Being Neutral In a Non-Neutral Situation: The UN Problem in Bosnia

In his second day of direct testimony and under cross examination by Milosevic, Mr. Charles Kirudja revealed the major weakness of the United Nations in responding to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia: its insistence on being neutral in a non-neutral situation, i.e. treating aggressors and victims as if they were equally guilty.

Mr. Kirudja, a former UN official in the Balkans, testified to the accuracy of reports he sent his superiors as early as May 1992 of Serbian forces ethnically cleansing parts of Bosnia. In one report, he relayed information from refugees about the existence of concentration camps in Keraterm, Prijedor, Trnopolje, Omarska and Manjaca, in which conditions were 'atrocious,' including regular beatings and deprivation of food and water. General Sadish Nambiar, force commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, telephonhed Mr. Kirudja to express his concern about the allegations. Very politely, he asked, 'Charles, do you really believe there are concentration camps?' When Mr. Kirudja replied yes, it was what they were being told, the General suggested 'maybe they were detention camps.' Though the witness did not back down, the UN took no action at that time to investigate. Not long after, the images of skeletal men behind barbed wire hit television screens around the world, after a British TV crew gained access to one of the camps.

In a written response to his reports about Bosnian refugees streaming into his area (Sector North in Croatia), Mr. Kirudja's superiors told him not to get involved in what was going on in Bosnia. He characterized the response as 'sad, though not unexpected.' 'We were not exceeding our concern. We were responding to people in need drawn to where we were by the fact of the UN flag flying [over our building].' Mr. Kirudja informed his staff that they would continue to respond. As well, he continued to make reports to his UN superiors. And the local Serb officials continued to ask for UN assistance to relocate thousands of Bosnian Muslims.

On cross examination, Milosevic read a recent statement attributed to General Nambiar to the effect that there was 'no genocide beyond the killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions.' His representative on the ground, however, disagreed. 'We did see violence from all three groups, but not of equal magnitude or weight in terms of numbers, repercussions, and impact,' Mr. Kirudja said. Milosevic then showed a videotape of the General stating, 'None of my troops ever gave me any reports of genocide . . . . There were allegations by other people, but my troops were not a witness to it and none reported it to me.' In response, Mr. Kirudja pointed out that the General had very carefully limited his statement to his 'forces,' referring to military forces while Mr. Kirudja and his staff were civilian. The General's statement, he said, might be technically correct, but not factually.

Many analyses and criticisms have been written about the UN role in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, including by the UN itself. Today's courtroom drama is an apt illustration. Despite reports from their own observers in the field, UN officials continued to put the events into a context that fit their mission. Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was not on the UN agenda in mid-1992. Their mission was to observe the demilitarization of forces in Croatia, while a political settlement was sought through another process. Reports of ethnic cleansing and concentration camps were inconvenient. They concerned Bosnia, an area beyond the immediate UN mission. Perhaps, if they didn't notice -- or if they called a concentration camp a detention facility -- it would go away. Yet, avoidance is rarely a viable strategy.

In defense of the UN, it is only as good as its members and structure permit -- and its members wanted the Balkans conflict contained more than they wanted a real resolution that might have required more involvement than they were prepared for. At a minimum, however, they should have found another name for their mission than UN Protection Force, since they were not designed to or capable of protecting anyone. A salve to some consciences was a deception to desperate people -- and that was indefensible.

While UN officials sought to ignore the growing crisis, local Serbian mayors sought UN help in carrying out their ethnic cleansing activities. Mr. Kirudja testified that he was shocked when one of them presented him with a computer list of 7700 plus names of Bosnian Muslims who they wanted UN assistance in relocating. '[The meticulous list of people to be relocated] was a reminder of WWII,' he said. When he confronted local officials about how wrong this was, they responded with a lack of comprehension, as well as determination to carry out their plan.

One official, however, did not show such naivete when Mr. Kirudja resisted UN involvement in the relocation of Bosnian Muslims out of Bosnia. According to Mr. Kirudja's contemporaneous notes, the man warned, 'If the Serb side is not respected there could be massive deaths on both sides. If we are left to resolve the matter by ourselves, we will resolve it very quickly.'

Mr. Kirudja and his staff were caught on the horns of a dilemma. On one side were their UN superiors who didn't want to hear about ethnic cleansing or concentration camps. On the other were local Serbian officials who tried to implicate and involve them in their ethnic cleansing operation. In the middle were the Bosnian Muslim refugees, homeless and desperate. To aid the refugees to find safety was also to aid the local Serb officials in their project of cleansing Bosnia of its Muslims. In such a situation, Mr. Kirudja chose to do the only humane thing -- to help the refugees, to confront the Serbs and to continue reporting the horrific situation to his superiors. If his conscience is clear, those of others should not be.