Syria Conflict – No End in Sight

As protests in Syria enter their sixth month, the regime continues to use extreme violence to try to stamp out the uprising, drawing sanctions from the international community and condemnation from the Arab world.

IWPR contributor Zoe Holman looks at the regional response to the brutality and assesses western action against the regime and the opposition’s prospects.

How have Syria’s neighbours responded to the deepening conflict?

The stakes are high for the regional balance of power. The Baathist regime in Damascus is of great strategic significance to surrounding states. It has allied itself with so-called "rogue" powers like Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, and has been accused of fuelling conflict in neighbouring Iraq by providing easy transit for insurgents.

Because President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is dominated by the minority Alawite group, and because Syria’s religious and ethnic makeup is so complex, other Arab states are afraid that the current struggle could descend into civil war, generating chaos and economic instability in the wider region.

Initially, Lebanon and Iran voiced unqualified support for the Assad regime. Other key players like the Arab League and Turkey were slow to criticise the regime’s crackdown, out of a reluctance to rock the boat.

However, there now seems to be a growing awareness that – with or without Assad – the uprising is going to lead to a different kind of political system. Leaders in each of the regional states are now calculating how best to respond to the crisis so as to maximise their influence with whoever ends up in charge in Damascus.

Saudi Arabia, which exerts a strong influence over the Arab League, recently issued a strongly-worded condemnation of the Syrian regime’s violence, but thus far it has not called on Assad to step down. It seems to be see maintaining a secure business environment in the region as a priority. It’s also looking for ways to marginalise Iran both politically and as an oil producer. As a result, the Saudis may opt to broker negotiations between the regime and the opposition, with a view to a peaceful outcome where Assad stays.

Assad is fast losing support elsewhere. Turkey, which had been building strong ties with Damascus, has grown impatient with Assad as the threat of instability grows and the refugee crisis spills over its own borders, and is taking an ever stronger stance against the violence deployed by his regime.

There are also indications that even the support of Hezbollah and Iran is no longer unconditional. Although both would prefer to see their long-term ally remain in power, fearing that any replacement would be worse for them, they are aware that his ruthless approach is not working. Hezbollah senses that its close association with Assad’s increasingly violent and isolated regime could affect its own reputation and political credibility.

The Iranian foreign ministry, meanwhile, has warned that a power vacuum would have alarming repercussions for Syria’s neighbours and has urged Damascus to listen to its people’s “legitimate demands”. Even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has urged Assad to change his ways. 

How effective is international action against the regime likely to be?

Unlike in Libya, Syrians have expressly opposed any form of armed intervention in their struggle. In light of this stance, and the current lack of western appetite for further military involvement in the region, any intervention by the international community is likely to be limited in scope. Many opposition members hope that the expanding range of targeted sanctions against the oil industry and key business figures will see the regime weakened without the need for further armed action. There have been some suggestions that limited military support could be supplied to the opposition, although this has had little traction both amongst the Syrian opposition and the international community.

Moreover, any concerted action at a United Nations level is likely to be vetoed by Russia – and possibly China – which both have lucrative arms and natural gas deals with the Assad regime. If diplomatic and economic measures fail to end the violence, the only foreign armed intervention which may prove acceptable to Syrians is some form of Arab-Turkish measure aimed at preserving regional stability.

Again, this too seems an unlikely prospect. Despite Assad's recent concessions to human rights inspectors, such as allowing the Red Cross access to prisoners, the regime has given little indication that it will yield to international pressure. But it is possible that increased international isolation will take its toll. Some analysts have pointed to the final withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, following the assassination of former Lebanese leader Rafiq Hariri, as an indication that pressure can be brought to bear on the regime. 

To what extent does the regime retain the support of the military?

There have been some rumours about defections in the security forces, but these are difficult to substantiate. Unlike in Egypt, it does not seem that the Syrian people can expect the military to ally with the opposition in the near future. The armed forces are also dominated by members of the ruling Alawite group – almost 70 per cent of the career soldiers – and appears to be highly loyal. The army’s most elite division, the Republican Guard, is commanded by the president's brother, Mahar, and due to its fearsome reputation has been deployed in key centres of unrest like Hama, Latakia and suburbs of Damascus.

Some analysts have suggested that as military resources are spread ever more thinly, the regime might need to deploy conscripts who may be more resistant to open fire on their own people and therefore inclined to defect. But there are also fears that, at least in the short term, large-scale military defections are more likely to result in civil conflict than an all-out victory for the protesters.

Has the opposition become stronger or more divided in recent months?

Despite indications that the protest organisers on the ground in Syria are trying to be more coordinated, the Syrian opposition remains far from united. Anti-regime forces are roughly divided between Local Coordination Committees on the ground, many of whose members are young activists with little political experience, and the opposition abroad, made up of exiled dissidents, artists, politicians and business figures.

The new generation of politically-active Syrians has accused the opposition in exile of being out-of-touch and unrepresentative, and it is true that the old guard has been notoriously splintered by long-standing political and ideological differences. These divisions were made all the more evident by an attempt by some opposition exiles to form a National Transitional Council, a move which was not only rejected by a large proportion of the foreign opposition but also subsequently condemned by activist groups inside Syria.

Voices in the international community have reinforced the need for a cohesive Syrian opposition if the revolution is to succeed. But despite their differences, the opposition on the ground has made an effort to disprove the Assad’ warnings about sectarian violence by stressing that their struggle has united Syrians. Indeed, opposition ranks have been joined by some high-profile figures from the worlds of business, law and the arts, and the defection of the Hama governorate attorney-general Adnan Bakkour - which Assad loyalists tried to explain by insisting he had been kidnapped – points to dissent within the regime.