Kyrgyz Debate Blueprint for Change
Draft constitution provides sound basis for shift to parliamentary system, but must translate into real reform.
Kyrgyz Debate Blueprint for Change
Draft constitution provides sound basis for shift to parliamentary system, but must translate into real reform.
The draft constitution unveiled by Kyrgyzstan’s new leaders sets out the foundations for transforming a political system dominated by the president rule into a parliamentary democracy. It remains to be seen, however, whether this attempt at constitutional reform will actually result in a truly representative body.
The obstacles that lie in the way of this lofty ambition are to be found in the current political environment, where the government is dominated by yesterday’s opposition parties. They appear to be bolstering their position to such a degree that they could take control of the legislature to be elected this October, at the expense of other political forces.
Furthermore, the draft constitution, as it stands now, contains certain provisions that fall somewhat short of democratic standards.
Those behind the document, which the interim government promulgated on April 26, believe it will safeguard the country from power again being concentrated in the hands of its president.
The draft was written by a working group consisting of six people – two legal experts and two translators to provide texts in Kyrgyz and Russian – and led by Omurbek Tekebaev, the leader of the Ata Meken party who has been given the task of pushing through constitutional reform.
It is the eighth attempt at reform since post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan got its first constitution in 1993. All past amendments have been initiated by the then heads of state, and inevitably resulted in stronger powers for the president and less authority for parliament and government.
The popular unrest on April 6-7 that ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiev was, like the Tulip Revolution of March 2005 that deposed his predecessor Askar Akaev, were expressions of anger at this concentration of power, which had left not just the president but their family members in de facto control of the country.
More than 80 people died during the April 2010 disturbances, which started in the northern Talas region and culminated in protests on the streets of the capital Bishkek, as crowds tried to storm the White House or government building.
Bakiev’s departure gave his opponents from the leading opposition parties – the Social Democratic Party, Ata Meken and Ak Shumkar – a free hand to take over and form an interim administration.
The draft constitution makes it quite clear that political decision-making must devolve to parliament. The president’s role is to be reduced to that of nominal head of state, whose job is confined to giving the seal of approval to decisions and appointments made by parliament and government.
In addition, the president will only be allowed to stand for one term in office.
In terms of making new laws, the president loses a lot of influence. He or she can no longer, for example, call a referendum or initiate new legislation. The presidential right to veto laws has been also curbed, and in any case parliament will have powers to overturn such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote. At that point, the disputed legislation automatically enters into force without requiring the president’s signature.
The right to propose laws is vested instead in parliament, in the government, and in the people of Kyrgyzstan. It becomes much easier to submit a public proposal for a new law as this will require only 10,000 signatures, whereas three times that number used to be needed.
The head of state no longer appoints judges, as was formerly the case, and instead merely approves candidatures put forward by the proposed National Council for Judicial Affairs.
The old Constitutional Court is dissolved, and constitutional matters are instead referred to the Supreme Court, which thus becomes the highest court in the land, and elects a chairperson and deputy chairs from among its own judges.
Under the draft constitution, the majority group in parliament proposes a prime minister. If legislators subsequently express no confidence in the government, the president can veto this move once, but on a second attempt, the cabinet must stand down.
Finally, the president no longer controls the security agencies or foreign policy matters, and is not allowed to address the nation unless he or she does so in parliament.
Parliamentary seats will be filled via elections based on proportional representation. There may be more seats to fill – the plan is to expand parliament from 90 to perhaps 120 members, although this is still open to question as it will depend on the funds available.
In the interests of pluralism, the constitutional draft makes an attempt to distribute parliamentary posts more equitably than before. The deputy speakers will be selected from all the parties represented, unlike the previous system where these positions were held by members of Bakiev’s Ak Jol party. Moreover, minority parties will be assigned the chairmanships of key committees dealing with the budget and law enforcement.
To ensure fair elections, the draft constitution proposes that the Central Electoral Commission’s membership is fully representative and reflects the mix of candidates backed by the president, the dominant party and minority parties.
There is also a provision forbidding any law that tends towards restricting freedom of expression and the media.
Despite all these checks and balances, introducing a parliamentary system cannot provide an absolute guarantee that the political system will become more democratic, that civil society will prosper, or that the economy will recover.
The question now is whether the current arrangement of political power could overshadow ambitions to build fully democratic institutions. There is a risk, for instance, that the handful of parties now dominant in the interim administration could end up holding the presidency, top jobs in government, and the majority in parliament.
All the key posts in the interim government are occupied by members of the Social Democratic Party, Ata Meken and Ak Shumkar, all of them opposition parties when Bakiev was in power. They have been accused of displaying political bias by handing out public-sector jobs to their members.
Civil society activists are already expressing concern that this drive to install supporters and consolidate power could have a negative impact on the October elections, giving the insider parties an unfair advantage.
The nature of political parties in Kyrgyzstan is itself a problem. Political groupings tend to be formed not around ideas, but out of regional and tribal allegiances. In the last two decades, political groups have also been focused around strong personalities, often businessmen keen to convert their wealth into political clout.
Regrettably, the new text carries over some provisions from the current constitution that it could well have done without. One example if this is a rule that all presidential candidates have to sit a test to see whether they are fluent in Kyrgyz. Introduced in 1995, this language clause it was used by sitting leaders to weed out strong challengers, even when the latter manifestly had a good command of Kyrgyz.
Proposed changes to the current draft can be submitted until May 14, and will be reviewed by the Constitutional Conference, a 50-member body being set up to agree a final version. After that, a final text is expected to be published on May 19, in time for a national referendum on the constitution set for June 27. That should mean the constitution is in place ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for October.
Pavel Dyatlenko is a political analyst with the Polis Asia think-tank in Bishkek.
This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.
The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign Ministry of Norway.