The Shameful Gamesmanship of Politicians: Witness Testifies That Milosevic Controlled Events & People
Day 275-76
The Shameful Gamesmanship of Politicians: Witness Testifies That Milosevic Controlled Events & People
Day 275-76
Two men playing a mostly friendly game of chess over a period of many years. That's the picture that came to mind listening to the testimony of Hrvoje Sarinic, former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's confidential envoy to former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It sounds innocuous, even pleasant, but the chess pieces were the people and lands of the former Yugoslavia, none of which, not even the presidents' 'own' nationalities seemed real or important. Winning the game was all, and it meant different things to each of the men. For Tudjman, it meant an independent state of Croatia. For Milosevic, it meant power. For most of the people of the former Yugoslavia it meant loss -- of livelihood, property, way of life; -- of friends, family and life itself.
Long time advisor to President Tudjman, Mr. Sarinic told about Milosevic's willingness to relinquish Sarajevo and Knin to Tudjman because they weren't Serb towns. Bihac (in Bosnia) could also go under Croat control. For his part, Tudjman was willing to give up small sections on the Croatian coast -- a proposal he made without ever consulting his Parliament. Even Alija Izetbegovic got into the act by suggesting to Tudjman that he would have no objection if Croatia annexed Herzeg Bosna, the Bosnian territory claimed by the Bosnian Croats. Though proposals were made, few chess pieces were moved in this way. The real force -- violence -- was on the ground, out of sight, but not out of control of the game players. It was, after all, a friendly game.
The 'queen' in this 'chess match' was Bosnia-Herzegovina. In prior testimony, the Court heard that Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to divide up Bosnia when they met at Karadjordjevo in March 1991. Lord Paddy Ashdown testified that Tudjman told him about it, drawing the proposed border between Serbia and Croatia through the heart of Bosnia on a napkin. Ante Markovic told the Court that both men individually admitted it to him. Mr. Sarinic, who was at Karadjordjevo though not in the room during the majority of the discussion, said he could not confirm the content of their conversation.
A few days later, however, Tudjman told the Croatian leadership that he and Milosevic had discussed the question of dividing Bosnia. He also said that Slovenia would be leaving the federation and that Serbs wanted a greater Serbia. While Milosevic may have refrained from using the words 'Greater Serbia', it seems Tudjman and many others interpreted his stated intentions as a desire to create exactly that.
The two presidents each had his own view of Bosnia, which ignored or made light of its mixed, multi-ethnic population, as well as its coequal status as one of Yugoslavia's six republics. According to Mr. Sarinic, Tudjman considered it a historical absurdity, resulting from Turkish conquests in the 15th Century, while Milosevic thought its Muslim citizens constituted the greatest evil and were a demographic threat to both Serbia and Croatia. In 1995, when Sarinic asked Milosevic, 'why don't you recognize Bosnia?' the Accused replied, 'Which Bosnia? Whose Bosnia? What kind of Bosnia?' 'He was absolutely denying the existence of Bosnia,' Sarinic testified.
Following a meeting of all republic presidents in the spring of 1991, Tudjman showed Sarinic a note 'Slobo' (as Tudjman called him) had given him. 'I looked at the paper written in black ballpoint pen,' Sarinic told the Court. 'It said the Muslims were the major evil. Actually, that one should be cautious about the so-called Green Transversal --from Turkey, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Sandjak. It was a major threat for Bosnia and for peace in the area.' The 'Green Transversal' refers to countries in the region with substantial Muslim populations. The note went on to warn Tudjman that the Muslims wanted 'a unitary Bosnia where they would rule and the Croats and Serbs would be minorities.' Sarinic told the Court that regarding Islamic Fundamentalism as the greatest evil was Milosevic's 'leitmotif,' i.e. recurring theme.
In 1995, on the run up to the Dayton Accords, Milosevic, the great game player, suggested to Sarinic, 'Hrvoje, let's each of us take our part of Bosnia without the international community. The U.S. is cradling this bastard [Bosnia] without knowing what they're doing, nor are they familiar with our problems.' The Accused declared he opposed a unitary Bosnia and proposed that there be an entity of two federations, with three nations and a weak umbrella authority. With the exception of the interim UN role in governance, this was pretty much the outcome of Dayton.
Despite Milosevic's and Tudjman's seeming agreement over Bosnia, areas in Croatia taken by the Serbs early in the war remained a matter of contention and ongoing negotiations. In 1991 at Karadjordjevo, Tudjman referred to the Serb-controlled Krajina as the Trojan Horse of Serbian politicians in Croatia, i.e. the Serb-controlled area in Croatia could act as a launching site for further Serb attacks against Croatia. He confronted Milosevic with his belief that the Croatian Serbs could not prevail without Milosevic supplying and standing behind them. Milosevic denied having anything to do with it. As events developed, Tudjman was right -- Milosevic did not come to the aid of the RSK in 1995 and it fell to the Croatian assaults.
In 1993, Tudjman appointed Sarinic as his confidential envoy to Milosevic to see if he had changed his position regarding reintegration of the Republic of Serbia Krajina (RSK) into Croatia. In that capacity, Sarinic held 14 confidential meetings with Milosevic over the next two years. Despite numerous promises and agreements, no progress was made for the return of the Krajina. Milosevic, according to the witness, made agreements, but never kept them. 'You were the 'peacemaker' on the surface, but any agreements always fell through.' As a result, Croatia resumed fighting in 1995 in violation of the internationally negotiated cease fire (Vance Plan) that froze positions and interjected UN troops in 1992.
During cross examination, Milosevic made much of Croatia's renewed assault in 1995 to reclaim the Krajina. He appeared to consider it a personal betrayal. Sarinic told the Court about a telephone call from Milosevic after Croatia had launched Operation Flash in May 1995 'Why are you doing this?' Milosevic furiously demanded. 'Why did we spend so many hours in discussion?' According to Sarinic, he replied, 'You see what the situation is like with the Serbs in Krajina over which you have considerable influence and we cannot achieve anything.. . . Get Martic and Celeketic replaced and it will improve.' Milosevic responded that he hadn't appointed them and could not replace them, then slammed down the receiver. Earlier, however, the witness said, it was Milosevic who negotiated with Zagreb on behalf of Knin (i.e. Croatian Serbs) to reopen the highway the Croatian Serbs had blockaded. In Court, Sarinic insisted the negotiations had been between Belgrade and Zagreb, not Zagreb and Knin. 'You were involved up to your neck, it is absolutely certain. The Knin leadership could not do anything without you.'
Sarinic also testified about Milosevic's behind the scenes control of RSK politics. He reported his conclusion that Milosevic manipulated Milan Martic's electoral win over Milan Babic for president of the RSK, reporting a teasing conversation he had with Milosevic. Despite Milosevic's support for Martic, Babic had won the majority of votes in the first round of elections. When Sarinic joked with Milosevic about his loss, Milosevic replied that there had been irregularities in the election. When a second round of elections was held, Milosevic's man Martic won.
Sarinic testified that Milosevic warned him on two or three occasions to be careful of both Martic and Babic because they had already committed atrocities. 'The Accused liked to replace people. He accused them of atrocities.' In support of this conclusion, Sarinic reported another incident, this one involving the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Vladislav Jovanovic. At one of their tete-a-tetes, the witness told Milosevic that he felt one of the reasons they weren't getting anywhere in negotiations was Jovanovic's negative attitude. Milosevic responded confidentially 'I will replace Jovanovic, but don't tell anyone.'
Milosevic also had plans in 1995 to remove the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership, most particularly Radovan Karadzic, its president, according to Sarinic. He learned this, he said, from Bora Mikelic, RSK representative in negotiations with Croatia Milosevic said Karadzic was a 'lost politician but was not aware of it.' Milosevic reportedly continued, 'I will try to topple him but by the people in Banja Luka who are reasonable. . . .' General Ratko Mladic, on the other hand, was '200% Milosevic's man.' Mikelic denied the conversation in a letter Milosevic read in Court. Milosevic wanted Karadzic removed because he had become an obstacle to the negotiated settlement that Milosevic needed to end sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. At this time, Milosevic was telling Sarinic that he was going to let the Bosniaks have Sarajevo and that the Serbs had no more than a 50% right to Bosnia (they controlled 70%), a position with which Karadzic did not agree.
The shadow of Milosevic's hand, that of the supreme chess master, could be seen in all these machinations. He appeared to regard the RSK presidents, the Yugoslav foreign minister and the leadership of the RS as his pawns to be moved and removed to achieve his purposes -- the maintenance of power and a place in history.
Milosevic also admitted to Sarinic in one of their one on one meetings that Zeljko Raznjatovic 'Arkan' worked for him. When Sarinic asked him about Arkan, Milosevic laughingly answered, 'I have to have someone as well who is going to do part of the job for me.' The witness said he was well aware of the 'evils' of Arkan and his army and knew Milosevic was behind him. Sarinic further told the Court that Arkan and his army of 5000 could not have been organized and armed without Milosevic's support and financial backing. 'He [Milosevic] was all powerful in Serbia at the time,' Sarinic concluded.
When he had the opportunity for cross examination, Milosevic denied having said anything to him about Arkan. Sarinic insisted it was 'the absolute truth.' The Accused asserted that Arkan's Volunteer Guard was never more than a company, not an army of 5000 men. 'Where do you get such fantastic ideas?' he asked Sarinic. 'From our intelligence services,' the former Tudjman advisor cooly replied, adding, 'If you weren't involved in it, you wouldn't know if it was a company or not.' Following a little more back and forth, Milosevic declared, 'You have no document which could link me to activities of the Serbian Volunteer Guard.' 'No, but you have a reputation for leaving very few traces,' Sarinic answered.
To show Croatia's perfidy in restarting the war in Croatia, the Accused read from confidential Croatian documents, including verbatim notes of Tudjman's meetings with his leadership, disclosing a plan to provoke an incident that would justify renewed fighting. The witness did not deny Croatia's initiation of the attack, but replied provocation wasn't necessary. Any state has a right to take up arms to liberate its territory that has been illegally occupied. When Milosevic accused the Croats of ethnically cleansing Serbs from Croatia during Operations Flash (May 1995) and Storm (August 1995), Sarinic replied that the Croatian Serbs themselves had made plans 2 1/2 years before to evacuate the population. Every two hours, he said, Croatian radio broadcast a plea for Serbs to remain in their homes. Whatever the reason, after Operations Flash and Storm few Croatian Serbs remained in Croatia.
Milosevic also broached the role of the international community, specifically the U.S., in allegedly sanctioning the Croatian attacks on the Serb enclaves in Croatia. Quoting Ambassador Richard Holbrooke from transcripts in his possession, Milosevic confronted Sarinic with Holbrooke's statement that Croatia had justification for the military operation in Eastern Slavonia and that he had defended its position in Washington. 'They [the U.S.] gave you the green light for the operation,' Milosevic accused. Sarinic's diplomatic answer was, 'They saw the negotiations were not going anywhere. They never told us openly that we could launch an action, and they stopped the operation when it was moving toward Banja Luka. . . . Holbrooke was an absolutely pragmatic politician.' Milosevic responded, 'I know how they stopped it -- with me telling Holbrooke we would stop negotiating if they failed to stop it. Holbrooke said he would see Tudjman right away. . . .' Sarinic commented wryly: 'You have turned into a witness.'
Whether the offensive was stopped by Milosevic's phone call or not, neither he nor the RS made any military intervention on behalf of the Krajina Serbs. They were left to their fate. Others have said it was for this reason that Milan Martic, gave orders to bomb Zagreb, which elicited a furious reaction from Milosevic.
Regardless of Milosevic's action or inaction, at least one Krajina Serb went out of his way to show his support for the former President of Serbia, from whom Sarinic said he took orders. Borisav Mikelic faxed a letter to the Accused, dutifully claiming that Sarinic had lied in his testimony the day before. He denied Sarinic's allegation that his relationship with Milosevic was that of a servant to his master. As Judge May reminded the Accused, however, a letter from a friend is not evidence. Milosevic can call Mikelic as a witness at the appropriate time.
The two men, Sarinic and Milosevic, also argued over who was responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its descent into war. Milosevic accused Croatia of seeking independence rather than attempting to save the Yugoslav state. Sarinic accused Milosevic of unilaterally changing the Yugoslav constitution and taking control of the Yugoslav Presidency, which led to its dissolution and the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.
The men who had formerly had many cordial 'tete-a-tete' meetings, then clashed over Kosovo. Sarinic testified that in their last meeting in March 1998, Milosevic shared his ideas for Kosovo. He proposed a bicameral legislative chamber, consisting of Serbs and Albanians, with no possibility of either side outvoting the other. Sarinic remarked that it was far less than the Albanians (who comprised 90% of the population of Kosovo) had under the 1974 constitution. Milosevic responded, 'Yes, but that was a mistake which we will not repeat at any cost.'
Trying to cover as many topics as possible in the nearly three hours the Court allowed him for cross examination, while complaining it was inadequate, Milosevic asked the witness about the bombing of Sarajevo's Markale Marketplace in February 1994. 'Did I say to you that according to information I received the Muslims shelled Markale Marketplace?' 'Yes,' Sarinic agreed, 'you said, 'See how much you can trust them? They killed themselves. Twenty-five are dead. It doesn't mean anything to them.' Later you put the blame on Karadzic.' With additional questions about the results of a French team's investigation, Milosevic secured Sarinic's agreement that their conclusion the shell was fired from Muslim positions appeared to be true.
Another topic he turned to was the Yugoslav Army and Navy shelling of Dubrovnik, a world heritage protected site. Sarinic confirmed that Miloseivc told him no one from Belgrade had approved the shelling. 'I didn't believe you organized it but you certainly knew about it.' He went on to report that Milosevic had also denied that General Veljko Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for Defense, ordered it, but told him that General Bagoje Adzic, Kadijevic's successor, initiated and directed the campaign. Milosevic vehemently denied it. Sarinic added that Croatia had also seized documents that included a 1991 order by the Yugoslav Navy Commander, Admiral Mile Kandic, to cut off Dubrovnik from the rest of Croatia.
While some of Sarinic's testimony repeated what other witnesses have said, it was important corroboration coming from a man at the center of Balkan politics during the period critical to Milosevic's indictment for crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. It showed not only Milosevic's involvement in those critical events, but his control over many of them and his attempt to control them all. It also revealed the role of Franjo Tudjman, Milosevic's partner in this Balkan chess game. In retrospect, it is easy to see he was no match for Milosevic. As long as they were the main players, Tudjman couldn't win. But since it wasn't really a chess game, they had more than each other to contend with, and more to answer for. Over time, the pieces in their deadly game came to life (many only in death) in the eyes of the rest of the world and exposed the reality behind the game: nearly a quarter million people dead and many more wounded, several million refugees and displaced persons, destroyed property, homes, livelihoods, way of life and trust in others and the future. It is that for which Milosevic has been called to answer before an international tribunal. Tudjman died before an indictment was issued against him.
Long time advisor to President Tudjman, Mr. Sarinic told about Milosevic's willingness to relinquish Sarajevo and Knin to Tudjman because they weren't Serb towns. Bihac (in Bosnia) could also go under Croat control. For his part, Tudjman was willing to give up small sections on the Croatian coast -- a proposal he made without ever consulting his Parliament. Even Alija Izetbegovic got into the act by suggesting to Tudjman that he would have no objection if Croatia annexed Herzeg Bosna, the Bosnian territory claimed by the Bosnian Croats. Though proposals were made, few chess pieces were moved in this way. The real force -- violence -- was on the ground, out of sight, but not out of control of the game players. It was, after all, a friendly game.
The 'queen' in this 'chess match' was Bosnia-Herzegovina. In prior testimony, the Court heard that Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to divide up Bosnia when they met at Karadjordjevo in March 1991. Lord Paddy Ashdown testified that Tudjman told him about it, drawing the proposed border between Serbia and Croatia through the heart of Bosnia on a napkin. Ante Markovic told the Court that both men individually admitted it to him. Mr. Sarinic, who was at Karadjordjevo though not in the room during the majority of the discussion, said he could not confirm the content of their conversation.
A few days later, however, Tudjman told the Croatian leadership that he and Milosevic had discussed the question of dividing Bosnia. He also said that Slovenia would be leaving the federation and that Serbs wanted a greater Serbia. While Milosevic may have refrained from using the words 'Greater Serbia', it seems Tudjman and many others interpreted his stated intentions as a desire to create exactly that.
The two presidents each had his own view of Bosnia, which ignored or made light of its mixed, multi-ethnic population, as well as its coequal status as one of Yugoslavia's six republics. According to Mr. Sarinic, Tudjman considered it a historical absurdity, resulting from Turkish conquests in the 15th Century, while Milosevic thought its Muslim citizens constituted the greatest evil and were a demographic threat to both Serbia and Croatia. In 1995, when Sarinic asked Milosevic, 'why don't you recognize Bosnia?' the Accused replied, 'Which Bosnia? Whose Bosnia? What kind of Bosnia?' 'He was absolutely denying the existence of Bosnia,' Sarinic testified.
Following a meeting of all republic presidents in the spring of 1991, Tudjman showed Sarinic a note 'Slobo' (as Tudjman called him) had given him. 'I looked at the paper written in black ballpoint pen,' Sarinic told the Court. 'It said the Muslims were the major evil. Actually, that one should be cautious about the so-called Green Transversal --from Turkey, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Sandjak. It was a major threat for Bosnia and for peace in the area.' The 'Green Transversal' refers to countries in the region with substantial Muslim populations. The note went on to warn Tudjman that the Muslims wanted 'a unitary Bosnia where they would rule and the Croats and Serbs would be minorities.' Sarinic told the Court that regarding Islamic Fundamentalism as the greatest evil was Milosevic's 'leitmotif,' i.e. recurring theme.
In 1995, on the run up to the Dayton Accords, Milosevic, the great game player, suggested to Sarinic, 'Hrvoje, let's each of us take our part of Bosnia without the international community. The U.S. is cradling this bastard [Bosnia] without knowing what they're doing, nor are they familiar with our problems.' The Accused declared he opposed a unitary Bosnia and proposed that there be an entity of two federations, with three nations and a weak umbrella authority. With the exception of the interim UN role in governance, this was pretty much the outcome of Dayton.
Despite Milosevic's and Tudjman's seeming agreement over Bosnia, areas in Croatia taken by the Serbs early in the war remained a matter of contention and ongoing negotiations. In 1991 at Karadjordjevo, Tudjman referred to the Serb-controlled Krajina as the Trojan Horse of Serbian politicians in Croatia, i.e. the Serb-controlled area in Croatia could act as a launching site for further Serb attacks against Croatia. He confronted Milosevic with his belief that the Croatian Serbs could not prevail without Milosevic supplying and standing behind them. Milosevic denied having anything to do with it. As events developed, Tudjman was right -- Milosevic did not come to the aid of the RSK in 1995 and it fell to the Croatian assaults.
In 1993, Tudjman appointed Sarinic as his confidential envoy to Milosevic to see if he had changed his position regarding reintegration of the Republic of Serbia Krajina (RSK) into Croatia. In that capacity, Sarinic held 14 confidential meetings with Milosevic over the next two years. Despite numerous promises and agreements, no progress was made for the return of the Krajina. Milosevic, according to the witness, made agreements, but never kept them. 'You were the 'peacemaker' on the surface, but any agreements always fell through.' As a result, Croatia resumed fighting in 1995 in violation of the internationally negotiated cease fire (Vance Plan) that froze positions and interjected UN troops in 1992.
During cross examination, Milosevic made much of Croatia's renewed assault in 1995 to reclaim the Krajina. He appeared to consider it a personal betrayal. Sarinic told the Court about a telephone call from Milosevic after Croatia had launched Operation Flash in May 1995 'Why are you doing this?' Milosevic furiously demanded. 'Why did we spend so many hours in discussion?' According to Sarinic, he replied, 'You see what the situation is like with the Serbs in Krajina over which you have considerable influence and we cannot achieve anything.. . . Get Martic and Celeketic replaced and it will improve.' Milosevic responded that he hadn't appointed them and could not replace them, then slammed down the receiver. Earlier, however, the witness said, it was Milosevic who negotiated with Zagreb on behalf of Knin (i.e. Croatian Serbs) to reopen the highway the Croatian Serbs had blockaded. In Court, Sarinic insisted the negotiations had been between Belgrade and Zagreb, not Zagreb and Knin. 'You were involved up to your neck, it is absolutely certain. The Knin leadership could not do anything without you.'
Sarinic also testified about Milosevic's behind the scenes control of RSK politics. He reported his conclusion that Milosevic manipulated Milan Martic's electoral win over Milan Babic for president of the RSK, reporting a teasing conversation he had with Milosevic. Despite Milosevic's support for Martic, Babic had won the majority of votes in the first round of elections. When Sarinic joked with Milosevic about his loss, Milosevic replied that there had been irregularities in the election. When a second round of elections was held, Milosevic's man Martic won.
Sarinic testified that Milosevic warned him on two or three occasions to be careful of both Martic and Babic because they had already committed atrocities. 'The Accused liked to replace people. He accused them of atrocities.' In support of this conclusion, Sarinic reported another incident, this one involving the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Vladislav Jovanovic. At one of their tete-a-tetes, the witness told Milosevic that he felt one of the reasons they weren't getting anywhere in negotiations was Jovanovic's negative attitude. Milosevic responded confidentially 'I will replace Jovanovic, but don't tell anyone.'
Milosevic also had plans in 1995 to remove the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership, most particularly Radovan Karadzic, its president, according to Sarinic. He learned this, he said, from Bora Mikelic, RSK representative in negotiations with Croatia Milosevic said Karadzic was a 'lost politician but was not aware of it.' Milosevic reportedly continued, 'I will try to topple him but by the people in Banja Luka who are reasonable. . . .' General Ratko Mladic, on the other hand, was '200% Milosevic's man.' Mikelic denied the conversation in a letter Milosevic read in Court. Milosevic wanted Karadzic removed because he had become an obstacle to the negotiated settlement that Milosevic needed to end sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. At this time, Milosevic was telling Sarinic that he was going to let the Bosniaks have Sarajevo and that the Serbs had no more than a 50% right to Bosnia (they controlled 70%), a position with which Karadzic did not agree.
The shadow of Milosevic's hand, that of the supreme chess master, could be seen in all these machinations. He appeared to regard the RSK presidents, the Yugoslav foreign minister and the leadership of the RS as his pawns to be moved and removed to achieve his purposes -- the maintenance of power and a place in history.
Milosevic also admitted to Sarinic in one of their one on one meetings that Zeljko Raznjatovic 'Arkan' worked for him. When Sarinic asked him about Arkan, Milosevic laughingly answered, 'I have to have someone as well who is going to do part of the job for me.' The witness said he was well aware of the 'evils' of Arkan and his army and knew Milosevic was behind him. Sarinic further told the Court that Arkan and his army of 5000 could not have been organized and armed without Milosevic's support and financial backing. 'He [Milosevic] was all powerful in Serbia at the time,' Sarinic concluded.
When he had the opportunity for cross examination, Milosevic denied having said anything to him about Arkan. Sarinic insisted it was 'the absolute truth.' The Accused asserted that Arkan's Volunteer Guard was never more than a company, not an army of 5000 men. 'Where do you get such fantastic ideas?' he asked Sarinic. 'From our intelligence services,' the former Tudjman advisor cooly replied, adding, 'If you weren't involved in it, you wouldn't know if it was a company or not.' Following a little more back and forth, Milosevic declared, 'You have no document which could link me to activities of the Serbian Volunteer Guard.' 'No, but you have a reputation for leaving very few traces,' Sarinic answered.
To show Croatia's perfidy in restarting the war in Croatia, the Accused read from confidential Croatian documents, including verbatim notes of Tudjman's meetings with his leadership, disclosing a plan to provoke an incident that would justify renewed fighting. The witness did not deny Croatia's initiation of the attack, but replied provocation wasn't necessary. Any state has a right to take up arms to liberate its territory that has been illegally occupied. When Milosevic accused the Croats of ethnically cleansing Serbs from Croatia during Operations Flash (May 1995) and Storm (August 1995), Sarinic replied that the Croatian Serbs themselves had made plans 2 1/2 years before to evacuate the population. Every two hours, he said, Croatian radio broadcast a plea for Serbs to remain in their homes. Whatever the reason, after Operations Flash and Storm few Croatian Serbs remained in Croatia.
Milosevic also broached the role of the international community, specifically the U.S., in allegedly sanctioning the Croatian attacks on the Serb enclaves in Croatia. Quoting Ambassador Richard Holbrooke from transcripts in his possession, Milosevic confronted Sarinic with Holbrooke's statement that Croatia had justification for the military operation in Eastern Slavonia and that he had defended its position in Washington. 'They [the U.S.] gave you the green light for the operation,' Milosevic accused. Sarinic's diplomatic answer was, 'They saw the negotiations were not going anywhere. They never told us openly that we could launch an action, and they stopped the operation when it was moving toward Banja Luka. . . . Holbrooke was an absolutely pragmatic politician.' Milosevic responded, 'I know how they stopped it -- with me telling Holbrooke we would stop negotiating if they failed to stop it. Holbrooke said he would see Tudjman right away. . . .' Sarinic commented wryly: 'You have turned into a witness.'
Whether the offensive was stopped by Milosevic's phone call or not, neither he nor the RS made any military intervention on behalf of the Krajina Serbs. They were left to their fate. Others have said it was for this reason that Milan Martic, gave orders to bomb Zagreb, which elicited a furious reaction from Milosevic.
Regardless of Milosevic's action or inaction, at least one Krajina Serb went out of his way to show his support for the former President of Serbia, from whom Sarinic said he took orders. Borisav Mikelic faxed a letter to the Accused, dutifully claiming that Sarinic had lied in his testimony the day before. He denied Sarinic's allegation that his relationship with Milosevic was that of a servant to his master. As Judge May reminded the Accused, however, a letter from a friend is not evidence. Milosevic can call Mikelic as a witness at the appropriate time.
The two men, Sarinic and Milosevic, also argued over who was responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its descent into war. Milosevic accused Croatia of seeking independence rather than attempting to save the Yugoslav state. Sarinic accused Milosevic of unilaterally changing the Yugoslav constitution and taking control of the Yugoslav Presidency, which led to its dissolution and the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.
The men who had formerly had many cordial 'tete-a-tete' meetings, then clashed over Kosovo. Sarinic testified that in their last meeting in March 1998, Milosevic shared his ideas for Kosovo. He proposed a bicameral legislative chamber, consisting of Serbs and Albanians, with no possibility of either side outvoting the other. Sarinic remarked that it was far less than the Albanians (who comprised 90% of the population of Kosovo) had under the 1974 constitution. Milosevic responded, 'Yes, but that was a mistake which we will not repeat at any cost.'
Trying to cover as many topics as possible in the nearly three hours the Court allowed him for cross examination, while complaining it was inadequate, Milosevic asked the witness about the bombing of Sarajevo's Markale Marketplace in February 1994. 'Did I say to you that according to information I received the Muslims shelled Markale Marketplace?' 'Yes,' Sarinic agreed, 'you said, 'See how much you can trust them? They killed themselves. Twenty-five are dead. It doesn't mean anything to them.' Later you put the blame on Karadzic.' With additional questions about the results of a French team's investigation, Milosevic secured Sarinic's agreement that their conclusion the shell was fired from Muslim positions appeared to be true.
Another topic he turned to was the Yugoslav Army and Navy shelling of Dubrovnik, a world heritage protected site. Sarinic confirmed that Miloseivc told him no one from Belgrade had approved the shelling. 'I didn't believe you organized it but you certainly knew about it.' He went on to report that Milosevic had also denied that General Veljko Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for Defense, ordered it, but told him that General Bagoje Adzic, Kadijevic's successor, initiated and directed the campaign. Milosevic vehemently denied it. Sarinic added that Croatia had also seized documents that included a 1991 order by the Yugoslav Navy Commander, Admiral Mile Kandic, to cut off Dubrovnik from the rest of Croatia.
While some of Sarinic's testimony repeated what other witnesses have said, it was important corroboration coming from a man at the center of Balkan politics during the period critical to Milosevic's indictment for crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. It showed not only Milosevic's involvement in those critical events, but his control over many of them and his attempt to control them all. It also revealed the role of Franjo Tudjman, Milosevic's partner in this Balkan chess game. In retrospect, it is easy to see he was no match for Milosevic. As long as they were the main players, Tudjman couldn't win. But since it wasn't really a chess game, they had more than each other to contend with, and more to answer for. Over time, the pieces in their deadly game came to life (many only in death) in the eyes of the rest of the world and exposed the reality behind the game: nearly a quarter million people dead and many more wounded, several million refugees and displaced persons, destroyed property, homes, livelihoods, way of life and trust in others and the future. It is that for which Milosevic has been called to answer before an international tribunal. Tudjman died before an indictment was issued against him.
