Witness Claims Bosnian Politicians Undermined Authority of Army Commanders

A retired Bosnian general testifying in the case of General Rasim Delic told the tribunal this week that the late Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, interfered with military orders and sanctioned financial incentives for some disobedient commanders.



Vahid Karavelic described how his efforts to discipline a district official for financially rewarding commanders in his region were undermined by the president.



“I called him [the official] to task very vigorously, as a soldier. He was very frightened. Later on he complained to President Izetbegovic. Izetbegovic then took me to task and… [attempted] to reconcile the two of us,” Karavelic told the court.



Delic was head of the Bosnian army during the war in this country and stands accused of failing to prevent or punish his troops’ crimes against Serb and Croat prisoners between 1993 and 1995. According to the indictment, Delic knew of executions and abuse but did not stop them or discipline those responsible.



Karavelic testified this week about the state of the Bosnian army during 1993 when Delic was put in charge. The witness’ evidence reinforced the defence’s argument that some military detachments were not under the command of Delic and that Izetbegovic had “direct control over some units”.



He told the court that the incident concerning the district official had come about due to a new law passed in April 1992 to involve civilians in the war effort. He said the law had led to “numerous problems because of the interference of civilian bodies and district chiefs in the control and command of [military] units”.



Answering questions put to him by Judge Bacone Maloto, Karavelic said that by reprimanding him for disciplining an unruly subordinate, “President Izetbegovic was also undermining the war effort.”



According to Karavelic, financial incentives offered to certain commanders diminished troops’ spirit throughout the Bosnian army.



“It turns out the disobedient ones (commanders) were being rewarded, directly impacting on the moral in other brigades,” he said.



And it was the army’s chain of command, he said, that particularly suffered, “If ..certain individuals are financially rewarded and.. are negative characters this has a severe impact on command and control.”



Such a breakdown in the chain of command, said Karavelic, was evident when Izetbegovic took him to task. Izebegovic rebuked him personally, rather than through Delic as army chief, as should have been the case according to military protocol.



“He [Delic] did not have anything to do with it,” said Karavelic.



Karavelic went on to tell the court about the “burning problem” of how to properly train and discipline troops and achieve a satisfactory level of discipline within the Bosnian army. According to him, most commanders in charge of military units in Sarajevo in 1993 “had no military education whatsoever”. He also said that many had criminal records before entering the army.



But Karavelic told the court that Delic was well aware of the problem and did his utmost to address it.



“I say this with absolute certainty…He (Delic) required that anyone who did not observe army discipline be removed. From his first to his last day in the army, he invested every effort to build up discipline.”



The witness also corroborated the defence’s position that it was the corps commanders and not Delic, as head of the army, who were directly responsible for independent military units.



The former army chief is charged with responsibility for crimes committed by a unit of foreign Muslim fighters known as the El Mujahed detachment that was incorporated into the Bosnian army. The El Mujahed are alleged to have committed acts that included decapitating a prisoner and torturing and killing a number of Serb and Croat detainees.



The witness told how a plan was made at a meeting of military commanders in October 1993 to bring such autonomous units under the army’s control.



“The conclusion made was that these independent units, at all costs, should be assigned to various units of the corps so that they could be placed under control more easily in the period that followed,” he said.



Asked by defence lawyer Vasvija Vidovic why such a small unit had to be integrated into the corps, Karavelic replied, “According to military rules, the staff commander deals with the corps commander and it is up to the corps commander to fulfil whatever request he receives from above and integrate the smaller units within the corps.”



Karavelic said it was the corps commander, and not the head of the army as alleged, who made decisions about the use of these units in combat.



The defence this week further argued that the Bosnian army was not fit for purpose when Delic took charge. Vidovic presented a document to the court, signed by Delic, which assessed the state of the Bosnian army when he became chief of staff in 1993.



The document pointed to “an absence of clearly defined aims of armed combat” and to the fact that the supreme command staff had “not been established properly”.



Confirming the contents of this analysis, Karavelic said that there was “a failure to provide basic necessities, especially a system of command and control”.



“These are vital issues; prerequisites without which the commander of supreme staff was unable to charter a course to follow,” he said.



Simon Jennings is an IWPR reporter in The Hague.