Metamorphosis of an Army & Birth of the VRS
Day 219
Metamorphosis of an Army & Birth of the VRS
Day 219
Witness B-127 considered himself a Yugoslav long after there was any hope that the former state would survive. Though he was a Bosnian Muslim by nationality, he remained a member of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) for years after it had become the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and withdrawn from his native Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving behind men and materiel for the Bosnian Serbs. He was considered to be an officer in the newly-formed army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), but he carried a VJ military I.D. and continued to receive his salary, benefits and promotions from VJ authorities through the VJ's 30th Personnel Center in Banja Luka. About 90% of his unit did so as well.
B-127's testimony, and the numerous supporting documents he authenticated, painted a picture of a multi-ethnic federal army metamorphosing into a Serb-dominated army and, on the territory of Bosnia, becoming a subsidiary army to the transformed JNA/VJ. In April 1992, the JNA withdrew from Bosnia. With international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, Yugoslavia ceased to exist, and its army ceased to exist, as well. But this was not a peaceful breakup and there was no negotiated solution as to the distribution of the army's resources, its men and materiel.
On first glance, what happened appears to have an internal logic. Army personnel who originated from Bosnia remained in Bosnia, along with weapons and equipment, while personnel originating from Serbia and Montenegro returned to the FRY to continue their service. Most of those from Croatia and other parts of the former state had long since returned to their home ground. For the most part, the nationalities also separated, joining the military forces of their ethnicity or newly independent republic. There was no equal division of materiel.
This apparently 'natural' separation provided Milosevic and other political leaders with plausible deniability. They could say it was a natural phenomenon rather than the result of a well-planned strategy. What was not 'natural,' however, was the continuing connection between the VJ and only one of the former army's constituent parts -- the newly-formed army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). In addition to turning over weapons, ammunition and equipment to the VRS and military personnel originating from Bosnia, the VJ continued to pay the salaries and benefits of its former officers and men, now ostensibly part of the VRS.
B-127 was unusual in that he was a Bosnian Muslim who did not join the Bosnian Government forces, but remained with the JNA's successor in Bosnia, the VRS. In fact, he testified, 'From 1992-95, wartime, on all grounds that constitute the position of an officer and rank, duties and rights, I considered myself . . . a member of the VJ.' He continued to receive his salary from Belgrade, and his retirement benefits were calculated according to VJ regulations and FRY law. His regular promotions were also made under VJ regulations and FRY law. His personnel records state that he was serving in Belgrade, though he testified he was never there during the war.
The witness was not unique among 'former' VJ officers and men who remained in Bosnia. The Prosecution introduced a number of documents, including personnel records for Dragan Obrenovic, Vinko Pandurevic and other VRS officers, showing that the VJ regulated their pensions, promotions and housing.
On cross examination, Milosevic attempted to characterize Belgrade's continuing role with its 'former' officers and men in the VRS as one of providing aid. FRY and the VJ were merely assuring that military personnel continued to receive accrued and present social benefits, Milosevic suggested. These humanitarian measures were only taken on behalf of 'former' JNA personnel who subsequently served in the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb armies. Other former JNA personnel did not receive this assistance.
In addition to continued FRY and VJ support of personnel in the VRS, the VJ and VRS were operationally unified. According to the witness and a document the Prosecution produced, the two armies maintained a unified air surveillance system after the JNA's withdrawal and throughout the war. Before 1991, B-127 testified, the JNA had a centralized air defense system, headquartered in Bihac, a predominantly Muslim area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the JNA withdrawal, it was relocated to Banja Luka, also in Bosnia but under Bosnian Serb control. The data link between the FRY and RS was maintained so that each had automatic and immediate access to the radar surveillance of the other.
Milosevic challenged that this exchange of information showed the VRS and VJ constituted a unified army. He asked the witness, if it was a unified army, why did the VRS not take part in defending FRY against NATO 'aggression' in 1999? B-127 pointed out that the VRS, at that time, was under direct control of SFOR, the NATO Stabilization Force.
On re-examination, Prosecutor Dermot Groome asked the witness to read a further portion of the document that Milosevic maintained only dealt with exchange of information between the VRS and VJ. The document, approved by Ratko Mladic, also addressed coordinated action plans, joint plans, joint use of forces and exchange of officers for coordinated actions, as well as stipulating that exchange of information for these purposes would be considered a combat operation. The document was not an order, the witness said, but instructions on what should be done. It did not show that Mladic had command authority over the army of the RSK (Republic of Serbia Krajina) and the VJ. But it suggests that someone did. Because of B-127's non-combat assignment, he had no knowledge of actual joint operations or operations with VJ participation.
Milosevic pointed out that FRY's payment of salaries and benefits for VJ personnel continued until 2000, long after the war ended. He argued this showed FRY's support had nothing to do with war. What he neglected to say is that FRY only ceased supporting the VRS when it was forced to do so by the international community.
In what appeared as an afterthought, but was clearly not, Mr. Groome established a further link with his last questions of B-127. Referring to Obrenovic's and Pandurevic's personnel files where it was indicated that both had received extraordinary promotions, he asked the witness to explain. B-127 testified that an extraordinary promotion is a premature promotion awarded for certain activities. Groome followed up, 'It is public record that Mr. Pandurevic was indicted for crimes [committed in Srebrenica] in July 1995 and Mr. Obrenovic recently pled guilty [for crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995].' He then asked the witness to read the date of their promotions. '31 December 1995,' the witness answered.
With these two questions Mr. Groome established that two officers involved in the massacre of 7000 to 10,000 men and boys in Srebrenica (one allegedly, the other by his own admission) received extraordinary promotions with approval of the VJ five months later. While the Prosecution has yet to present its Srebrenica case, some important pieces are falling into place.
As for witness B-127, when given the opportunity by the prosecution, he said he had voluntarily come forward to testify. He wrote a letter to ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, indicating that he had information that could be of assistance in the Milosevic trial. While he did not give his motive for testifying, perhaps it can be found in his explanation that he remained in the VRS because he still believed in Yugoslavia. 'If that country were to be formed again tomorrow, I would not mind laying down my life for it.' Quite a number did, and, as Stjepan Kljuic testified a few days ago, the tragedy was that 'Milosevic formally advocated Yugoslavia and did everything for it to cease.'
B-127's testimony, and the numerous supporting documents he authenticated, painted a picture of a multi-ethnic federal army metamorphosing into a Serb-dominated army and, on the territory of Bosnia, becoming a subsidiary army to the transformed JNA/VJ. In April 1992, the JNA withdrew from Bosnia. With international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, Yugoslavia ceased to exist, and its army ceased to exist, as well. But this was not a peaceful breakup and there was no negotiated solution as to the distribution of the army's resources, its men and materiel.
On first glance, what happened appears to have an internal logic. Army personnel who originated from Bosnia remained in Bosnia, along with weapons and equipment, while personnel originating from Serbia and Montenegro returned to the FRY to continue their service. Most of those from Croatia and other parts of the former state had long since returned to their home ground. For the most part, the nationalities also separated, joining the military forces of their ethnicity or newly independent republic. There was no equal division of materiel.
This apparently 'natural' separation provided Milosevic and other political leaders with plausible deniability. They could say it was a natural phenomenon rather than the result of a well-planned strategy. What was not 'natural,' however, was the continuing connection between the VJ and only one of the former army's constituent parts -- the newly-formed army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). In addition to turning over weapons, ammunition and equipment to the VRS and military personnel originating from Bosnia, the VJ continued to pay the salaries and benefits of its former officers and men, now ostensibly part of the VRS.
B-127 was unusual in that he was a Bosnian Muslim who did not join the Bosnian Government forces, but remained with the JNA's successor in Bosnia, the VRS. In fact, he testified, 'From 1992-95, wartime, on all grounds that constitute the position of an officer and rank, duties and rights, I considered myself . . . a member of the VJ.' He continued to receive his salary from Belgrade, and his retirement benefits were calculated according to VJ regulations and FRY law. His regular promotions were also made under VJ regulations and FRY law. His personnel records state that he was serving in Belgrade, though he testified he was never there during the war.
The witness was not unique among 'former' VJ officers and men who remained in Bosnia. The Prosecution introduced a number of documents, including personnel records for Dragan Obrenovic, Vinko Pandurevic and other VRS officers, showing that the VJ regulated their pensions, promotions and housing.
On cross examination, Milosevic attempted to characterize Belgrade's continuing role with its 'former' officers and men in the VRS as one of providing aid. FRY and the VJ were merely assuring that military personnel continued to receive accrued and present social benefits, Milosevic suggested. These humanitarian measures were only taken on behalf of 'former' JNA personnel who subsequently served in the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb armies. Other former JNA personnel did not receive this assistance.
In addition to continued FRY and VJ support of personnel in the VRS, the VJ and VRS were operationally unified. According to the witness and a document the Prosecution produced, the two armies maintained a unified air surveillance system after the JNA's withdrawal and throughout the war. Before 1991, B-127 testified, the JNA had a centralized air defense system, headquartered in Bihac, a predominantly Muslim area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the JNA withdrawal, it was relocated to Banja Luka, also in Bosnia but under Bosnian Serb control. The data link between the FRY and RS was maintained so that each had automatic and immediate access to the radar surveillance of the other.
Milosevic challenged that this exchange of information showed the VRS and VJ constituted a unified army. He asked the witness, if it was a unified army, why did the VRS not take part in defending FRY against NATO 'aggression' in 1999? B-127 pointed out that the VRS, at that time, was under direct control of SFOR, the NATO Stabilization Force.
On re-examination, Prosecutor Dermot Groome asked the witness to read a further portion of the document that Milosevic maintained only dealt with exchange of information between the VRS and VJ. The document, approved by Ratko Mladic, also addressed coordinated action plans, joint plans, joint use of forces and exchange of officers for coordinated actions, as well as stipulating that exchange of information for these purposes would be considered a combat operation. The document was not an order, the witness said, but instructions on what should be done. It did not show that Mladic had command authority over the army of the RSK (Republic of Serbia Krajina) and the VJ. But it suggests that someone did. Because of B-127's non-combat assignment, he had no knowledge of actual joint operations or operations with VJ participation.
Milosevic pointed out that FRY's payment of salaries and benefits for VJ personnel continued until 2000, long after the war ended. He argued this showed FRY's support had nothing to do with war. What he neglected to say is that FRY only ceased supporting the VRS when it was forced to do so by the international community.
In what appeared as an afterthought, but was clearly not, Mr. Groome established a further link with his last questions of B-127. Referring to Obrenovic's and Pandurevic's personnel files where it was indicated that both had received extraordinary promotions, he asked the witness to explain. B-127 testified that an extraordinary promotion is a premature promotion awarded for certain activities. Groome followed up, 'It is public record that Mr. Pandurevic was indicted for crimes [committed in Srebrenica] in July 1995 and Mr. Obrenovic recently pled guilty [for crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995].' He then asked the witness to read the date of their promotions. '31 December 1995,' the witness answered.
With these two questions Mr. Groome established that two officers involved in the massacre of 7000 to 10,000 men and boys in Srebrenica (one allegedly, the other by his own admission) received extraordinary promotions with approval of the VJ five months later. While the Prosecution has yet to present its Srebrenica case, some important pieces are falling into place.
As for witness B-127, when given the opportunity by the prosecution, he said he had voluntarily come forward to testify. He wrote a letter to ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, indicating that he had information that could be of assistance in the Milosevic trial. While he did not give his motive for testifying, perhaps it can be found in his explanation that he remained in the VRS because he still believed in Yugoslavia. 'If that country were to be formed again tomorrow, I would not mind laying down my life for it.' Quite a number did, and, as Stjepan Kljuic testified a few days ago, the tragedy was that 'Milosevic formally advocated Yugoslavia and did everything for it to cease.'
