbs Plan Ethnic Cleansing, Cover Up Crimes
Day 235
In a prior article ['Transcripts Reveal Milosevic Involvement In Bosnian War,' 12 September 2003], CIJ reported on portions of the transcripts of Republika Srpska (RS) Assembly Sessions from 1992 – 1995, which were reviewed and excerpted by prosecution expert Dr. Robert J. Donia of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan in the Milosevic trial. This article focuses on crimes admitted or alluded to in those Sessions, particularly in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. A discussion of the Accused's cross examination will follow in a third article.
INTIMATIONS OF GENOCIDE
As early as July 1992, RS President Radovan Karadzic reminds the Assembly of their goal in the war against the Bosnian Government. 'Europe does not desire and does not dare allow creation of an Islamic state here, that's our greatest problem. They want us and the Croats to remain in a unified Bosnia so that we control the Muslims. We cannot be in that unified state. We well know, where fundamentalism arrives, you cannot live any more. There's no tolerance. . . . This conflict was incited so that the Muslims would not exist.' [emphasis added] Aside from the irony of accusing Bosnia's Muslims of intolerance at a time when the Bosnian Serbs had undertaken a campaign for an ethnically pure Serbian state, the admission is shocking in its directness. It is understandable within the context that these were closed sessions, frank discussions among the RS leadership.
Another Assembly member, Dragan Kalinic, indicates how far he is willing to go to accomplish this goal. '[K]nowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key people, I do not hesitate in selecting the first option, the option of war. . . . And let me tell you this right now, if the Military Hospital falls into the hands of the enemy, I am for the destruction of the Kosevo hospital [in Sarajevo] so that the enemy has nowhere to go for medical help.' Kalinic was Minister of Health and a medical doctor. Such intentional targeting of medical facilities is a war crime.
In these early days (May 1992), Ratko Mladic appeared very much the professional soldier. He opposed war against Muslims or Croats “as a people,” saying the Bosnian Serbs would fight only if attacked. 'Therefore, we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. Well, that is, that will not, I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People, that would be genocide.' [emphasis added] Mladic himself was indicted for genocide by the ICTY in 1995. Dr. Donia suggested that his earlier position changed during the course of the war, though the transformation was not explained.
ETHNIC CLEANSING
Nevertheless, the transcript excerpts show that the Bosnian Serbs pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing. Living in a state with the Muslims was unacceptable.
Speaking of Gorazde, Dusko Pejovic argues at an April 1993 Session, “That’s a single oasis that must be completely cleansed as soon as possible, breaking all Sarajevo’s links with the East. If they remain, they will attack us, expand, and butcher us in the surrounding area.” He makes no distinction between civilians and soldiers. Earlier, in January 1993, Trifko Radic tells the Assembly, 'Believe me, we cannot further live together. I don't know under what conditions we can live together, but I must be candid: They have done a lot of bad things to us, and we have not done much less to them this time.' At a later Session that year, Radic “lends support to the idea that ‘separation’ was a concept that included creating an ethnically pure territory through induced migration,” according to Dr. Donia’s summary.
At a later session in 1993, supporting a proposed Union of the Three Republics, while rejecting return of refugees and advocating further population transfers, Dobroslav Milinkovic argues, “Gentlemen, there is no Serbian state in the Bosnian stew without relocations and evacuations. If we want our ethnically pure Serbian state, and we desire it, don’t we? If we all know and understand that common life with them is impossible, then we must understand that this map offers it and that people must relocate.”
BLAME THE VICTIM
The excerpts also reveal strategies used in the war which reflect the RS leadership’s concern with how it is seen by the “international community.” General Ratko Mladic’s statement to the Assembly on May 12, 1992 is a good example. 'We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no because that would get America out of its seat, but gentlemen, please, fine, well, one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo . . . . Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the water supply facilities, there was a power cut at such and such a place, we are doing our best repairing this, that is what diplomacy is . . . .' (Diplomacy as the big lie.) The RS rather effectively projected this tactic onto the Bosnian Muslims, accusing them of shelling and shooting their own people in order to elicit international intervention to protect them.
Several other excerpts show this turn-about strategy at work in peace negotiations, where the RS leadership maneuvered the Muslims into rejecting proposals which they also found unacceptable. It made the Bosniaks appear obstructionist. As Dr. Donia summarized from the January 1993 Session discussing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 'Karadzic makes clear that many elements of this plan are unfavorable to Serbian aims, but he proposes to force the Muslims to oppose the plan so that the peace conference doesn't collapse because of the Serbs.'
The strategy is implemented on the battlefield as well, again according to Karadzic speaking about Gorazde (July 20-21 1993). '[W]e must foresee what will happen and inflame those events, or a day beforehand take measures that will incite senseless measures against us.' Later, in 1993, “[Karadzic] reminisces about having paced events in the pre-war and early wartime period so that each move by [Bosnian President Alija] Izetbegovic was a pretext for a step on the part of the Serbian leadership,” as Dr. Donia summarizes the transcript.
ADMISSION OF CRIMES
The transcripts also include admissions of crimes. On January 8, 1993, Mladic reports to the Assembly about the murder of Hakija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister of the Bosnian Government. Mr. Turajlic was riding in an UNPROFOR armored personnel carrier with a Turkish delegation when the vehicle was stopped by Bosnian Serb soldiers. Mladic says, “In the UNPROFOR vehicle were Lieutenant Sartre, a Frenchman, and Vice President [sic] Hakija Turaljic, of that rump government of BH. Our guys stopped the vehicle and searched them. One of our soldiers killed Turajlic with six bullets.” The transcript then indicates Mladic was interrupted by applause. Mladic responds that they shouldn’t “spread such anti-UNPROFOR sentiment,” because “there are those who work well [with us].” He goes on to say that he will lodge a protest with the UN operation about its being used as a “taxi service.” He says nothing about disciplining the soldier who killed the Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister in cold blood.
The Assembly also discusses destruction of mosques, another violation of the Geneva Conventions. On 9 May 1993, two days after the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka was razed to the ground, Radoslav Brdjanin offered this, “I propose to ban the Satanization of Serbs by Serbs. Please. The main topic in Banja Luka day and night is about the mosque. I don’t say that we must praise them for being destroyed, but you mustn’t cry so much, at least not in our media. For all those who cry, I’ll enlarge a post card in color and they can carry it with them.” Later in 1993, Miroslav Vjestica argues against a Union of Three Republics because a return of Muslim refugees to Veliki Babic would mean “we will have to compensate them for everything that we destroyed and burned there and the 17 mosques we razed to the ground.”
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Later in the war (May 10-11, 1994), Karadzic tells the delegates more about their relationship with UNPROFOR. 'We have instances of exceptionally good relations with UNPROFOR where our officers have sufficient patience and wisdom and those foreign officers eat out of their hands, we have relations with UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, where they fill up trenches, drive them (the Muslims) away from us, and lodge complaints with them; now the Dutch are there . . . .' The reference to UNPROFOR support of the Bosnian Serbs foreshadows the UN's shameful (in)action a little more than a year later.
The excerpted transcripts reveal the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs were influenced by international opinion and actions. The all-out assault on the safe haven of Srebrenica was timed to take advantage of international opinion against the Croats for their military actions in Western Slavonia, according to General Gvero, addressing the Assembly on August 9, 1995. He also speaks of having had to “conduct complete psychological and propaganda operations concerning the resolution of operations in Zepa and Srebrenica” to sway international public opinion. At the same Session, Karadzic recalls pressure to take Srebrenica in 1993. “Had we taken Srebrenica and entered it when [General Phillipe] Morillon was there, they would have bombed us, you know how, with carpet bombing. . . .” Instead, the Bosnian Serbs “wisely” waited for the right moment and overran the safe haven with virtually no resistance (and even assistance) from UN forces.
SREBRENICA
Assembly Sessions following the massacre at Srebrenica are peppered with references to it, as the Bosnian Serb leadership struggled to manage international public opinion (which turned against them following media accounts of Srebrenica and the Markale Marketplace Massacre in Sarajevo), their losses on the ground (Croatia retook much of the area it had lost to the RS early in the war) and Milosevic’s withdrawal of support for continued fighting.
In October 1995, Milorad Dodik (later president of the RS) tells the Assembly, “[O]ur greatest mistake of the war was Srebrenica and Zepa, and someone has to take responsibility for that . . . . Who is responsible?” Dodik felt the attack on the safe area established a precedent for the Croatian Army assault on the Krajina which resulted in loss of considerable territory by the Bosnian Serbs. By attacking safe areas, he said, the RS had ceded its right to complain. This and other excerpts of Assembly Sessions do not reveal remorse at the killing of thousands of civilians in Srebrenica. Only distress at the repercussions and the reversal of fortunes in the war.
Another delegate at the 54th Session attempts a response to Dodik’s question. “Gentlemen, we never wanted to admit that our shells fell [on civilians]. I know personally that neither the High Command nor the Main Staff did that. They never gave such orders, but that was done by some aspiring and irresponsible individuals. We needed [to recognize], and in the future we should recognize, that this happened, but we should say that it was done by irresponsible individuals who will be arrested. Then we just needed to report some sentence as a charade. [emphasis added] Look what Mr. Tudjman does.” While the delegate attempts to exonerate the VRS leadership for the killing of civilians at Srebrenica, he inadvertently implicates all those in the chain of command for failing to take disciplinary action against those “irresponsible individuals” who committed the war crimes.
In an earlier session, within weeks after the Srebrenica massacre, Karadzic (the civilian leader) takes responsibility for ordering the troops to take the safe area of Srebrenica. “The moment came, and with Directive #7, I signaled the taking of Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. Everything was signed and we entered in force. . . . I am for our decisions, and I stand behind them, and the Supreme Commands were recorded, and everything that I ordered, both verbally and in writing, that we go to Zepa and Srebrenica.”
At an October session, he repeats his earlier declaration of responsibility. 'As Supreme Commander, I stood behind plans for Zepa and Srebrenica, mainly for Srebrenica. Zepa was understood. Gentlemen, we would have lost the war had Zepa, with 90,000 armed Muslims, continued to exist. I personally looked over the plans without the knowledge of the General Staff, not intentionally but by coincidence, found General Krstic and advised him to go into the city and proclaim the fall of Srebrenica, and after that we will chase the Turks through the woods. I approved that radical mission, and I feel no remorse for it.'
[emphasis added]
An indication that Karadzic knew the Srebrenica operation violated the laws of war is his cautioning journalists who were present at the Assembly Session not to write about it. Adding, by way of explanation, “I must again point out an example of this court in Nuremberg. . . .” On August 6, 1995, he told the Assembly, “As you know, we had success in Srebrenica and Zepa. There’s nothing to criticize or comment on there. Of course, many stupidities were committed after that, for many Muslim soldiers roamed the surrounding woods, and there we suffered some losses. . . .” At the same session, Karadzic’s intervention shows that Mladic was involved (not just General Krstic) and that the leadership is aware of civilian casualties. 'Lieutenant Colonel Milutinovic . . . gives catastrophic pictures to foreign news agencies. These could cost Mladic if they are shown at the Hague. He allows those who wish, to take pictures of the corpses of women on the streets of Srebrenica and then releases them to foreign media.'
SARAJEVO
“Sarajevo is not in a Muslim state, but in a Serbian state, because everything around is Serbian. . . . Sarajevo has more chance of becoming completely Serbian than completely Muslim. And the most realistic prospect is that Sarajevo will be divided and become two cities. . . . Everything that is Serbian we will retain. For us, Sarajevo integrates eastern Hercegovina, Old Hercegovina, and Romanija. . . . We will create a polycentric development and for such development Serbian Sarajevo is of inestimable importance, and we won’t give it away.”
This 1993 speech by Karadzic illustrates the important role the Bosnian Serbs saw for Sarajevo in the new ethnically pure Serbian state. A divided Sarajevo was the fifth of the six strategic goals Karadzic outlined to the Assembly in May 1992. “The fifth strategic goal is division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of an effective state government in each of these two constituent states.” He goes on to explain the purpose of a divided Sarajevo. “Alija [Izetbegovic] does not have a state while we have a part of Sarajevo . . . . In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps the fighting far away from Krajina, far away from Semberija, far away from the Drina, far away from those areas, where we could possibly have conflicts with Muslims.”
Under questioning by Prosecutor Dermot Groome, Dr. Donia explained further the reasons the RS took a different approach with Sarajevo than with other municipalities, surrounding and bringing it under siege for three years. First, Sarajevo was to be the hub of Serbian lands, connecting various Serbian territories. Second, the siege was intended to isolate the city so the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina couldn’t function.
But Sarajevo was not to be assaulted with heavy weapons which might provoke international intervention. As Dr. Donia summarizes Karadzic’s advice to the Assembly in the fall of 1993, '[H]e says to expect a blood bath in Sarajevo within two years, but he asserts that Serb forces cannot use heavy weapons to destroy the city because of constraints of international law and global media attention.'
Looking back in 1995, Karadzic takes a little different view. 'We surrendered a large territory. True, the JNA helped us plenty, but in some places they hindered us. In Sarajevo they didn't want to do what we sought. They didn't want to give us a unit of tanks so we could do what we wanted. The war would have concluded had the JNA done that.”
Faced with the results of the negotiations in Dayton, on December 17, 1995, Karadzic protests the plan for Sarajevo. “The mission of this republic and its first strategic goal is for us to divide from Muslims and Croats, and no one has the right to create a strategy whereby Serbian Sarajevo remains in a common state. Thus any kind of danger or wish for a connection and solution for Sarajevo is excluded, such that we want to stay with the Muslims and Croats. No one is allowed now to create a new solution to stay together.” Explaining that the leadership had never foreseen that Sarajevo would be a city of shared power, he tells the delegates “[W]e need time for a political solution and a final separation, and at the end of it all, the best solution is that people leave Sarajevo . . . .” For most of the Bosnian Serbs living in and around Sarajevo, that is the solution their leadership imposed upon them.
ABANDONMENT BY MILOSEVIC
After the RS military defeats and international outcry over civilian massacres, voices were raised against Milosevic in the August 6, 1995 Assembly Session, likely because he was pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate an end to the war and withholding further military support. They also criticized Karadzic, who had relieved Mladic of his duties as Commander of the VRS two days before.
One of the critics was Orthodox Bishop Atanasije Jevtic, who argued, 'Karadzic's mistake is that he is too closely tied to the policies of Slobodan Milosevic. Mladic's error is that he has always followed a pro-communist line. . . .” Referring to “that gentleman from Dedinje” [Belgrade neighborhood where Milosevic lived], Atanasije complains, “Now he's listened to again, when he said that except for Serbia and Montenegro, the rest of this will [disappear] into darkness.'
Even Karadzic, Milosevic’s loyal defender, worries about being abandoned by the President of Serbia: 'Milosevic personally told me, 'Zimmerman was here and sought to put down your movement. He wants me to close the border on the Drina. I will never put down my own people.' I remember that and have counted on it, and I never could have a doubt that the border on the Drina would be closed. . . . Just one time, something before 4 August, at one assembly session I said, we will remain alone. . . . . Until that time I never dreamed that we would remain [on our own].'
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
These transcript excerpts make clear that the main goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership was an ethnically pure state for Serbs. To accomplish this, they used war and forced population transfers. In the process, war crimes were committed of which the leadership was well aware, yet there is no evidence that disciplinary action was contemplated or taken. On the contrary, efforts were directed at covering up all such crimes.
The excerpts also show that the Bosnian Serb leadership was influenced by and reactive to policies and opinions of the international community. They used subterfuge and manipulation to stay in favor and appear to have coopted at least a part of UNPROFOR in their ethnic cleansing campaign.
RS President Karadzic admits in the Assembly his direct control over the Bosnian Serb Army, including ordering the assaults on UN protected areas. The transcripts reveal that the Assembly knew about the massacre of civilians, yet Karadzic still maintained, 'I approved that radical mission and I feel no remorse for it,' even while expressing concern about war crimes tribunals (with references to Nuremberg and The Hague).
With regard to Sarajevo, the transcripts indicate the siege was an intentional tactic to isolate the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina from its citizens and armed forces. The city was important to the Bosnian Serbs as a hub to connect all Serbian lands. When their fortunes turned with losses in military actions, international public opinion and Milosevic's support, they called for all Serbs to leave Sarajevo, thus accomplishing a degree of its ethnic cleansing, though not as they had wished.
Milosevic's connection with the above was discussed in CIJ's first article about the transcripts. One important piece that remains missing is a connection between Milosevic and any prior plan for the massacre at Srebrenica. There has been some evidence of his knowledge of the massacre after the fact. His intimate involvement in VRS combat operations (having the ability to stop assaults on Gorazde and Bihac as wrongly timed, according to the transcripts) suggests he may have been involved in planning for Srebrenica as well (though planning a genocidal campaign requires at least another step). Suggestions, of course, are not enough. Much more is required to support the Prosecution's charge of genocide.
Milosevic faces a formidable task in cross examining Dr. Donia about the excerpts he drew from the 10,000 pages of RS Assembly transcripts. His initial efforts will be discussed in a following article. Dr. Donia must return at an unspecified future time for Mr. Milosevic to complete his cross examination.
INTIMATIONS OF GENOCIDE
As early as July 1992, RS President Radovan Karadzic reminds the Assembly of their goal in the war against the Bosnian Government. 'Europe does not desire and does not dare allow creation of an Islamic state here, that's our greatest problem. They want us and the Croats to remain in a unified Bosnia so that we control the Muslims. We cannot be in that unified state. We well know, where fundamentalism arrives, you cannot live any more. There's no tolerance. . . . This conflict was incited so that the Muslims would not exist.' [emphasis added] Aside from the irony of accusing Bosnia's Muslims of intolerance at a time when the Bosnian Serbs had undertaken a campaign for an ethnically pure Serbian state, the admission is shocking in its directness. It is understandable within the context that these were closed sessions, frank discussions among the RS leadership.
Another Assembly member, Dragan Kalinic, indicates how far he is willing to go to accomplish this goal. '[K]nowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key people, I do not hesitate in selecting the first option, the option of war. . . . And let me tell you this right now, if the Military Hospital falls into the hands of the enemy, I am for the destruction of the Kosevo hospital [in Sarajevo] so that the enemy has nowhere to go for medical help.' Kalinic was Minister of Health and a medical doctor. Such intentional targeting of medical facilities is a war crime.
In these early days (May 1992), Ratko Mladic appeared very much the professional soldier. He opposed war against Muslims or Croats “as a people,” saying the Bosnian Serbs would fight only if attacked. 'Therefore, we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. Well, that is, that will not, I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People, that would be genocide.' [emphasis added] Mladic himself was indicted for genocide by the ICTY in 1995. Dr. Donia suggested that his earlier position changed during the course of the war, though the transformation was not explained.
ETHNIC CLEANSING
Nevertheless, the transcript excerpts show that the Bosnian Serbs pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing. Living in a state with the Muslims was unacceptable.
Speaking of Gorazde, Dusko Pejovic argues at an April 1993 Session, “That’s a single oasis that must be completely cleansed as soon as possible, breaking all Sarajevo’s links with the East. If they remain, they will attack us, expand, and butcher us in the surrounding area.” He makes no distinction between civilians and soldiers. Earlier, in January 1993, Trifko Radic tells the Assembly, 'Believe me, we cannot further live together. I don't know under what conditions we can live together, but I must be candid: They have done a lot of bad things to us, and we have not done much less to them this time.' At a later Session that year, Radic “lends support to the idea that ‘separation’ was a concept that included creating an ethnically pure territory through induced migration,” according to Dr. Donia’s summary.
At a later session in 1993, supporting a proposed Union of the Three Republics, while rejecting return of refugees and advocating further population transfers, Dobroslav Milinkovic argues, “Gentlemen, there is no Serbian state in the Bosnian stew without relocations and evacuations. If we want our ethnically pure Serbian state, and we desire it, don’t we? If we all know and understand that common life with them is impossible, then we must understand that this map offers it and that people must relocate.”
BLAME THE VICTIM
The excerpts also reveal strategies used in the war which reflect the RS leadership’s concern with how it is seen by the “international community.” General Ratko Mladic’s statement to the Assembly on May 12, 1992 is a good example. 'We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no because that would get America out of its seat, but gentlemen, please, fine, well, one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo . . . . Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the water supply facilities, there was a power cut at such and such a place, we are doing our best repairing this, that is what diplomacy is . . . .' (Diplomacy as the big lie.) The RS rather effectively projected this tactic onto the Bosnian Muslims, accusing them of shelling and shooting their own people in order to elicit international intervention to protect them.
Several other excerpts show this turn-about strategy at work in peace negotiations, where the RS leadership maneuvered the Muslims into rejecting proposals which they also found unacceptable. It made the Bosniaks appear obstructionist. As Dr. Donia summarized from the January 1993 Session discussing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 'Karadzic makes clear that many elements of this plan are unfavorable to Serbian aims, but he proposes to force the Muslims to oppose the plan so that the peace conference doesn't collapse because of the Serbs.'
The strategy is implemented on the battlefield as well, again according to Karadzic speaking about Gorazde (July 20-21 1993). '[W]e must foresee what will happen and inflame those events, or a day beforehand take measures that will incite senseless measures against us.' Later, in 1993, “[Karadzic] reminisces about having paced events in the pre-war and early wartime period so that each move by [Bosnian President Alija] Izetbegovic was a pretext for a step on the part of the Serbian leadership,” as Dr. Donia summarizes the transcript.
ADMISSION OF CRIMES
The transcripts also include admissions of crimes. On January 8, 1993, Mladic reports to the Assembly about the murder of Hakija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister of the Bosnian Government. Mr. Turajlic was riding in an UNPROFOR armored personnel carrier with a Turkish delegation when the vehicle was stopped by Bosnian Serb soldiers. Mladic says, “In the UNPROFOR vehicle were Lieutenant Sartre, a Frenchman, and Vice President [sic] Hakija Turaljic, of that rump government of BH. Our guys stopped the vehicle and searched them. One of our soldiers killed Turajlic with six bullets.” The transcript then indicates Mladic was interrupted by applause. Mladic responds that they shouldn’t “spread such anti-UNPROFOR sentiment,” because “there are those who work well [with us].” He goes on to say that he will lodge a protest with the UN operation about its being used as a “taxi service.” He says nothing about disciplining the soldier who killed the Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister in cold blood.
The Assembly also discusses destruction of mosques, another violation of the Geneva Conventions. On 9 May 1993, two days after the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka was razed to the ground, Radoslav Brdjanin offered this, “I propose to ban the Satanization of Serbs by Serbs. Please. The main topic in Banja Luka day and night is about the mosque. I don’t say that we must praise them for being destroyed, but you mustn’t cry so much, at least not in our media. For all those who cry, I’ll enlarge a post card in color and they can carry it with them.” Later in 1993, Miroslav Vjestica argues against a Union of Three Republics because a return of Muslim refugees to Veliki Babic would mean “we will have to compensate them for everything that we destroyed and burned there and the 17 mosques we razed to the ground.”
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Later in the war (May 10-11, 1994), Karadzic tells the delegates more about their relationship with UNPROFOR. 'We have instances of exceptionally good relations with UNPROFOR where our officers have sufficient patience and wisdom and those foreign officers eat out of their hands, we have relations with UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, where they fill up trenches, drive them (the Muslims) away from us, and lodge complaints with them; now the Dutch are there . . . .' The reference to UNPROFOR support of the Bosnian Serbs foreshadows the UN's shameful (in)action a little more than a year later.
The excerpted transcripts reveal the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs were influenced by international opinion and actions. The all-out assault on the safe haven of Srebrenica was timed to take advantage of international opinion against the Croats for their military actions in Western Slavonia, according to General Gvero, addressing the Assembly on August 9, 1995. He also speaks of having had to “conduct complete psychological and propaganda operations concerning the resolution of operations in Zepa and Srebrenica” to sway international public opinion. At the same Session, Karadzic recalls pressure to take Srebrenica in 1993. “Had we taken Srebrenica and entered it when [General Phillipe] Morillon was there, they would have bombed us, you know how, with carpet bombing. . . .” Instead, the Bosnian Serbs “wisely” waited for the right moment and overran the safe haven with virtually no resistance (and even assistance) from UN forces.
SREBRENICA
Assembly Sessions following the massacre at Srebrenica are peppered with references to it, as the Bosnian Serb leadership struggled to manage international public opinion (which turned against them following media accounts of Srebrenica and the Markale Marketplace Massacre in Sarajevo), their losses on the ground (Croatia retook much of the area it had lost to the RS early in the war) and Milosevic’s withdrawal of support for continued fighting.
In October 1995, Milorad Dodik (later president of the RS) tells the Assembly, “[O]ur greatest mistake of the war was Srebrenica and Zepa, and someone has to take responsibility for that . . . . Who is responsible?” Dodik felt the attack on the safe area established a precedent for the Croatian Army assault on the Krajina which resulted in loss of considerable territory by the Bosnian Serbs. By attacking safe areas, he said, the RS had ceded its right to complain. This and other excerpts of Assembly Sessions do not reveal remorse at the killing of thousands of civilians in Srebrenica. Only distress at the repercussions and the reversal of fortunes in the war.
Another delegate at the 54th Session attempts a response to Dodik’s question. “Gentlemen, we never wanted to admit that our shells fell [on civilians]. I know personally that neither the High Command nor the Main Staff did that. They never gave such orders, but that was done by some aspiring and irresponsible individuals. We needed [to recognize], and in the future we should recognize, that this happened, but we should say that it was done by irresponsible individuals who will be arrested. Then we just needed to report some sentence as a charade. [emphasis added] Look what Mr. Tudjman does.” While the delegate attempts to exonerate the VRS leadership for the killing of civilians at Srebrenica, he inadvertently implicates all those in the chain of command for failing to take disciplinary action against those “irresponsible individuals” who committed the war crimes.
In an earlier session, within weeks after the Srebrenica massacre, Karadzic (the civilian leader) takes responsibility for ordering the troops to take the safe area of Srebrenica. “The moment came, and with Directive #7, I signaled the taking of Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. Everything was signed and we entered in force. . . . I am for our decisions, and I stand behind them, and the Supreme Commands were recorded, and everything that I ordered, both verbally and in writing, that we go to Zepa and Srebrenica.”
At an October session, he repeats his earlier declaration of responsibility. 'As Supreme Commander, I stood behind plans for Zepa and Srebrenica, mainly for Srebrenica. Zepa was understood. Gentlemen, we would have lost the war had Zepa, with 90,000 armed Muslims, continued to exist. I personally looked over the plans without the knowledge of the General Staff, not intentionally but by coincidence, found General Krstic and advised him to go into the city and proclaim the fall of Srebrenica, and after that we will chase the Turks through the woods. I approved that radical mission, and I feel no remorse for it.'
[emphasis added]
An indication that Karadzic knew the Srebrenica operation violated the laws of war is his cautioning journalists who were present at the Assembly Session not to write about it. Adding, by way of explanation, “I must again point out an example of this court in Nuremberg. . . .” On August 6, 1995, he told the Assembly, “As you know, we had success in Srebrenica and Zepa. There’s nothing to criticize or comment on there. Of course, many stupidities were committed after that, for many Muslim soldiers roamed the surrounding woods, and there we suffered some losses. . . .” At the same session, Karadzic’s intervention shows that Mladic was involved (not just General Krstic) and that the leadership is aware of civilian casualties. 'Lieutenant Colonel Milutinovic . . . gives catastrophic pictures to foreign news agencies. These could cost Mladic if they are shown at the Hague. He allows those who wish, to take pictures of the corpses of women on the streets of Srebrenica and then releases them to foreign media.'
SARAJEVO
“Sarajevo is not in a Muslim state, but in a Serbian state, because everything around is Serbian. . . . Sarajevo has more chance of becoming completely Serbian than completely Muslim. And the most realistic prospect is that Sarajevo will be divided and become two cities. . . . Everything that is Serbian we will retain. For us, Sarajevo integrates eastern Hercegovina, Old Hercegovina, and Romanija. . . . We will create a polycentric development and for such development Serbian Sarajevo is of inestimable importance, and we won’t give it away.”
This 1993 speech by Karadzic illustrates the important role the Bosnian Serbs saw for Sarajevo in the new ethnically pure Serbian state. A divided Sarajevo was the fifth of the six strategic goals Karadzic outlined to the Assembly in May 1992. “The fifth strategic goal is division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of an effective state government in each of these two constituent states.” He goes on to explain the purpose of a divided Sarajevo. “Alija [Izetbegovic] does not have a state while we have a part of Sarajevo . . . . In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps the fighting far away from Krajina, far away from Semberija, far away from the Drina, far away from those areas, where we could possibly have conflicts with Muslims.”
Under questioning by Prosecutor Dermot Groome, Dr. Donia explained further the reasons the RS took a different approach with Sarajevo than with other municipalities, surrounding and bringing it under siege for three years. First, Sarajevo was to be the hub of Serbian lands, connecting various Serbian territories. Second, the siege was intended to isolate the city so the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina couldn’t function.
But Sarajevo was not to be assaulted with heavy weapons which might provoke international intervention. As Dr. Donia summarizes Karadzic’s advice to the Assembly in the fall of 1993, '[H]e says to expect a blood bath in Sarajevo within two years, but he asserts that Serb forces cannot use heavy weapons to destroy the city because of constraints of international law and global media attention.'
Looking back in 1995, Karadzic takes a little different view. 'We surrendered a large territory. True, the JNA helped us plenty, but in some places they hindered us. In Sarajevo they didn't want to do what we sought. They didn't want to give us a unit of tanks so we could do what we wanted. The war would have concluded had the JNA done that.”
Faced with the results of the negotiations in Dayton, on December 17, 1995, Karadzic protests the plan for Sarajevo. “The mission of this republic and its first strategic goal is for us to divide from Muslims and Croats, and no one has the right to create a strategy whereby Serbian Sarajevo remains in a common state. Thus any kind of danger or wish for a connection and solution for Sarajevo is excluded, such that we want to stay with the Muslims and Croats. No one is allowed now to create a new solution to stay together.” Explaining that the leadership had never foreseen that Sarajevo would be a city of shared power, he tells the delegates “[W]e need time for a political solution and a final separation, and at the end of it all, the best solution is that people leave Sarajevo . . . .” For most of the Bosnian Serbs living in and around Sarajevo, that is the solution their leadership imposed upon them.
ABANDONMENT BY MILOSEVIC
After the RS military defeats and international outcry over civilian massacres, voices were raised against Milosevic in the August 6, 1995 Assembly Session, likely because he was pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate an end to the war and withholding further military support. They also criticized Karadzic, who had relieved Mladic of his duties as Commander of the VRS two days before.
One of the critics was Orthodox Bishop Atanasije Jevtic, who argued, 'Karadzic's mistake is that he is too closely tied to the policies of Slobodan Milosevic. Mladic's error is that he has always followed a pro-communist line. . . .” Referring to “that gentleman from Dedinje” [Belgrade neighborhood where Milosevic lived], Atanasije complains, “Now he's listened to again, when he said that except for Serbia and Montenegro, the rest of this will [disappear] into darkness.'
Even Karadzic, Milosevic’s loyal defender, worries about being abandoned by the President of Serbia: 'Milosevic personally told me, 'Zimmerman was here and sought to put down your movement. He wants me to close the border on the Drina. I will never put down my own people.' I remember that and have counted on it, and I never could have a doubt that the border on the Drina would be closed. . . . Just one time, something before 4 August, at one assembly session I said, we will remain alone. . . . . Until that time I never dreamed that we would remain [on our own].'
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
These transcript excerpts make clear that the main goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership was an ethnically pure state for Serbs. To accomplish this, they used war and forced population transfers. In the process, war crimes were committed of which the leadership was well aware, yet there is no evidence that disciplinary action was contemplated or taken. On the contrary, efforts were directed at covering up all such crimes.
The excerpts also show that the Bosnian Serb leadership was influenced by and reactive to policies and opinions of the international community. They used subterfuge and manipulation to stay in favor and appear to have coopted at least a part of UNPROFOR in their ethnic cleansing campaign.
RS President Karadzic admits in the Assembly his direct control over the Bosnian Serb Army, including ordering the assaults on UN protected areas. The transcripts reveal that the Assembly knew about the massacre of civilians, yet Karadzic still maintained, 'I approved that radical mission and I feel no remorse for it,' even while expressing concern about war crimes tribunals (with references to Nuremberg and The Hague).
With regard to Sarajevo, the transcripts indicate the siege was an intentional tactic to isolate the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina from its citizens and armed forces. The city was important to the Bosnian Serbs as a hub to connect all Serbian lands. When their fortunes turned with losses in military actions, international public opinion and Milosevic's support, they called for all Serbs to leave Sarajevo, thus accomplishing a degree of its ethnic cleansing, though not as they had wished.
Milosevic's connection with the above was discussed in CIJ's first article about the transcripts. One important piece that remains missing is a connection between Milosevic and any prior plan for the massacre at Srebrenica. There has been some evidence of his knowledge of the massacre after the fact. His intimate involvement in VRS combat operations (having the ability to stop assaults on Gorazde and Bihac as wrongly timed, according to the transcripts) suggests he may have been involved in planning for Srebrenica as well (though planning a genocidal campaign requires at least another step). Suggestions, of course, are not enough. Much more is required to support the Prosecution's charge of genocide.
Milosevic faces a formidable task in cross examining Dr. Donia about the excerpts he drew from the 10,000 pages of RS Assembly transcripts. His initial efforts will be discussed in a following article. Dr. Donia must return at an unspecified future time for Mr. Milosevic to complete his cross examination.
