Two Views of Reality: 1989 Removal of Kosovo's Autonomy
Two Views of Reality: 1989 Removal of Kosovo's Autonomy
Jokanovic is a Kosovo Serb with a long history in politics both in Kosovo and at the federal level of the rump Yugoslavia. Notably, he was President of the Kosovo Assembly when it adopted amendments to the Serbian constitution in 1989. Albanians maintain the amendments stripped Kosovo of its autonomy within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Serbs assert they restored Serbia's sovereignty and equality as a republic in the SFRY. Much of Jokanovic's testimony focused on the 1989 amendments.
First, however, he gave an overview of Kosovo history from the Serb point of view. Serbs claim Kosovo as the spiritual heartland of the ancient Serb Empire and consider Albanians usurpers who gradually forced Serbs out through threat, violence and a higher birth rate. Since Kosovo was placed in the Yugoslav Kingdom by the Great Powers following WWI, Albanians living there have sought to secede and join Albania proper, according to this view. Jokanovic maintains this secessionist movement (seeking a Greater Albania) has been a constant in Kosovo Albanian politics. Through this screen, he views the Kosovo Albanian demonstrations of 1968 which, though brutally repressed, contributed to the 1974 SFRY Constitution giving Kosovo (and Vojvodina) significant autonomy. From the Serb viewpoint, it took away Serbia's right to control its territory, thus making it unequal among the other Yugoslav Republics. 'It practically denied Serbia all rights in Kosovo,' Jokanovic testified.
As a result, when further Kosovo Albanian demonstrations occurred in 1981, Serbia could not send in its security forces to assist in restoring order, the witness testified. It could only enter the province as part of a joint force including security personnel from the other Republics. Yet, Jokanovic complained, Kosovo citizens through their Assembly could veto acts the Serbian Assembly wished to pass.
After the 1968 demonstrations, followed by the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional amendments, non-Albanians in Kosovo had a feeling of uncertainty,” according to the witness. Over the next two decades they were gradually pressured to move out of Kosovo. In a question to the witness, Milosevic suggested that Serbia had the duty to protect non-Albanians in Kosovo against the pressure and violence being directed against them, but lacked the constitutional authority to do so. Judge Iain Bonomy interrupted to point out that the witness had not said anything about violence.
These events gave rise to efforts to redraft the Serbian constitution which began in 1986 and culminated with their adoption in 1989, according to Jokanovic. Milosevic made much of the fact that the Indictment against him erroneously alleges that the Serbian Assembly proposed the amendments in early 1989, when the process was undertaken three years earlier by a Constitutional Commission and was subject to extensive public debate. The error, if error it was, doesn't go to the charges against Milosevic, however.
The most controversial amendment was #47, which required the Serbian Assembly to seek the 'opinion' of the provincial Assemblies (Kosovo and Vojvodina) before changing the Serbian constitution. Formerly, their “consent” was necessary. While opponents objected that the provision had not been adequately discussed by the public, Jokanovic said it resulted from those discussions. The changes also granted Serbia control over police, security services and other aspects of Kosovo autonomy.
In addition, Milosevic challenged the Indictment as a lie for claiming the Kosovo Assembly did not pass the amendments by the required two-thirds majority and that most Albanian members refrained from voting. According to Jokanovic, 187 members of the 190 member Assembly were present; ten voted against the amendments, two abstained and the rest voted in favor. They were adopted to applause and a standing ovation, he said. Milosevic showed a short video clip supporting the testimony and provided a transcript of the proceedings. Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice advised the Court that pages were missing from the transcript and that he would seek to bring a rebuttal witness to testify on the issue.
Prosecution witnesses earlier testified that members of the Assembly were pressured into voting for the constitutional changes, and that military tanks or anti-personnel carriers surrounded the Assembly building as further intimidation during the vote. The Prosecution also asserted that non-Assembly members voted in a show of hands voting, all of which Jokanovic categorically denied, suggesting the Prosecution had been manipulated by Albanian separatists. In cross examination, Nice established that emergency measures had been imposed in Kosovo in February 1989, the month before the vote, which imposed a curfew, prohibited strikes and brought in federal troops.
According to the witness, there was overwhelming support for the constitutional changes. Only 'Albanian separatists' were opposed. Milosevic produced a file of newspapers from the period, including an Albanian-language paper, which he claimed reflected 'an atmosphere of complete consensus.' On cross examination, Nice asked the witness about a challenge to the amendments that was filed with the Kosovo Constitutional Court. Again, Jokanovic dismissed it as being filed by Albanian separatists. According to Nice, the Constitutional Court annulled the vote, but Serbian authorities dissolved the Court before its decision could be effected. Jokanovic similarly dismissed the massive demonstrations and miners’ strike which followed the vote as inconsequential because those involved were separatists. In Jokanovic's view, all opposition is dismissed as separatists and, thereby, becomes nonexistent. From this, it isn't difficult to see why differences between Serbs and Albanians persisted.
Dr. Ivan Kristan, former judge of the Yugoslavian Constitutional Court, testified earlier for the Prosecution that the 1989 amendments violated the SFRY constitution because it was the SFRY that granted autonomy to Kosovo, therefore, only the SFRY could withdraw it. Though called as a constitutional law expert, Dr. Kristan was not allowed to provide expert testimony on the issue because he declared his position that the amendment was illegal when the issue was presented to the SFRY Constitutional Court. As a result, the Prosecution has yet to find a constitutional law expert to present its case who will satisfy the judges. See CIJ reports, 'Court Finds Former Constitutional Court Judge Not Sufficiently Disinterested,' May 23, 2003; 'Constitutional Expert Says Serbia Violated Federal Constitution,' September 1, 2003.
In cross examination, Nice put significant parts of the Prosecution’s case to the witness, but he would not budge from his view of events. Even when Nice suggested that the constitutional changes did more than restore Serbia’s equality with other republics by giving Serbia control over three votes on the eight-member federal presidency, while other republics had only one vote each, Jokanovic insisted the former provinces elected their own representatives, free of Serbian (or Milosevic’s) influence. In response to Nice’s assertion, “The history you described to the Court is one of this Accused effecting the centralization of power in Serbia,” the witness responded, “Serbia was only given back the essential functions every other republic had.”
Showing a video clip of the 1989 session of the League of Communists where Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic’s mentor, was ousted and Milosevic was installed as president, Nice questioned the witness about Milosevic’s orchestration of the process. Azem Vllasi, Kosovo Albanian and communist party leader, says on the video tape that Milosevic canvassed every possible vote, and Milosevic says: “No one is going to stand in the way of our reforms.” When Nice asked the witness if taking over leadership of the Communist Party was part of the reforms Milosevic speaks about,” Jokanovic declined to answer since he didn’t attend the session.
Jokanovic challenged Nice over the power he ascribed to Milosevic, power Milosevic just did not have, he insisted. Judge Kwon intervened to ask if the Accused didn’t exercise considerable power as president of the Serbian League of Communists. The witness answered that the president of every party has influence over its members. He can propound his position, but he is not the only decision-maker. Proposals also come from the grassroots and other fora. Please. Don’t believe Slobodan Milosevic held a magic wand and that he appointed and replaced [officials]. He had no such power. It is true he had authority. He was held in great esteem.”
Nice persisted with his case, “The process of reform and the memorandum [of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, SANU] provided opportunities the Accused took, in each case adopting, however silently, the position of the memorandum and the process of reform to establish his power base.” Jokanovic also persisted in disagreeing.
The Prosecutor read from two newspaper articles, based on interviews with the witness. Since they were given in 1982 and 1986, and were only two among many, Jokanovic said he was unable to recall them. The newspaper articles are not evidence, but were merely used as a device by the Prosecutor from which to question the witness, except for quotations ascribed to him. In the case of former statements, they may be used to impeach a witness if they are inconsistent with the witness’s testimony. For the most part, they didn’t work to do that. As Jokanovic pointed out, journalists choose what to print, including selective choice of quotations.
It was only near the end of cross examination that Nice got the better of Jokanovic, when he denied any knowledge of the names of paramilitary units or how they or the Red Berets were financed, or of federal support for Serbs fighting in Croatia and Bosnia despite being a deputy in the Federal Assembly which passed the federal budget. He also denied knowledge about how spending was supervised in the Dafina Bank, though he headed the investigation into its collapse and the fraud it perpetrated on the public. Nice concluded by asking Jokanovic if, as Federal Minister of the Interior, and later Federal Prosecutor between 1994 and 2000, he had any knowledge that General Ratko Mladic’s employment file, recently made available by Serbia and Montenegro, showed he was kept on the federal payroll until 2002, how he was paid and why. The witness denied knowledge of it, except what he read in the press. He stated further that it was a military matter, over which the Federal Interior Minister had no authority.
Milosevic conducted a brief , professional re-direct examination. It allowed the witness to re-assert that the 1989 emergency measures in Kosovo were imposed by the Presidency of the SFRY (not Milosevic), that amendment 47 to the Serbian constitution emerged from discussions in a democratic process in Kosovo and Vojvodina, that none of the guests at the 1989 march assembly session voted, that the show of hands voting was legal, that, while it was possible to challenge the vote in one of the constitutional courts in Yugoslavia, there was no challenge, that no deputies were prosecuted or arrested who voted in opposition or could have been since deputies have immunity, and that no one from Belgrade could have decided on appointments in Kosovo until 1990.
With the unshakeable position of a true-believer, Jokanovic, for the most part, presented Milosevic's case well. Except for continuing problems with untranslated documents served at the last minute, if at all, Milosevic also showed himself capable of making a proper defence.