Transcripts Reveal Milosevic Involvement in Bosnian War
Day 235
Transcripts Reveal Milosevic Involvement in Bosnian War
Day 235
'Without Serbia nothing would have happened, we don't have the resources and would not have been able to make war.' Radovan Karadzic, then President of the Republika Srpska (RS), made that admission before the RS Assembly on the 10th or 11th of May, 1994. His words represent a tiny portion of the 10,000 pages of RS Assembly meeting transcripts obtained by the Office of the Prosecutor from Karadzic's former secretary, who also served as Assembly secretary, and from the RS Ministry of Justice.
The transcripts appear to be a gold mine of evidence, showing Milosevic's concrete support for the RS wars and his intimate involvement in RS policy-making. They include Karadzic's admission that he issued the order for the military attack on the safe haven of Srebrenica, as well as discussions about the siege of Sarajevo where intentional attacks against the civilian population and infrastructure were acknowledged. Most of the transcripts were from closed sessions of the Assembly.
Dr. Robert J. Donia, a historian whose academic work has focused on Bosnia, reviewed the transcripts and provided a report at the Prosecution's request. Titled, 'The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlights and Excerpts,' the report is mostly composed of selected quotations from the transcripts concerning issues relevant to the Prosecution's case against Slobodan Milosevic.
In court today, Dr. Donia began his testimony by pointing out passages that identified the overall goals of the Bosnian Serbs as a unified state for all Serbs. An example was provided by Aleksandar Buha at the May 10-11, 1994 session: '[O]ur primary option is unification with Serbia, and if that doesn't fly, then independence.' On October 1, 1993, Karadzic states, '[If sanctions were to be lifted,] then we must propose the complete unity of the Serbian people, including Yugoslavia, the RSK [Republic of Serbia Krajina], and the RS . . . .' President Momcilo Krajisnik indicates on August 11, 1992, 'I personally think that the Serbian Republic of BH is a temporary state that will exist until the situation allows all Serbian lands to unite.' He goes on to say, 'This is not an agreement just among us, but among us and Serbia, and us and the Krajina, etc.'
To achieve the goal of a unified Serb nation, according to Dr. Donia's report, the Bosnian Serbs adopted six strategic goals on May 12, 1992, at the same session they established the Bosnian Serb Army [VRS]. Karadzic outlined them to the Assembly. The first goal was separation from the other two nationalities in Bosnia (Croats and Muslims). The remaining five goals consisted of elements necessary to achieve the first one, as well as to unite with Serbia, i.e. eliminating borders between Serbia and the RS, connecting majority Serb areas, dividing Sarajevo and securing access to the sea.
The transcripts show that the Bosnian Serbs relied on Serbia, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Mr. Milosevic, according to Dr. Donia's report. Mladic provides particularly revealing evidence when he addresses the Assembly about sources of weapons and military equipment at the April 15 - 16, 1995 session. 'From the beginning of the war to 31 December 1994, a total of 9,185 tons of infantry ammunition has been expended. 1.49% was self-produced, 42.2% came from supplies inherited by the VRS [RS Army] and withdrawn from enclaves and kasernes of the former JNA; 47.2% was provided by the Yugoslav Army; and 4.9% was imported. At the present we have 9.69% of the total needs for 1995. . . . We have expended 18,151 tons of artillery munitions, 26.2% of it from production, 39% from supplies, 34.4% provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 0.26% imported. At the present we have 18.36% of the needs for this year. As for anti-aircraft ammunition, we expended 1,336 tons. We secured none from production, which means we didn't produce one shell, one bullet, . . . 49.7% came from supplies, 52.4% were provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 4.9% came from imports. We have 7.89% of the needs for this year.' In other words, the JNA and the VJ (Yugoslav Army) provided nearly 90% of identified RS military supplies throughout the war.
At an 18 August 1995 session, Karadzic acknowledges, '[G]entlemen, you must know that we have created a structure that depends on Yugoslavia and that is tied to Yugoslavia in pay, pensions, use of arms and ammunition, etc., and though we have paid for a good part of it, we have received a good part.' At the April 1995 session, Karadzic also confirms that the JNA provided the RS with officers for its army and was intimately involved in setting it up. 'Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for Mladic. . . . I took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I went to General Kukanjac's [JNA Commander of Bosnia and Croatia Military District] office and listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres [Bosnia] and Knin [Croatia]. We spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time. . . . We asked for Mladic and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw fit, we wouldn't interfere. . . .' Jovo Mijatovic states, 'We accepted nearly all officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And often officers arrived and served . . . ' at a May 1993 session.
In April 1995, Karadzic discusses how the JNA assisted the Bosnian Serbs to create an army. 'The war began, and the JNA helped as much as it could here and there. It helped before that . . . . Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it was the SDS which organized the people and created the army, that was an army.'
Later in August 1995, Karadzic reflects about JNA support, as well as hindrance. 'We surrendered a large territory. True, the JNA helped us plenty, but in some places they hindered us. In Sarajevo they didn't want to do what we sought. They didn't want to give us a unit of tanks so we could so what we wanted. The war would have concluded had the JNA done that. When the Vladika [Bishop] spoke of the Banja Luka Korpus [Corps], that was the JNA, and the current commanders Talic and Kostic and others have done a lot for us, and after that they accepted [command of] the Korpus and created a Serbian Korpus out of it.'
The transcripts also indicate that the State Security Division of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (SDB) was actively involved in RS military operations. At a 1993 session, Karadzic refers to his activities involving Jovica Stanisic, head of the SDB: 'I ordered Mice Stanisic to order that network [Typhoon -- a group of intelligence officers], equipment and all, to move to Bijeljina and to integrate it into the constitutional system.' Momcilo Mandic clarifies Stanisic's role, 'You know that Mice Stanisic, advisor to the President of the Republic and his collaborator, has the duty of cooperation between MUP of Yugoslavia and our MUP, he has his two colleagues who take care of that business up there, and that is under his authority.' At a session in December 1993, Mandic reports, '[T]ogether with Stanisic I took 560 Heklers [sic] [machine guns] to Romanija [Romanija Corps of the VRS, conducting the siege of Sarajevo] and divided them between Sokolac, Rogatica, Han Pijesak and Pale [predominantly Serb areas near Sarajevo] . . . . '
Paramilitaries from Serbia are also described in the transcripts as taking part in military operations in Bosnia. In a December 1993 meeting, Vojinovic responds to a charge that paramilitaries in Brcko murdered a military policeman. 'In the city of Brcko itself, those who committed excesses were certain members of the VRS who are not paramilitary formations, but have entered the ranks of the VRS; it's just that they bear different markings; those are the so-called Red Berets. In conversation with the commander of the Brigade, [I learned] that those boys are intended for some special offensive operations and certainly have a certain beneficial status in our city, and perhaps because they have not been used in a long time, they created those excesses, because they haven't fought in awhile.' According to earlier testimony in the Milosevic trial, the Red Berets did not act without orders from the Serbian DB, of which they were a creation.
An October 1995 session provided another revealing colloquy about the role of paramilitaries from Serbia in RS military action in Bosnia. Delegate Nedic says, 'At this time we cannot expect help that we enjoyed the entire time from Yugoslavia, only, in my view, in regard to volunteers. That means military volunteers and material assistance, we won't get these because there is an exceptionally difficult situation there [in Serbia]. Those volunteers that Zeljko Raznjatovic leads as patriots, I have heard that they achieved success, but in his presentation General Milanovic said he would not accept this kind of help, which amazes me. I think that those units, I assume they are under command of the VRS rather than free-standing or independent units.' Delegate Duric takes exception, 'Arkan serves Belgrade's policies, as far as I know, otherwise he wouldn't exist. In a true state, such a paramilitary formation [as his] would not exist. In his function he did not come to help us, but to do the bidding of Belgrade . . . .'
According to excerpts from the transcripts, intertwined governmental structures supported the military assistance that Serbia and the FRY provided to the Bosnian Serbs. In May 1993, Rajko Kasagic expresses concern about dual authority since the RS MUP has an office in Belgrade and the Serbian MUP has one in the RS. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Lukic, concludes, '[W]e have enough information that what's going on here is a parallel authority, parallel MUP's, and so on.' At another place in the transcript, there is discussion of a parallel office of economic cooperation and reference to the daily exchange of intelligence information among the security services of the RS, the FRY, Serbia, Montenegro and the RSK.
Milosevic's influence is also discussed in the RS Assembly. One of the first excerpts Dr. Donia provides is from the May 5, 1993 session, where Milosevic addresses the Assembly in person, arguing for acceptance of the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). His speech emphasized the continuing connection between the RS and Serbia since the VOPP placed the RS in a separate state. 'Since you are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money transfer. . . . that we are going to stabilise the entire unified area of economy, in which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally, educationally, and in every other aspect. . . . [D]o not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them and helped with all our powers and with all our capacities, for the cost of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue to help you, that is not disputed.' Despite his passionate plea, the Assembly rejected the VOPP. And despite the rejection, Milosevic's own words testify to Serbia's past and continued support for the RS.
Nevertheless, concern was expressed in the Assembly that Milosevic wielded too great an influence over Bosnian Serb affairs. Karadzic defended him at an Assembly session later in 1993: 'I must say to you that they [Serbia's leaders] are very cautious with us. They highly respect us. I cannot say that they don't exert pressure, but they don't exert pressure in the form of ultimatums . . . They would rather persuade us than to exert pressure. And Milosevic is, I must tell you, cunning as a snake and he has helped a great deal to make things happen in that way. Naturally he helped on the basis of constitutional principles . . . .' One might ask, 'what principles of which constitution?' Not everyone was assuaged by Karadzic, however. At an October 1993 meeting, the Minister of Agriculture opined, 'We have only made one error, . . . in that we have strictly followed Serbian policy.'
Dr. Donia summarizes Milosevic's attempts to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept another peace plan in June 1994. 'Krajisnik reports that he and other Bosnian Serb leaders met with Milosevic and Montenegrin President [Momir] Bulatovic in Belgrade on 17 July 1994, and the two men told them that they needed to accept the plan or face being replaced by more pliant allies such as Nenad Kecmanovic, who would accept the plan.'
Despite the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs, Krajisnik and Karadzic held onto their leadership positions. And despite their failure to knuckle under to Milosevic's pressure, they continued to believe that their destiny was with Serbia. Speaking of the failed Contact Group Plan of 1994, Karadzic addressed the Assembly in August 1995: 'We were at a meeting with President Milosevic, that's secret and for now should not leave this circle. . . . That was our initiative, that we unite all resources and defend the Republic, looking at what happened in the RSK, we cannot have that approach, and the Serbian bloc must always have a common policy. We must always seek unity for Serbs, for we know that they build their strategy on that.'
They also continued to rely on Milosevic to head negotiations with the international community. Speaking about the proposed delegation to the Dayton peace talks, on August 28, 1995, Karadzic told the Assembly: '[I]f we form a common /delegation/, not a united but a common delegation, where naturally Milosevic will be at the head, formally or informally he will be the head -- and in Geneva he was the head every time, it was clear that he was the head . . . .'
There were other times, according to transcript excerpts, when the RS leaders did follow Milosevic's directions -- and later regretted it. One involved Milosevic's halting an offensive against the safe area of Gorazde. Here, General Tolimir addresses Karadzic: 'And later we all went together to Milosevic [in Belgrade], when I and General Mladic and everyone else, and President Krajisnik also, were opposed to breaking off the offensive against Gorazde.' At a later meeting, Djuric refers to this event as the Assembly contemplates the change in their situation since Srebrenica, NATO bombing and loss of territory to Croatia in summer 1995. 'President Krajisnik said that Milosevic prevented the offensive, so that we couldn't take Bihac. He [Milosevic] accuses us of not helping [Fikret] Abdic, we were supposed to do that for Abdic. . . . The man knows all our thinking, even though he's never seen some of us, except for those at Pale. He is an informed man, and he simply passes the responsibility on to someone else.'
Contemplating their debilitated position, Karadzic tells the Assembly, 'We must lead him (Milosevic) into a situation that he fights for us as if he were fighting for himself and his place in history and his reputation.'
In these excerpts from the RS Assembly sessions during the war it waged in Bosnia, we hear the voices of the Bosnian Serb leadership themselves. Since the sessions are not public, the members' discussions are candid and revealing. What they reveal about Serbia's and Milosevic's role in their war against the Bosnian Muslims provides significant evidence to support the Prosecution's case against Slobodan Milosevic. The transcripts show active military support from the beginning of the war, including weapons, equipment, army officers, special paramilitary units, intelligence, police and economic assistance. They reveal that Milosevic was actively involved in decision-making, including decision on military operations. These voices from the past provide some of the strongest evidence the prosecution has presented connecting Milosevic to the war in Bosnia.
The transcripts also include damning revelations about Srebrenica and Sarajevo, which will be covered in a subsequent CIJ article, as will observations of Mr. Milosevic's cross examination. Since Mr. Milosevic had not completed cross examination of Dr. Donia by the end of Friday's court session, the witness was asked to return at a time convenient to him. The time remains to be scheduled.
The transcripts appear to be a gold mine of evidence, showing Milosevic's concrete support for the RS wars and his intimate involvement in RS policy-making. They include Karadzic's admission that he issued the order for the military attack on the safe haven of Srebrenica, as well as discussions about the siege of Sarajevo where intentional attacks against the civilian population and infrastructure were acknowledged. Most of the transcripts were from closed sessions of the Assembly.
Dr. Robert J. Donia, a historian whose academic work has focused on Bosnia, reviewed the transcripts and provided a report at the Prosecution's request. Titled, 'The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlights and Excerpts,' the report is mostly composed of selected quotations from the transcripts concerning issues relevant to the Prosecution's case against Slobodan Milosevic.
In court today, Dr. Donia began his testimony by pointing out passages that identified the overall goals of the Bosnian Serbs as a unified state for all Serbs. An example was provided by Aleksandar Buha at the May 10-11, 1994 session: '[O]ur primary option is unification with Serbia, and if that doesn't fly, then independence.' On October 1, 1993, Karadzic states, '[If sanctions were to be lifted,] then we must propose the complete unity of the Serbian people, including Yugoslavia, the RSK [Republic of Serbia Krajina], and the RS . . . .' President Momcilo Krajisnik indicates on August 11, 1992, 'I personally think that the Serbian Republic of BH is a temporary state that will exist until the situation allows all Serbian lands to unite.' He goes on to say, 'This is not an agreement just among us, but among us and Serbia, and us and the Krajina, etc.'
To achieve the goal of a unified Serb nation, according to Dr. Donia's report, the Bosnian Serbs adopted six strategic goals on May 12, 1992, at the same session they established the Bosnian Serb Army [VRS]. Karadzic outlined them to the Assembly. The first goal was separation from the other two nationalities in Bosnia (Croats and Muslims). The remaining five goals consisted of elements necessary to achieve the first one, as well as to unite with Serbia, i.e. eliminating borders between Serbia and the RS, connecting majority Serb areas, dividing Sarajevo and securing access to the sea.
The transcripts show that the Bosnian Serbs relied on Serbia, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Mr. Milosevic, according to Dr. Donia's report. Mladic provides particularly revealing evidence when he addresses the Assembly about sources of weapons and military equipment at the April 15 - 16, 1995 session. 'From the beginning of the war to 31 December 1994, a total of 9,185 tons of infantry ammunition has been expended. 1.49% was self-produced, 42.2% came from supplies inherited by the VRS [RS Army] and withdrawn from enclaves and kasernes of the former JNA; 47.2% was provided by the Yugoslav Army; and 4.9% was imported. At the present we have 9.69% of the total needs for 1995. . . . We have expended 18,151 tons of artillery munitions, 26.2% of it from production, 39% from supplies, 34.4% provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 0.26% imported. At the present we have 18.36% of the needs for this year. As for anti-aircraft ammunition, we expended 1,336 tons. We secured none from production, which means we didn't produce one shell, one bullet, . . . 49.7% came from supplies, 52.4% were provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 4.9% came from imports. We have 7.89% of the needs for this year.' In other words, the JNA and the VJ (Yugoslav Army) provided nearly 90% of identified RS military supplies throughout the war.
At an 18 August 1995 session, Karadzic acknowledges, '[G]entlemen, you must know that we have created a structure that depends on Yugoslavia and that is tied to Yugoslavia in pay, pensions, use of arms and ammunition, etc., and though we have paid for a good part of it, we have received a good part.' At the April 1995 session, Karadzic also confirms that the JNA provided the RS with officers for its army and was intimately involved in setting it up. 'Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for Mladic. . . . I took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I went to General Kukanjac's [JNA Commander of Bosnia and Croatia Military District] office and listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres [Bosnia] and Knin [Croatia]. We spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time. . . . We asked for Mladic and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw fit, we wouldn't interfere. . . .' Jovo Mijatovic states, 'We accepted nearly all officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And often officers arrived and served . . . ' at a May 1993 session.
In April 1995, Karadzic discusses how the JNA assisted the Bosnian Serbs to create an army. 'The war began, and the JNA helped as much as it could here and there. It helped before that . . . . Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it was the SDS which organized the people and created the army, that was an army.'
Later in August 1995, Karadzic reflects about JNA support, as well as hindrance. 'We surrendered a large territory. True, the JNA helped us plenty, but in some places they hindered us. In Sarajevo they didn't want to do what we sought. They didn't want to give us a unit of tanks so we could so what we wanted. The war would have concluded had the JNA done that. When the Vladika [Bishop] spoke of the Banja Luka Korpus [Corps], that was the JNA, and the current commanders Talic and Kostic and others have done a lot for us, and after that they accepted [command of] the Korpus and created a Serbian Korpus out of it.'
The transcripts also indicate that the State Security Division of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (SDB) was actively involved in RS military operations. At a 1993 session, Karadzic refers to his activities involving Jovica Stanisic, head of the SDB: 'I ordered Mice Stanisic to order that network [Typhoon -- a group of intelligence officers], equipment and all, to move to Bijeljina and to integrate it into the constitutional system.' Momcilo Mandic clarifies Stanisic's role, 'You know that Mice Stanisic, advisor to the President of the Republic and his collaborator, has the duty of cooperation between MUP of Yugoslavia and our MUP, he has his two colleagues who take care of that business up there, and that is under his authority.' At a session in December 1993, Mandic reports, '[T]ogether with Stanisic I took 560 Heklers [sic] [machine guns] to Romanija [Romanija Corps of the VRS, conducting the siege of Sarajevo] and divided them between Sokolac, Rogatica, Han Pijesak and Pale [predominantly Serb areas near Sarajevo] . . . . '
Paramilitaries from Serbia are also described in the transcripts as taking part in military operations in Bosnia. In a December 1993 meeting, Vojinovic responds to a charge that paramilitaries in Brcko murdered a military policeman. 'In the city of Brcko itself, those who committed excesses were certain members of the VRS who are not paramilitary formations, but have entered the ranks of the VRS; it's just that they bear different markings; those are the so-called Red Berets. In conversation with the commander of the Brigade, [I learned] that those boys are intended for some special offensive operations and certainly have a certain beneficial status in our city, and perhaps because they have not been used in a long time, they created those excesses, because they haven't fought in awhile.' According to earlier testimony in the Milosevic trial, the Red Berets did not act without orders from the Serbian DB, of which they were a creation.
An October 1995 session provided another revealing colloquy about the role of paramilitaries from Serbia in RS military action in Bosnia. Delegate Nedic says, 'At this time we cannot expect help that we enjoyed the entire time from Yugoslavia, only, in my view, in regard to volunteers. That means military volunteers and material assistance, we won't get these because there is an exceptionally difficult situation there [in Serbia]. Those volunteers that Zeljko Raznjatovic leads as patriots, I have heard that they achieved success, but in his presentation General Milanovic said he would not accept this kind of help, which amazes me. I think that those units, I assume they are under command of the VRS rather than free-standing or independent units.' Delegate Duric takes exception, 'Arkan serves Belgrade's policies, as far as I know, otherwise he wouldn't exist. In a true state, such a paramilitary formation [as his] would not exist. In his function he did not come to help us, but to do the bidding of Belgrade . . . .'
According to excerpts from the transcripts, intertwined governmental structures supported the military assistance that Serbia and the FRY provided to the Bosnian Serbs. In May 1993, Rajko Kasagic expresses concern about dual authority since the RS MUP has an office in Belgrade and the Serbian MUP has one in the RS. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Lukic, concludes, '[W]e have enough information that what's going on here is a parallel authority, parallel MUP's, and so on.' At another place in the transcript, there is discussion of a parallel office of economic cooperation and reference to the daily exchange of intelligence information among the security services of the RS, the FRY, Serbia, Montenegro and the RSK.
Milosevic's influence is also discussed in the RS Assembly. One of the first excerpts Dr. Donia provides is from the May 5, 1993 session, where Milosevic addresses the Assembly in person, arguing for acceptance of the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). His speech emphasized the continuing connection between the RS and Serbia since the VOPP placed the RS in a separate state. 'Since you are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money transfer. . . . that we are going to stabilise the entire unified area of economy, in which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally, educationally, and in every other aspect. . . . [D]o not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them and helped with all our powers and with all our capacities, for the cost of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue to help you, that is not disputed.' Despite his passionate plea, the Assembly rejected the VOPP. And despite the rejection, Milosevic's own words testify to Serbia's past and continued support for the RS.
Nevertheless, concern was expressed in the Assembly that Milosevic wielded too great an influence over Bosnian Serb affairs. Karadzic defended him at an Assembly session later in 1993: 'I must say to you that they [Serbia's leaders] are very cautious with us. They highly respect us. I cannot say that they don't exert pressure, but they don't exert pressure in the form of ultimatums . . . They would rather persuade us than to exert pressure. And Milosevic is, I must tell you, cunning as a snake and he has helped a great deal to make things happen in that way. Naturally he helped on the basis of constitutional principles . . . .' One might ask, 'what principles of which constitution?' Not everyone was assuaged by Karadzic, however. At an October 1993 meeting, the Minister of Agriculture opined, 'We have only made one error, . . . in that we have strictly followed Serbian policy.'
Dr. Donia summarizes Milosevic's attempts to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept another peace plan in June 1994. 'Krajisnik reports that he and other Bosnian Serb leaders met with Milosevic and Montenegrin President [Momir] Bulatovic in Belgrade on 17 July 1994, and the two men told them that they needed to accept the plan or face being replaced by more pliant allies such as Nenad Kecmanovic, who would accept the plan.'
Despite the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs, Krajisnik and Karadzic held onto their leadership positions. And despite their failure to knuckle under to Milosevic's pressure, they continued to believe that their destiny was with Serbia. Speaking of the failed Contact Group Plan of 1994, Karadzic addressed the Assembly in August 1995: 'We were at a meeting with President Milosevic, that's secret and for now should not leave this circle. . . . That was our initiative, that we unite all resources and defend the Republic, looking at what happened in the RSK, we cannot have that approach, and the Serbian bloc must always have a common policy. We must always seek unity for Serbs, for we know that they build their strategy on that.'
They also continued to rely on Milosevic to head negotiations with the international community. Speaking about the proposed delegation to the Dayton peace talks, on August 28, 1995, Karadzic told the Assembly: '[I]f we form a common /delegation/, not a united but a common delegation, where naturally Milosevic will be at the head, formally or informally he will be the head -- and in Geneva he was the head every time, it was clear that he was the head . . . .'
There were other times, according to transcript excerpts, when the RS leaders did follow Milosevic's directions -- and later regretted it. One involved Milosevic's halting an offensive against the safe area of Gorazde. Here, General Tolimir addresses Karadzic: 'And later we all went together to Milosevic [in Belgrade], when I and General Mladic and everyone else, and President Krajisnik also, were opposed to breaking off the offensive against Gorazde.' At a later meeting, Djuric refers to this event as the Assembly contemplates the change in their situation since Srebrenica, NATO bombing and loss of territory to Croatia in summer 1995. 'President Krajisnik said that Milosevic prevented the offensive, so that we couldn't take Bihac. He [Milosevic] accuses us of not helping [Fikret] Abdic, we were supposed to do that for Abdic. . . . The man knows all our thinking, even though he's never seen some of us, except for those at Pale. He is an informed man, and he simply passes the responsibility on to someone else.'
Contemplating their debilitated position, Karadzic tells the Assembly, 'We must lead him (Milosevic) into a situation that he fights for us as if he were fighting for himself and his place in history and his reputation.'
In these excerpts from the RS Assembly sessions during the war it waged in Bosnia, we hear the voices of the Bosnian Serb leadership themselves. Since the sessions are not public, the members' discussions are candid and revealing. What they reveal about Serbia's and Milosevic's role in their war against the Bosnian Muslims provides significant evidence to support the Prosecution's case against Slobodan Milosevic. The transcripts show active military support from the beginning of the war, including weapons, equipment, army officers, special paramilitary units, intelligence, police and economic assistance. They reveal that Milosevic was actively involved in decision-making, including decision on military operations. These voices from the past provide some of the strongest evidence the prosecution has presented connecting Milosevic to the war in Bosnia.
The transcripts also include damning revelations about Srebrenica and Sarajevo, which will be covered in a subsequent CIJ article, as will observations of Mr. Milosevic's cross examination. Since Mr. Milosevic had not completed cross examination of Dr. Donia by the end of Friday's court session, the witness was asked to return at a time convenient to him. The time remains to be scheduled.
