US and Russia Should Not Compete in Central Asia

Wednesday, 10 November, 2010

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Dina Tokbaeva

Central Asia Editor

Leading Central Asia expert Alexei Malashenko says that if major external powers like Russia and the United States cooperate rather than compete on security issues in the region, everyone will win.

Malashenko, a specialist on Central Asian politics and political Islam at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, discussed the prospects for Kyrgyzstan and the wider region in an interview for IWPR while he was in the capital Bishkek on November 3. He was attending a round-table debate hosted jointly by IWPR and the Institute for Public Policy in Bishkek.

IWPR began by asking him what Moscow wanted from Kyrgyzstan, given the upsurge in speculation about Russia’s role on the political scene there.

Alexei Malashenko: Russia has yet to clearly formulate what its national interests are along the perimeter of its frontiers, including its relationship with NATO. Of course, attempts to define them are being made. This applies equally to Central Asia.

Central Asia is part of the former Soviet expanse, there’s a Russian military base here [at Kant airport, near Bishkek], many politicians express pro-Russian views, and there’s a fairly substantial Russian-speaking population.

If Russia backs stability here, then its influence in the region will automatically increase. Thus far, Russia has tried to play the role of mediator on some contentious issues, for example water. That hasn’t always been a success.

Given that Russia wields substantial influence in Kyrgyzstan, and assuming the new prime minister is pro-Russian, that’s going to be very important for Russia – Kyrgyzstan will be a country where it feels comfortable. Kyrgyzstan represents a very good strategic platform for Russia. So we can talk about common national interests.

Relations with Russia are undoubtedly important to Kyrgyzstan, too. The media in Kyrgyzstan have even described Russia as the main focus for Kyrgyz politics. That may be true, but nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan is pursuing a multi-vector policy, which features the American factor as well as Kazakstan and China.

If this trend continues, [Russian-Kyrgyz] relations will strengthen. And it goes without saying that it’s not at all to Kyrgyzstan’s advantage to be in conflict in Russia.

IWPR: To what extent can we talk about a Great Game, the model used in the western media, with regard to the transit hub [US air base for supplies to Afghanistan] at Manas airport? Or are things a lot more complex than that?

Malashenko: This isn’t a game. It’s an attempt to somehow rethink current relationships. It’s an attempt by the Russians to assert Russian interests to the Americans, and by the Americans to see whether Russia can be an effective partner for establishing stability in Central Asia.

It’s too simplistic to talk about competition just because there’s the Manas base here and Kant there. First, Russia and the US are, after all, states of differing magnitudes. Second, Russia is not fighting in Afghanistan. And third, relationships in Central Asia fit into the broader context of American-Russian relations which cover NATO, the Caucasus and so on. In other words, it’s wrong to view trends here in isolation. At the moment, the Central Asian region is a kind of common area of cooperation, thanks to Afghanistan.

Of course both sides have ambitions. And the Americans aren’t planning to move out of somewhere they’ve moved into. Whatever one calls Manas, the main point is that it’s American planes sitting there.

IWPR: What’s the reason for Russia’s current enthusiasm for cooperating with NATO on Afghanistan, and what does that mean for Central Asia?

Malashenko: To answer that, we will need to know who’s going to head the US Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs after the Congressional elections; whether it will be [John] McCain or someone else. A lot will hang on that.

I’m not going to comment yet on how the Americans are going to behave and how Russia will react to this. Russian policy is entirely reactive. There is, incidentally, a risk that relations will deteriorate over Georgia, and this would have an immediate impact in Central Asia, since it’s all interconnected.

As for the fact that Russia is now cooperating with NATO – that’s normal.

The story of the joint US-Russian anti-narcotics operation [in Afghanistan in October] is interesting. The head of the Russian federal counternarcotics service Viktor Ivanov was there in the spring and was well received. But it looks like Afghan president Hamid Karzai was offended that he was not apprised of the operation; that they didn’t trust him. There have also been reports in Russia that Russian military instructors might return. That looks unlikely, but they are writing about it it. There’s no doubt that Afghanistan is keeping an eye on what Russia does.

IWPR: How great is the threat posed to Central Asia by the Taleban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU] at the moment?

Malashenko: There will be a threat if the Taleban become part of the ruling coalition in Afghanistan. If the Americans and Russians agree to this happening, questions then arise as to what this means for the Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan. After all, the Islamic radicals there also talk about social justice and corruption, and they have the same ideology.

With regard to the IMU: first of all, it does exist, although it’s unclear in what numbers. Its fighters are armed and are trained. The IMU enjoys external support, in the shape of funding and training camps. Its combatants include Arabs and people from the North Caucasus and Uzbekistan; it’s a quasi-international movement.

They might play some role in the event of conflict situation in Uzbekistan. The same would be true of Kyrgyzstan, if it experienced something worse than what happened this year [mass ethnic violence in June]. It’s a real armed force which claims it is fighting for justice. So it’s potentially a very important factor. And there’s also [the banned Islamic group] Hizb ut-Tahrir.

IWPR: Who or what do you think was behind events in the Rasht valley [clashes between government troops and militants in eastern Tajikistan]?

Malashenko: In Tajikistan, it is a mishmash of things – problems to do with the Islamic opposition, relations between the regions, the “family” [of President Imomali Rahmon], and political Islam.

The Islamic Rebirth Party was the main force behind the United Tajik Opposition [in the 1992-97 civil war], but it’s been sidelined. As the situation deteriorates, it’s becoming more active, criticising the authorities and demand a role in decision-making. But it is loyal to the regime; it consists of “Islamic reformers”.

There is also Hizb ut-Tahrir… and once again the IMU. Islam thus occupies a political space in Tajikistan. Add to that the general trend for Tajik society to become more Islamic and more archaic, and the immense number of mosques and madrassas, and the conditions for an upsurge in Islam do exist. And Afghanistan is just over the [frontier] river. The Russian base [in Tajikistan] is thus a real factor for stability.

IWPR: Is it possible that Tajikistan could see a repeat of the kind of events that led to regime change in Kyrgyzstan?

Malashenko: If this happened, it would mean another civil war. But people are still worn out by that [first civil] war. After the conflict ended, I remember how people were proud of [small things like] having the traffic lights working again. Would a mother whose son was ten when the conflict ended send him, now aged 20-plus, to war?

IWPR: There’s often been talk of closing down the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Is that just speculation by politicians to curry favour with Russia, or is it a realistic demand?

Malashenko: First of all, the reason the Manas base is there is the conflict in Afghanistan. It will remain there as long as [conflict in] Afghanistan goes on. The planes will stay - both the US and Russia need them.

Secondly, supposing there is speculation in Kyrgyzstan about closing the Manas base. The Americans can do without it if they have to. They can shift the base to Turkey, although that would be more expensive. No one would win.

The Manas-Kant pairing is truly pragmatic – it is a symbol of [US-Russian] proximity, and it’s to Kyrgyzstan’s advantage as well.

There could be another scenario where the Americans shift to Uzbekistan, and set up a large version of Khanabad [US air base until 2005]. An American base there would be permanent. Russia thus has no interest in driving out the [US base]. No serious politician in Kyrgyzstan is going to tell the Americans to remove the base.

Dina Tokbaeva is IWPR’s editor for Kyrgyzstan.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign Ministry of Norway.