What Next for Abkhazia?

Beka Bajelidze

Caucasus Regional Director

Friday, 14 February, 2025

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Russia appears to be reconfiguring its presence in Abkhazia, a region it has illegally occupied since the early 1990s. 

With February 15 elections almost certain to usher in another Moscow-friendly president, all signs point to the Kremlin preparing for a broader intervention. 

The snap election was called following mass protests that erupted in Abkhazia in November last year over a controversial investment agreement, initiated by Russia and endorsed by then-President Aslan Bzhania.

These aimed to attract Russian investments in agriculture, housing, energy and tourism, while – leveraging classic bait-and-switch tactics - promising to upgrade severely dilapidated critical infrastructure.

The investment plan included significant benefits for Russian investors, such as an eight-year exemption from customs duties, corporate property and profit taxes. It also proposed reducing VAT to five per cent (half the standard rate) and allowing investors to allocate foreign labour quotas while granting priority access to energy capacity and infrastructure. 

Investors could use land allocated by the local authorities as collateral for loans in Russian banks, as Abkhazia’s unrecognised banking sector lacks financial capacity and access to international markets.

The deal should have been ratified by the 35-member parliament, where most deputies are independents backed by public groups and veteran unions from the 1992 war against Georgia. 

But even in a tiny territory effectively controlled by the Russian military and pro-Moscow ruling elites, this proved a step too far.

The ratification failed and the opposition accused the president and his government of granting preferential treatment to Russian investors at the expense of Abkhazia’s sovereignty.

This has long been a sensitive point for Abkhazians, who despite their near-total reliance on Russia’s support, still treasure the perception of independence.

Tensions were already high given the government’s proposed July bill to construct multistorey apartment hotels in underdeveloped areas, primarily in districts bordering Georgia that saw mass displacement during the early 1990s war. The opposition argued that Abkhazia not only lacked sufficient resources to support such developments but also that an influx of foreigners could alter demographics and threaten national identity.

These grievances led to widespread protests, during which activists were detained and mistreated. The rallies escalated, eventually blocking the bridge on the arterial highway connecting Abkhazia to Russia. Later, opposition activists stormed the presidential office. As a result, Bzhania resigned on November 19, and his vice president, Badra Gunba, took over and is now running for president.

All five candidates have pledged loyalty to Russia while promising economic prosperity and improved infrastructure; the deciding factor may depend on external influences.

Favoured by Russia

A key factor might be the role of Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian President and a long-serving operative known for engineering pseudo-legitimacy in occupied eastern Ukraine, now appears to be tasked as Russia’s new envoy to Abkhazia. 

Kiriyenko recently visited Sukhumi and delivered a series of high-profile pledges, including billions of roubles in funding for healthcare, infrastructure and economic projects.

Visiting the construction site of a children’s hospital, he promised an additional 200 million roubles (two million US dollars) in funding. Ahead of its completion next year, he offered help with deploying mobile medical units to serve remote villages; similar to his actions in Donbas following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

Another pledge was to support the revamping of the Sokhumi airport, non-operational since 1993. The site remains a painful reminder of that year’s attack on Georgian civilian planes, in which 130 people died. 

Although the airport remains barred from hosting international flights due to Abkhazia’s unrecognised status, Kiriyenko suggested it could be fully operational by May 1 for the upcoming summer season. 

Presidential candidate Gunba - viewed as the candidate favoured by Russia - was a passenger of the first test flight on his recent return from a visit to Moscow. Speaking to the press, Gunba claimed the flight was the result of an 11 billion-rouble (113 million dollars) investment that would transform the 2025 tourist season.

Kiriyenko’s agenda also includes tackling electricity shortages, a perennial problem in Abkhazia, which relies on the Enguri (also known as Ingouri) hydropower station, controlled by Georgia. Despite being one of Europe’s largest dams, Enguri alone cannot meet Abkhazia’s energy demands. The situation is further exacerbated by the widespread practice of cryptocurrency mining, which, amid Russia’s financial sanctions and Abkhazia’s struggling economy, has become one of the territory’s most lucrative industries.

The Russian envoy pledged Russian assistance in restoring all memorials and monuments ahead of preparations for the 80th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, set to be commemorated on May 9. Other offerings related to staffing assistance for Abkhazia’s government and business sectors as part of a programme that has also supplied pro-Kremlin young graduates for governance position in Russia-occupied regions of Ukraine. 

All these sweeteners outline Russia’s renewed, complex campaign of actions towards strategically important Black Sea territories, intended to influence Abkhaz people and make them more receptive to Russia’s earlier investment deal. 

The disputes over land and property ownership also have huge implications for the ethnic Georgian population still living in border districts, along with some 300,000 people displaced during the wars. The right of return remains a core issue in the conflict. 

Of course, much depends on regional developments, mainly on the outcomes of US mediated Russia-Ukraine negotiations and the course of action taken by the Georgian government, which has deviated significantly from its Euro-Atlantic commitments, straining relations with its allies and its own citizens.

But Russia’s strategy in Abkhazia remains reminiscent of the one it uses in Ukraine’s occupied territories, just as its actions in Ukraine have drawn from methods first tested in Georgia’s occupied regions. 

And the outcome of the election is likely to determine Abkhazia’s strategic choice – rather than opening up new opportunities beyond its current isolation, the territory looks headed for yet more intense integration with Russia alone. Moscow, meanwhile, seeks to regain influence over the Black Sea routes and the south corridor through Georgia - the only access to developed markets and a vital lifeline amid tightening sanctions.