Could Central Asian Insurgents in Syria Present a New Regional Threat?

In early January, Tajik national Saifiddin Tojiboev was reportedly appointed head of operational headquarters in the ministry of defence of the new Syrian government. 

The 41-year-old, a native of Spitamen district in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, was one of the commanders of the militant wing of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a group allied with the ruling Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) movement. Most of the group's fighters are from Central Asian countries. 

Tojiboev's reportedly high position is recognition that the contribution of Central Asians to defeating Bashar al-Assad was significant. Following the fall of that regime, questions remain over the future of these foreign fighters, with fears that they could pose a significant future security threat.

Considering the high mobility of these foreign jihadists, it can be argued that this threat extends to the entire Middle East, Africa, and the global community.

There is little verified data on the number of Central Asian citizens who are currently in various military formations in Syria. Media reports have focused on citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, although there are also fighters from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan among the insurgents. 

In November 2018, the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan reported that about 1,900 Tajik citizens had travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight in Islamist organisations in recent years. 

Tojiboev was among them. Previously a member of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), for a time he even headed a party cell in Spitamen district.

Dushanbe declared the IRPT a terrorist organisation in 2015 and dozens of its activists, including many leaders, were imprisoned. The IRPT itself rejected accusations of involvement in terrorism and considered the allegations politically charged.

In Tajikistan, Tojiboev remains on the list of individuals charged with terrorism and the authorities have previously accused him of recruiting Tajik citizens “into the ranks of terrorist groups”. 

A source in Tajikistan's security services told local media on January 5 that they were aware of Tojiboyev's appointment. He said Tojiboev travelled to Syria with his brother in 2013.

Most Tajik nationals who travelled to the region joined the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) group.

They included Gulmurod Khalimov, a former commander of the Tajik interior ministry's special purposes mobile unit, who was reportedly even appointed IS so-called minister of war.

In August 2016, the US described Khalimov as a “key leader” in IS and announced a three million US dollar reward for information about him. The following month, following the death of IS chief strategist Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, Khalimov was described as the second most important person in IS after its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to media reports, Khalimov was killed in an airstrike in Mosul in April 2017. 

Following the defeat of IS, some Central Asia militants relocated to Afghanistan, where they joined the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-KP), an IS affiliate operating in Afghanistan. 

In a 2019 UN report presented to the Security Council, another native of Tajikistan, Sayvali Shafiyev, was named as the leader of ISKP.

The report stated that the group, which operates in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, had more than 200 fighters. According to UN experts, Shafiyev was also recruiting new fighters for the ISKP and fundraising online.

Another influential Tajik national, Shamil Hukumatov, was also one of the leaders of the ISKP. In June 2023, he was arrested in Istanbul, where he was raising money and recruiting new fighters for ISKP. 

Lucas Webber, a researcher at the Soufan Centre, an international intelligence organisation, has stated that IS-Khorasan “expanded its influence in Central Asia following the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan”.

Central Asians have also been involved in a number of international terror attacks in recent years. 

In July 2023, Germany and the Netherlands detained six Tajik nationals on suspicion of terrorism and in January 2024 Tajik nationals were also suspected of carrying out attacks in Kerman and Shiraz in Iran. On March 22, 2024, Tajik migrants, apparently acting on the instructions of IS operatives, attacked the Crocus City Hall near Moscow killing more than 100 people. Last summer, eight men from Tajikistan were arrested in the US for alleged ties with IS, while in November 2024, three Uzbek nationals were arrested in the UAE on suspicion of murdering Israeli-Moldovan rabbi Zvi Kogan.

Regarding Central Asians in Syria, there are several possible scenarios, each with its own risks. 

One is that the Damascus authorities, under pressure from the international community and in order to preserve internal stability, will decide to expel foreign fighters. 
 

There are already voices in Syria demanding this. Following rumours that it was foreign fighters who set fire to a Christmas tree in a Christian neighbourhood in Damascus, a December 23 protest heard locals chant slogans against the presence of foreign fighters in Syria.

“Syria is free, non-Syrians must leave,” protesters said.

Most foreign fighters are unlikely to abandon the idea of jihad, and will probably relocate to other conflict zones, as happened following the defeat of IS. For Central Asian militants, the most probable destination is Afghanistan, where ideologically aligned IS factions are already active. However, other destinations such as Mali, cannot be ruled out. 

There are also widespread concerns in Central Asia that citizens who fought in foreign wars might return and attempt to cause serious unrest, although there have been no public announcements as to policy. In recent years, Central Asian governments have returned hundreds of fighters and their family members from Iraq and Syria, attempting to reintegrate them.

The situation is exacerbated by diminishing economic opportunities at home accompanied by worsening conditions for Central Asian migrants in Russia. This group has long been a key recruitment pool for radical Islamist groups; Dushanbe claims most Tajiks who fought abroad were recruited from the ranks of labour migrants.

It is also crucial not to overlook the presence of sleeper cells of radical Islamic group supporters in Central Asia, who actively recruit new members and orchestrate terrorist attacks both within the region and in Russia.

In Syria, installing foreign fighters such as Tojiboev in senior positions might raise concerns in other countries. 

The new authorities in Syria had made clear that had no ambitions of pursuing global jihad, but the appointment of foreign citizens connected to various radical organisations in their home countries could signal different intentions. 

If supporters of a global caliphate gain significant power in Syria, a return to the days when IS sought to spread its ideology worldwide through terrorist acts might be possible.