Tajik-Uzbek Spy Case Highlights Political Divisions

A string of spy accusations involving neighbours Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is merely a reflection of the deeply trouble relationship between these Central Asian states, analysts say.



In a trial in October, a court in the Soghd region of northern Tajikistan handed down sentences of up to 22 years to five officials at a uranium plant who were found to have passed secrets to Uzbekistan.



The spy ring allegedly involved top officials at the uranium plant in the town of Chkalovsk, including its director and the heads of its engineering, building and security departments.



In a separate incident in late October, an Uzbekistan national was arrested in Chkalovsk and accused of passing sensitive information to Uzbek police. The Tajik security service, quoted by the Fergana.ru news agency, did not specify the nature of the information but said the man had passed himself off as a top intelligence officer.



The Chkalovsk plant was set up to supply locally-mined uranium to the Soviet power and defence industries, but work slowed almost to a halt after Tajikistan became independent in 1991. Efforts have been made to revive processing, but using highly radioactive waste material left over from the past and stored in dumps rather than freshly-mined uranium.



Uzbekistan has a successful uranium industry of its own and is likely to be interested in its neighbour’s intentions.



As one Tajik analyst who asked to remain anonymous said, accusations of espionage may well be true but should hardly come as a surprise.



“All countries conduct intelligence work in territories of interest to them,” he said. “For instance, Russia, the United States and maybe some others conduct intelligence operations in Tajikistan in order to gather information.”



What sets these allegations apart is the implication that Uzbekistan is engaged in subversive activities in its smaller neighbour. The accusations also cut both ways – five people were convicted in a similar espionage trial in Uzbekistan in 2006, for example.



Despite their geographical proximity, cultural similarity and the presence of a Tajik minority in Uzbekistan and vice versa, the two states have had arguably the most troubled relationship in post-Soviet Central Asia.



On the political front, Tashkent has in the past accused its neighbour of failing to curb Islamic rebels who used Tajikistan as a launch-pad for raids in 1999 and 2000. The Tajiks alleged Uzbek support for a 1998 coup attempt by rebel army commander Mahmud Khudoiberdiev.



According to a leading Tajik political scientist, Parviz Mullojonov, “The fundamental reason for discord between the Central Asian states is that after they gained independence, each of them has been seeking its own place in the region. Uzbekistan aspires to the role of regional leader, as does Kazakstan. In turn, that is not welcomed by their neighbours. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan don’t want to play the role of vassals.”



Even more fundamental is the dispute over water, and specifically Tajikistan’s plan to build more hydroelectric dams which the Uzbeks – living downstream on the Amu Darya waterway – say will starve them of water during the crucial growing season.



A related set of disputes concern energy – the Tajiks are unhappy that the gas-rich Uzbeks pay nothing for water while charging them near the full commercial rate for fuel supplies.



Last month, the Uzbeks announced their withdrawal from the integrated Central Asian electricity grid. Speaking at a press conference in Dushanbe on November 23, Uzbek ambassador Shokasim Shoislamov made it fairly clear where the blame lay, hinting that the Tajiks were disrupting the shared grid by siphoning off electricity on the quiet.



Tashkent’s withdrawal from the common energy system will make it harder for the Tajiks to import electricity from Uzbekistan or in transit from Turkmenistan; and to export its own electricity when it has a surplus over the warmer seasons.



In response to the Uzbek move, Tajikistan has threatened to limit the amount of water reaching Uzbekistan along the Syr Darya river, saying it needs to fill up its reservoir at Kayrakkum in order to increase power production.



“The water and energy issue plays a very major role in the power-struggle,” said Mullojonov. “Uzbekistan has always feared being dependent on the upstream states [Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan], and it will continue to do so. It will do anything to stop this happening.”



The animosity with which such disputes, ranging from water to espionage, are handled reflects the long-standing mistrust between the two states.



Rajabi Mirzo, an independent journalist in Tajikistan, says the animosity is not felt between the average citizens of either country, but that “it’s there in the top echelons of power. And according to media reports, [Tajik president Imomali] Rahmon himself spoke about it during a meeting with journalists.”



Mirzo was referring to remarks attributed to President Rahmon during a meeting with local journalists on December 8, at which he is reported to have spoken in frank detail about the troubled Tajik-Uzbek relationship and his own dealings with President Islam Karimov.



Rustam Haidarov, a research academic based in Dushanbe, says it is not uncommon for close neighbours to be fearful of one another.



“An external enemy generally becomes necessary when a country has social and economic problems,” he said. “The image of an enemy distracts people from domestic problems, and can be held responsible for most of these problems.”



Sayfullo Safarov, deputy director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in Tajikistan, insists the recent espionage trial must be viewed dispassionately and must not be allowed cloud diplomatic relations.



“Spy mania is a very bad ailment affecting the newly independent states. There are crimes and there are relations between states,” he said, suggesting that the two things should be kept separate.



Parvina Khamidova is Tajikistan editor for IWPR's EC-funded Human Rights Reporting Project.