Turkey Votes: Normalisation With Armenia Will Continue

Richard Giragosian

Armenian American academic

Friday, 19 May, 2023

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As Turkey prepares for a second-round runoff presidential election on May 28, much of the world is eagerly watching and waiting for the outcome.

Incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces the biggest challenge of his two decades in power. A win of the six-party opposition alliance led by Kemal Kılıcdaroğlu would shift the country’s political course, with major repercussions on regional security and strategic relations with Russia and the West.

The vote looms large over the country’s immediate neighbours in the South Caucasus, bracing for impact ranging from both the relationship with Azerbaijan, which considers Turkey a fraternal nation, and concerning the outlook for Armenia-Turkey “normalisation.”

In the first round of voting on May 14, Erdogan both succeeded and failed.  The challenge from the opposition was less than expected, but at the same time, neither candidate secured a clear majority of votes, thereby necessitating a run-off. 

It is important to remember that the first round of the Turkish contest consisted of two distinct elections, for parliament as well as president.  In this separate parliamentary ballot the ruling AK Party garnered a surprisingly easier victory and retained its working majority,

Against that backdrop, the impact of the vote offers a binary assessment, with two clear alternative scenarios.  The first, featuring a reelection win for Erdogan, presents more of a continuation of status quo policies, with much less change in Turkish foreign policy. 

Under the second scenario, defined by an opposition win, the broader impact on Turkey’s policies toward the West and Russia will be substantial, with a related modification of the Turkish approach to the countries of the South Caucasus. 

Both scenarios, however, present starkly different repercussions for Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

ONE NATION, TWO STATES

For Azerbaijan, there is great concern that Baku may lose Erdogan as its long-time friend and supporter.  This is also seen in Azerbaijan’s rush to conclude a “peace treaty” with Armenia before the possible demise of Erdogan’s guaranteed support for his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev. 

This also means that an opposition win will directly undercut Turkish backing for Azerbaijan’s maximalist position in threatening Armenia. In the absence of any effective deterrence, Azerbaijan may become more restrained and reluctant in its bellicose threats towards Armenia.  

For years, the strategic relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan was rooted in close ties based on cultural and linguistic affinity and a shared Turkic identity.  In what became known as “one nation, two states,” this relationship gradually changed, however.  After the emergence of a new degree of asymmetry in recent years, it was Azerbaijan that secured the upper hand in the relationship with Turkey.  Based on economic power and energy-related influence, the Azerbaijani leadership determined and drove Turkish policies in the Caucasus.

From that perspective, there has been a degree of mounting frustration in Ankara that Baku has been able to limit and leverage Turkish policy options.  This suggests that no matter who wins the Turkish presidency, there is bound to be more strain on the Turkey alliance with Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy will continue to be guided by fundamental directives, with one important pillar defined by a commitment to Azerbaijan.  In this context, no matter who wins the election, the next Turkish president will be unwilling and quite unable to introduce any new sudden policy shift toward Azerbaijan.  And in terms of alliance politics, even if it wanted to Ankara would be hard pressed to undermine its relationship with Baku.

For Armenia, however, the Turkish vote has a less direct impact.  The process of normalisation will continue no matter who wins, with only slight variance or deviation in style but not substance in Turkey’s approach toward Armenia. 

The related reasons for such a direct impact from the presidential election on normalisation with Armenia is evident in the weakened and marginal position of civil society in Turkey, which can no longer advocate in favour of improved relations.  In this way, an opposition victory offers hope for a resurrection of Turkish civil society and an end to the authoritarian nature of Erdogan’s Turkey.

The possible victory of the opposition will likely return a degree of normalcy in Turkish foreign policy, reverting to its traditional ties to the West - and with the US and NATO in particular - and embarking on a course correction in the Turkish relationship with Russia, moving Ankara much further away from Moscow.  And this outcome will alter the style and substance of Turkish relations with Armenia.

Moreover, the outlook for the process of normalisation is also bolstered by the pre-election domestic environment, as the Armenia issue now appears much less politically sensitive in domestic politics than it once was.  This adds fresh optimism to the domestic political calculation for fulfilling expectations from the normalisation process, no matter who wins.

Yet the Turkish vote come in the immediate aftermath of a significant missed opportunity inherent in a recent breakthrough due to so-called earthquake diplomacy. Following the shock that struck southern and central Turkey on February 6, Ankara ended its three-decade policy of sealing its border with Armenia.

Of course, Turkey’s move to re-open the border for the first time since 1993 was largely driven by necessity over goodwill, to quickly facilitate the influx of Armenian humanitarian aid and the arrival of a disaster response team.  Yet this was a missed opportunity as Turkey quickly reversed course, closing the borders yet again.

At the same time, the election discourse demonstrated that the Armenia issue now appears much less politically sensitive in national politics than it once was.  This adds fresh optimism to the domestic political calculation for fulfilling expectations from the normalisation process.

The process remains frail. On May 3, Ankara closed its airspace to Armenian flights heading to a third destination in response to the unveiling of a controversial monument in Yerevan. The memorial is dedicated to members of the so-called Operation Nemesis, a programme to assassinate Ottoman Turkish officials responsible for mass killings of ethnic Armenians during World War One, which Yerevan says constituted a genocide. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu said Turkey would take further steps if the monument was not removed.

Overall, the election will most importantly determine the future of Turkey itself. And for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two possible scenarios of a victory or defeat of Erdogan will pose significant challenges in the coming months and years.