UN Official Says No Evidence Connecting Milosevic to Srebrenica Massacre
Day 239
UN Official Says No Evidence Connecting Milosevic to Srebrenica Massacre
Day 239
'There is no direct connection established in the Report [to the UN General Assembly] between Mr. Milosevic and the massacres at Srebrenica.' This testimony was given in the Milosevic trial by David Harland, former UN Civil and Political Officer for Sarajevo from1993 to 1999, referring to a report he compiled for the UN Secretary General about the fall of Srebrenica. He followed by concluding that Milosevic knew about and supported the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) attack on the safe area, drawing that conclusion from Serbia's longterm, ongoing support of the VRS and General Ratko Mladic's meeting with Milosevic a few days before.
This is bad news for the Prosecution's efforts to support its charge of genocide against Milosevic. While attack on a civilian population constitutes a war crime, that alone does not constitute genocide which requires a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnical, religious, racial or national group. Complicity in genocide, with which Mr. Milosevic has also been charged, is another matter, however. [See brief discussion below.]
Mr. Harland's conclusion about Milosevic's role in Srebrenica, however, should not eclipse the greater part of his testimony which repeatedly implicated Milosevic in the Bosnian Serb campaign to ethnically cleanse substantial parts of Bosnia of its non-Serb population. According to the witness, the VRS could not carry out its campaign without financial, military and moral support from Serbia. That support included anti-aircraft systems, tanks and other weapons, ongoing maintenance (in Serbia), military personnel, (possibly) a SAM II missile system, and financial assistance. Without it, the Bosnian Serbs would have lost their military advantage and been 'forced to settle on terms that would have made it impossible to bring about the major relocation of populations they had been pursuing,' Mr. Harland told the Court
The former UN officer, who wrote contemporaneous official reports of meetings with the RS leadership, testified that Radovan Karadzic, President of the RS, and Biljana Plavsic, member of the RS Presidency 'said the basic Serbian war aim was to redistribute the population of Bosnia so the Serbs would be left in control of a single, continuous block of territory embracing all of the border with Serbia and Montenegro and including historically important places.' To accomplish this required the removal of the significant Muslim populations, particularly along the Drina River Valley.
After only a few weeks of war, the Bosnian Serbs controlled 70% of Bosnia. Until summer 1995, they basically fought a defensive war to hold onto the conquered territory while trying to force the Bosnian Government to negotiate a peace agreement beneficial to them [Bosnian Serbs]. One of the tactics used to pressure the Bosnian Government was the three year long siege of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the city and squeezed. They cut off or reduced electricity, water, fuel and food supplies, while maintaining an indiscriminate campaign of sniping and shelling. Mr. Harland described it as a 'spigot of terror,' which the Bosnian Serbs turned on or off according to how much pressure was being brought against them by the international community or their own desire for concessions. They also modulated the intensity of sniping and shelling, keeping the general level of terror high while forestalling any dramatic events that would precipitate international intervention.
The shelling of the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, however, was of sufficient magnitude that it made the news. According to the witness, 68 people were killed. In the initial report, Bosnian Government forces were blamed for killing their own people, but a subsequent investigation found the shell came from an area to which both sides had access. Mr. Harland told the Court, 'No final determination was ever definitively made.'
From his many meetings with the RS and VRS leadership, the witness provided the Court with a view of Milosevic from the Bosnian Serb perspective. Though they had embarked on a joint enterprise together, they considered the Accused an opportunist rather than a true nationalist, and compared him unfavorably to Franjo Tudjman, who was a 'true [albeit Croatian] nationalist.' As the witness put it, 'Milosevic was inclined as a gambler to leave the table with his winnings. The Bosnian Serbs had done very well in the war with the help of Serbia. . . . [He felt] they should now make substantial concessions to get a peace settlement. This contrasted with the maximalist position of the Bosnian Serbs.'
More than with any other witness, Judges Robinson and May intervened to ask their own questions of Mr. Harland. Judge May wanted to know what the witness meant by saying the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic had embarked on a joint enterprise. The witness explained, 'They [Plavsic, Koljevic, Zametica] would call it the 'Serbian National Project,' whenever we referred to war or ethnic cleansing . . . .' They 'would say the Serbian National Project was launched with the full understanding of Serbia and they had gotten a lot of support.' Over time, 'as Western pressure on Mr. Milosevic mounted, they felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under them,' when Milosevic pressured them to pull back militarily and reach a negotiated solution.
The Bosnian Serb leadership was frustrated because Milosevic had influenced Mladic to stop the offensive on the safe haven of Gorazde, when they felt they could have taken it. [The RS Assembly transcripts bear this out.] They also complained about Milosevic's influence 'to hold [stay] their hand' in Sarajevo. Rifts grew between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership, as well as between the Bosnian Serb civilian and military leaders. Milosevic extended his influence over General Mladic, which, according to Mr. Harland, reached a peak in 1995 when Karadzic tried to fire Mladic. 'Milosevic clearly had at least influence' in Mladic retaining his position, the witness concluded.
In a question to the witness, Judge May gave an indication of what he understood from the testimony. '[Is it your position] that on the one hand, the Serbian Government and the Accused were giving supplies to the Bosnian Serbs -- material supplies and general moral support -- but on the other hand, the Accused was restraining the Bosnian Serbs where he thought it was in his interest to do so?' The witness replied in the affirmative.
According to Mr. Harland, Milosevic's influence worked both ways. That he used it to 'stay the hand' of the Bosnian Serbs in Gorazde and Sarajevo meant he could have used it at other times to prevent murder of civilians, ethnic cleansing and destruction. Though the witness concluded there was no evidence of Mr. Milosevic's involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, he also concluded that the Accused knew of the assault on the civilian enclave before it happened. He was seen with General Mladic in Belgrade only a few days before the assault. His influence in stopping the assault on Gorazde suggests he might have stopped the assault on Srebrenica, as well. That he did not could support the charge of complicity to commit genocide, with which Milosevic has been charged as well as genocide.
In its pretrial brief, the prosecution lays out the argument in support of Milosevic's responsibility for 'aiding or abetting' or complicity in genocide, based on the law as expressed in the Kvocka trial judgment. '[A]n aider or abettor of persecution 'need not share the principal's discriminatory intent, but must be aware of the broader discriminatory context and know that his acts of assistance or encouragement have a significant effect on the commission of the crimes.'' The image of Milosevic meeting with Mladic on July 7 in Belgrade suggests possibilities to be pursued.
Mr. Harland testified that Milosevic did influence what happened to refugees fleeing the safe area of Zepa which was taken by the Bosnian Serbs almost simultaneously with Srebrenica. Through the intercession of international interlocutors, Milosevic was asked to assure the safety of Bosnian Muslims fleeing from the fall of the enclave into Serbia. He did so, holding them as prisoners of war (he contests that) until they were released at the end of the war. The witness concluded that Milosevic's intercession with the Zepa refugees is 'one piece of evidence that inclines me to believe Mr. Milosevic was not involved with the massacres [of Srebrenica].' Whether he was or not, Mr. Harland provided significant evidence of Milosevic's involvement in the Bosnian war, both in terms of providing military supplies and participating in military decision-making.
Mr. Milosevic began cross examination of the witness today and will conclude tomorrow.
This is bad news for the Prosecution's efforts to support its charge of genocide against Milosevic. While attack on a civilian population constitutes a war crime, that alone does not constitute genocide which requires a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnical, religious, racial or national group. Complicity in genocide, with which Mr. Milosevic has also been charged, is another matter, however. [See brief discussion below.]
Mr. Harland's conclusion about Milosevic's role in Srebrenica, however, should not eclipse the greater part of his testimony which repeatedly implicated Milosevic in the Bosnian Serb campaign to ethnically cleanse substantial parts of Bosnia of its non-Serb population. According to the witness, the VRS could not carry out its campaign without financial, military and moral support from Serbia. That support included anti-aircraft systems, tanks and other weapons, ongoing maintenance (in Serbia), military personnel, (possibly) a SAM II missile system, and financial assistance. Without it, the Bosnian Serbs would have lost their military advantage and been 'forced to settle on terms that would have made it impossible to bring about the major relocation of populations they had been pursuing,' Mr. Harland told the Court
The former UN officer, who wrote contemporaneous official reports of meetings with the RS leadership, testified that Radovan Karadzic, President of the RS, and Biljana Plavsic, member of the RS Presidency 'said the basic Serbian war aim was to redistribute the population of Bosnia so the Serbs would be left in control of a single, continuous block of territory embracing all of the border with Serbia and Montenegro and including historically important places.' To accomplish this required the removal of the significant Muslim populations, particularly along the Drina River Valley.
After only a few weeks of war, the Bosnian Serbs controlled 70% of Bosnia. Until summer 1995, they basically fought a defensive war to hold onto the conquered territory while trying to force the Bosnian Government to negotiate a peace agreement beneficial to them [Bosnian Serbs]. One of the tactics used to pressure the Bosnian Government was the three year long siege of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the city and squeezed. They cut off or reduced electricity, water, fuel and food supplies, while maintaining an indiscriminate campaign of sniping and shelling. Mr. Harland described it as a 'spigot of terror,' which the Bosnian Serbs turned on or off according to how much pressure was being brought against them by the international community or their own desire for concessions. They also modulated the intensity of sniping and shelling, keeping the general level of terror high while forestalling any dramatic events that would precipitate international intervention.
The shelling of the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, however, was of sufficient magnitude that it made the news. According to the witness, 68 people were killed. In the initial report, Bosnian Government forces were blamed for killing their own people, but a subsequent investigation found the shell came from an area to which both sides had access. Mr. Harland told the Court, 'No final determination was ever definitively made.'
From his many meetings with the RS and VRS leadership, the witness provided the Court with a view of Milosevic from the Bosnian Serb perspective. Though they had embarked on a joint enterprise together, they considered the Accused an opportunist rather than a true nationalist, and compared him unfavorably to Franjo Tudjman, who was a 'true [albeit Croatian] nationalist.' As the witness put it, 'Milosevic was inclined as a gambler to leave the table with his winnings. The Bosnian Serbs had done very well in the war with the help of Serbia. . . . [He felt] they should now make substantial concessions to get a peace settlement. This contrasted with the maximalist position of the Bosnian Serbs.'
More than with any other witness, Judges Robinson and May intervened to ask their own questions of Mr. Harland. Judge May wanted to know what the witness meant by saying the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic had embarked on a joint enterprise. The witness explained, 'They [Plavsic, Koljevic, Zametica] would call it the 'Serbian National Project,' whenever we referred to war or ethnic cleansing . . . .' They 'would say the Serbian National Project was launched with the full understanding of Serbia and they had gotten a lot of support.' Over time, 'as Western pressure on Mr. Milosevic mounted, they felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under them,' when Milosevic pressured them to pull back militarily and reach a negotiated solution.
The Bosnian Serb leadership was frustrated because Milosevic had influenced Mladic to stop the offensive on the safe haven of Gorazde, when they felt they could have taken it. [The RS Assembly transcripts bear this out.] They also complained about Milosevic's influence 'to hold [stay] their hand' in Sarajevo. Rifts grew between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership, as well as between the Bosnian Serb civilian and military leaders. Milosevic extended his influence over General Mladic, which, according to Mr. Harland, reached a peak in 1995 when Karadzic tried to fire Mladic. 'Milosevic clearly had at least influence' in Mladic retaining his position, the witness concluded.
In a question to the witness, Judge May gave an indication of what he understood from the testimony. '[Is it your position] that on the one hand, the Serbian Government and the Accused were giving supplies to the Bosnian Serbs -- material supplies and general moral support -- but on the other hand, the Accused was restraining the Bosnian Serbs where he thought it was in his interest to do so?' The witness replied in the affirmative.
According to Mr. Harland, Milosevic's influence worked both ways. That he used it to 'stay the hand' of the Bosnian Serbs in Gorazde and Sarajevo meant he could have used it at other times to prevent murder of civilians, ethnic cleansing and destruction. Though the witness concluded there was no evidence of Mr. Milosevic's involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, he also concluded that the Accused knew of the assault on the civilian enclave before it happened. He was seen with General Mladic in Belgrade only a few days before the assault. His influence in stopping the assault on Gorazde suggests he might have stopped the assault on Srebrenica, as well. That he did not could support the charge of complicity to commit genocide, with which Milosevic has been charged as well as genocide.
In its pretrial brief, the prosecution lays out the argument in support of Milosevic's responsibility for 'aiding or abetting' or complicity in genocide, based on the law as expressed in the Kvocka trial judgment. '[A]n aider or abettor of persecution 'need not share the principal's discriminatory intent, but must be aware of the broader discriminatory context and know that his acts of assistance or encouragement have a significant effect on the commission of the crimes.'' The image of Milosevic meeting with Mladic on July 7 in Belgrade suggests possibilities to be pursued.
Mr. Harland testified that Milosevic did influence what happened to refugees fleeing the safe area of Zepa which was taken by the Bosnian Serbs almost simultaneously with Srebrenica. Through the intercession of international interlocutors, Milosevic was asked to assure the safety of Bosnian Muslims fleeing from the fall of the enclave into Serbia. He did so, holding them as prisoners of war (he contests that) until they were released at the end of the war. The witness concluded that Milosevic's intercession with the Zepa refugees is 'one piece of evidence that inclines me to believe Mr. Milosevic was not involved with the massacres [of Srebrenica].' Whether he was or not, Mr. Harland provided significant evidence of Milosevic's involvement in the Bosnian war, both in terms of providing military supplies and participating in military decision-making.
Mr. Milosevic began cross examination of the witness today and will conclude tomorrow.
