Tajiks Seek Best Deal in Defence Talks With Moscow
Leading Russian analyst says Tajikistan’s leaders overestimate how much they can pressure world powers to secure lucrative military base deals.
Tajiks Seek Best Deal in Defence Talks With Moscow
Leading Russian analyst says Tajikistan’s leaders overestimate how much they can pressure world powers to secure lucrative military base deals.
Arkady Dubnov
Political analyst with Moskovskie Novosti newspaper.
As Tajikistan finalises a new security treaty with Moscow, a leading analyst says Russia has good reason to worry about the flow of heroin coming its way via the Tajik-Afghan border.
Arkady Dubnov, a Moscow-based political analyst with the Moskovskie Novosti newspaper and a long-term expert on Central Asian affairs, told IWPR that while Moscow was mainly concerned about security on the Afghan border, Tajik leaders appeared to be trying to wring the maximum possible financial benefits from future defence deals.
A final agreement on Russian support for security on the Tajik-Afghan border is expected to be signed in September, when Russian president Dmitry Medvedev arrives for a summit of regional heads of state, 20 years after the founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russian troops patrolled the Afghan border until as late as 2005, when they were replaced by Tajiks. Since then, Moscow has provided 300 advisors to support the Tajik frontier service.
As the current arrangement came up for renegotiation at the beginning of this year, there were media reports that the Russian government wanted to redeploy its own forces along the 1,344 frontier, which is supposed to be a bastion against heroin exports and general instability emanating from Afghanistan.
But it is now clear that the Tajik leadership is not going to agree to Russia reasserting control of the border. An anonymous official quoted by the Asia Plus news agency on August 11 said the current arrangements involving military advisers, training assistance and equipment supplies would not change.
Tajik and Russian officials have also been discussing two other key defence issues – the two-decade-long presence of Russia’s 201st army division in Tajikistan, which comes up for renewal or annulment in 2014, and the possibility that Moscow might use the Ayni airfield as a platform for military aircraft. The Tajiks are likely to charge lease payments on the airfield, whereas the army base is currently rent-free.
IWPR began by asking Dubnov what the key concerns were for Russia and Tajikistan, respectively.
Arkady Dubnov: It’s hard to single out one single area of importance to Tajikistan, which currently has to navigate a way between Scylla and Charybdis – on the one hand, maintaining its independence, both militarily and politically, and on the other, earning money out of its geographical and geopolitical location, which international political players see as desirable.
Take the 201st division.… I don’t believe Moscow will ultimately insist on keeping it there if Tajikistan demands payment for allowing it to do so. It’s hard to say who is right or wrong here. We know that Moscow believes Dushanbe should bear in mind that it’s been supplying the Tajik army with weapons and equipment at discounted price and sometimes free of charge over many years. So it doesn’t think Dushanbe has a moral right to start demanding payment [for the army base].
IWPR: You’re saying that it’s really Tajikistan which benefits most from the continued presence of the Russian army?
Dubnov: Yes, I think that’s the case. The Russian army base is an important source of employment for the local population. Meanwhile, what does Russia actually get out of it these days, in military or political terms?
Turning to the Ayni airbase, it seems to me that on the one hand, Moscow is seeking to secure the base for itself, and on the other, it wants to ensure no one else gets hold of it.
IWPR: Some analysts say Tajikistan would prefer to lease the Ayni base to the United States rather than Russia. Is that true?
Dubnov: I think the truth lies somewhere in between. If the Americans withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, they will need some kind of infrastructure so as to be able to control the situation along Afghanistan’s borders. So the Ayni base could be a useful location for them…. Under certain circumstances, Russia might agree to the Americans using Ayni given that Moscow is an ally and partner in the US war on terror.
IWPR: The most hotly debated defence issue is Moscow’s reported wish to reinstate its border guards in Tajikistan. How convincing, then, are the diplomatically phrased assurances from Russian officials that they respect Tajikistan’s sovereignty over its borders?
Dubnov: You know, I am inclined to agree with the concerns the Russian government has voiced about the dangers posed by drug trafficking across this [Tajik-Afghan] frontier. Over several years, Moscow has constantly raised this issue as well as taking steps and proposing initiatives – including joint ones with the Americans – to halt Afghan drug production and trafficking.
Of course it’s a porous border, and that may be what’s motivating Moscow to seek to re-establish control, although there could also be [other] reasons – a pretext to restore Soviet-era frontiers.
IWPR: How successful will Dushanbe be in trying to extract financial benefits from cooperation on defence matters?
Dubnov: When the American military base in Kyrgyzstan was set up in [December 2001], the Kyrgyz won the lottery, as it were. The Americans are prepared to pay, and over time the Kyrgyz have successfully won higher rental payments for the base. But I don’t think it’s fair to compare that situation with the Russian base in Tajikistan, which is a legacy of the Soviet era.
IWPR: Some analysts argue that the difficulties in these security-sector negotiations reflect the Tajik leadership’s unhappiness at what it sees as Russia’s failure to support it in its dispute with Uzbekistan, which opposes plans to complete the Roghun hydroelectric dam scheme. There’s also a feeling that Russian investment isn’t as high as Dushanbe would wish.
Dubnov: Mr Rahmon is known for taking frequent and deep offence at Russian leaders. He talks about it at length with western diplomats, as WikiLeaks reports show. Maybe he has got reasons to be unhappy, but I’m not sure whether his demands are fair.
I’ve been watching the Tajik leadership’s stance and policies over the last 20 years, and I’ve said publicly on several occasions that Dushanbe overestimates its influence in the region and in the world.
Why does Kyrgyzstan manage to obtain extra benefits in the shape of loans and investment? It’s about the domestic politics – there’s political competition between various forces that curry favour with Moscow by promising [closer alignment] if they come to power. As we know, there’s nothing of the kind in Tajikistan. There isn’t any serious elite capable of challenging Rahmon by competing for Moscow’s attention.
The Russian leadership’s attitude to the somewhat authoritarian regime of President Rahmon and his family cooled a long time ago.
IWPR: How do you see Tajik-Russian defence ties progressing?
Dubnov: I don’t personally see reason to believe the present close cooperation can continue. We might end up seeking [a situation] where no international player is prepared to deal with Dushanbe on the terms it wants.
IWPR: Can you explain what you mean by that?
Dubnov: The constant refrain from Dushanbe is that if things go wrong with the Russians, they can always try with the Americans. It’s obvious game-playing.
When Foreign Minister [Hamrohon] Zarifi… says that Moscow doesn’t have rights of ownership in perpetuity over the [201st base] territory, it looks like the calculating behaviour of a player who’s hoping another partner might take him up on it and offer a higher price.
Lola Olimova is IWPR editor in Tajikistan.
