French General Warned of Srebrenica Risk

General Philippe Morillon is a somewhat mythical figure in the history of the Yugoslav wars, best known for his personal intervention to try to raise the siege of Srebrenica in 1993.

Last week, prosecutors called him to take the stand against Slobodan Milosevic.

The former commander of the United Nations’ UNPROFOR peacekeepers told the court that he had no doubt that Milosevic exercised considerable influence over the Bosnian Serb military and that the former Serbian president knew that terrible things were afoot in Srebrenica as early as 1993.

The general’s testimony appeared to be in tune with the sense that prosecutors intend to pursue a charge of complicity in genocide. Unlike the charge of genocide itself, complicity does not require proof of intent – something that has so far proved elusive in the case the prosecution has been building.

To prove complicity, prosecutors would need to show that Milosevic was aware that those he conspired with, or supported to a significant extent, had the intention of committing genocide.

In his testimony, General Morillon said that after seeing the besieged enclave of Srebrenica in 1993, he contacted Milosevic because he believed that the then Serbian president was the only one who could control the Bosnian Serbs’ military commander, General Ratko Mladic.

He met Milosevic and asked him to persuade the Bosnian Serb Army to allow aid convoys to enter the enclave and injured people to leave. Morillon said he believed Milosevic was the only person who could do this, as he alone exerted any authority over General Mladic.

In referring to Milosevic’s control over the Bosnian Serb commander, Morillon appeared to imply a degree of personal authority, rather than formal control through a military command structure. However, the exercise of a significant degree of authority, even if informal, would be enough to prove guilt.

At their meeting, Morillon urged the president to “help me attempt to save the people”.

Shortly afterwards, Morillon said, Bosnian Serb forces began allowing aid into Srebrenica and some of the wounded were permitted to leave. But the siege continued for a further two years, culminating in the final assault of July 1995 in which Serb forces overran the enclave and massacred some 7,000 men and boys.

When Prosecutor Dermot Groome pressed him to provide details of what he feared would happen in 1993, Morillon seemed incapable of doing so – “Something terrible could happen” was as specific as he got. He concluded that what he feared then, was to happen two years later – something that still haunts him.

Although Morillon did not use the word genocide, prosecutors appeared to be trying to prove that as far back as 1993, Milosevic was aware of the potential for genocide in Srebrenica specifically; and that not only did he take no action to prevent it, he continued to support and supply the Bosnian Serb army.

Morillion cited other examples in which Milosevic showed that he was able to control the Bosnian Serb leadership.

Earlier in 1993, he sought and received Milosevic’s help in securing a temporary halt to the bombardment of Sarajevo. When he met the president together with General Satish Nambiar, the then UNPROFOR commander, Milosevic promised to use his influence with Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic to get the shelling stopped – and to warn him that Belgrade might withdraw its support if the artillery assault continued.

A cease-fire was duly agreed, although like subsequent ones it proved transient.

Once again, Mladic emerges as the principle culprit in General Morillon’s account.

However, in testimony that appeared to contradict his earlier statement that Milosevic was able to control Mladic, the French general said he felt Karadzic wanted to stop the siege, but could not get his army commander-in-chief to do so.

Mladic obeyed no one except himself – certainly not Karadzic, said Morillon.

Morillon said he blamed Milosevic for “setting the dogs loose”, but said he thought the former Serbian president lost control of Mladic after May 1993, when the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan, for which the Serbian leader had strongly advocated.

In cross-examination, Milosevic referred to a 1992 report from the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which he advised the Security Council that the Bosnian Serb army was apparently no longer under Belgrade's control.

Morillon’s response to this was that the emphasis should be placed on the word "apparently".

The Secretary General was in New York, while he himself was on the ground, "In reality we knew very well Belgrade continued to exert its authority on Mladic".

Pressed by Milosevic on the root causes of the Yugoslav wars, Morillon responded, “History will tell…. I think the drama came out of memories of atrocities of past and ancestral fears that were fuelled, and you are one of those responsible for having sowed this fear, for having armed – for having pushed – those who were unleashed, became enraged and escaped your control."

Judith Armatta is based in The Hague for the Coalition For International Justice (http://www.cij.org)