A Soldier's Dilemma: Unlawful Orders at Srebrenica
Tuesday, 7 October, 2003
A Soldier's Dilemma: Unlawful Orders at Srebrenica
Tuesday, 7 October, 2003
A soldier's obligation towards international law requires his or her independent assessment of whether an order violates the law. If the soldier or officer decides it does, then their duty under international law further requires them to take independent action, to question their superiors and, if necessary, to disobey the order at obvious risk to themselves. Since 99% of military training and experience is one of obedience, independence of mind and action is not a well-honed skill. The military person's dilemma is heightened when it occurs in the heat of combat.
Dragan Obrenovic, former co-accused in the trial of Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic for crimes committed at Srebrenica, brought this dilemma into the courtroom when he testified for the prosecution. Like his other former co-accused, Momir Nikolic, he pled guilty to crimes against humanity and agreed to testify in exchange for the prosecution dropping genocide charges and recommending a lighter sentence.
Mr. Obrenovic was a career military man, having begun his training in the military gymnasium at age 15. As a Yugoslav Army (JNA) soldier, he rose quickly through the ranks. By the time of the events surrounding Srebrenica, the then-32 year old was made acting commander of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
After the fall of the Srebrenica safe haven to the Republika Srpska forces (VRS and MUP), he [Dragan Obrenovic] and his units were engaged in setting an ambush for the large column of soldiers from the Bosnian Government Army 28th Division who were trying to reach Bosnian Government territory -- a legitimate military activity according to both prosecution and defense military experts in the Krstic trial. Though Obrenovic testified he didn't know the column contained a substantial number of civilians (possibly as many as 2/3rds), he later learned it did.
In the evening of July 13, he received a call from Lt. Drago Nikolic, Chief of Security for the Zvornik Brigade, advising him that a large number of prisoners would be brought from Bratunac to Zvornik and preparations should be made. Nikolic received his information from Lt. Col. Vujadin Popovic, Assistant Commander of Security for the Drina Corps. Nikolic asked Obrenovic to relieve him of his duties with the Brigade so he could take part. He also requested that the Zvornik Brigade military police unit (MP) be put at his disposal.
Obrenovic asked his Security Chief why prisoners would be brought to Zvornik instead of the prison at Batkovici. Obrenovic told the Court that '[Nikolic] said prisoners were not going to be sent there because the Red Cross and UNPROFOR knew about it. The order was to take the prisoners and execute them in Zvornik.' That was how Major Obrenovic first learned about the plan to massacre Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Srebrenica, a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war.
He responded that the Brigade could not accept that obligation without the knowledge of their commander and without reporting back to the superior command. Nikolic said the order came from General Ratko Mladic, head of the VRS, and that the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Vinko Pandurevic, knew about it. Col. Ljubomir Beara, Chief of Security for the Main Staff of the VRS, and Vujadin Popovic were to personally implement the plan and they wanted Nikolic to be included.
Mr. Obrenovic made no attempt to contact his commander or General Mladic, telling the Court he had no reason to doubt what Nikolic told him. He apparently did not consider contacting them to protest that the order violated the Geneva Conventions. Nor did he consider refusing any connection with it. He merely told Nikolic he had already deployed the MP unit, but would see what he could do. When Prosecutor Peter McCloskey asked if, at that moment, he had decided to support the operation to kill Muslim prisoners, he answered simply, 'Yes.'
While Mr. Obrenovic did not order Nikolic to participate in the killing operation, he told the Court he tacitly approved it by permitting Nikolic to get someone to take over his duties in the unit and by saying he would do what he could to secure MPs. When asked what he should have done according to his training in the JNA, Mr. Obrenovic replied, 'I should have forbidden him to do any such thing. I should have looked for Colonel Pandurevic and the Corps Commander and opposed it.' He didn't because he was afraid and 'felt it was pointless to complain.' At that time, he had information that 3000 Muslim prisoners were to be killed.
Mr. Obrenovic was not personally involved in the killing operation. However, he released Nikolic from his duties so he could participate and soon ordered 6 men from the military police unit to assist him.
Shortly after his conversation with Nikolic on the evening of July 13, Obrenovic received information that the column of Bosniak soldiers had just entered the Zvornik area of responsibility. He left headquarters with reinforcements for his units in the field, where they engaged the Bosniaks in fierce fighting. By the 15th the bulk of the column he estimated at 6000 men had moved behind his troops and were threatening three of his battalions. Obrenovic returned to headquarters for more reinforcements.
As he entered the HQ building, the accused Major Dragan Jokic, Chief of the Engineering Battalion for the Zvornik Brigade, called out to him. Jokic told his commander he was having problems burying the prisoners because of the way Popovic, Beara and Drago Nikolic were conducting the operation. Obrenovic impatiently replied it was none of his business and went to his office to await the expected arrival of his Commander, Vinko Pandurevic. This was Obrenovic's only testimony implicating his former co-accused Dragan Jokic in the Srebrenica massacre. He admitted in court that it was his business and he should have responded to Major Jokic.
The day before (July 14) when Obrenovic was in the field conducting the ambush, he received a radio message directing him to send two engineers to Zvornik from the field. He was suspicious that they might be wanted to assist in the burial of executed prisoners. When he had his signalman check it out, his suspicions were confirmed. The operation they were needed for was that headed by Popovic, Beara and Nikolic -- the execution of prisoners. Nevertheless, he ordered these two men released to participate.
From his testimony, it appears that Obrenovic did his utmost to ignore the crimes he knew were being perpetrated, while doing what was requested of him to facilitate their commission, and to focus instead on legitimate military actions. In his office on the 15th, Obrenovic discussed the plight of the Zvornik Brigade in the field with MUP (Ministry of the Interior) officers, Dragomir Vasic, Ljubisa Borovcanin and Milorad Stupar. MUP forces were actively engaged in Srebrenica. The four men agreed the way to save the Zvornik Brigade units was to make a corridor to allow the Bosniak 28th Division to pass through to Bosnian government held territory. When they attempted to advise their superiors in the Main Staff and Ministry of the Interior, they met with dismissive responses. They were to destroy the Muslim forces and that was that. The authorities showed no understanding of the situation on the ground or how to deal with it. Eventually, they reached General Krstic who told them their Commander Pandurevic would arrive soon and he would deal with it.
When Pandurevic arrived, Obrenovic first informed him briefly about the prisoners, Beara's and Popovic's killing operation and the problems Jokic was experiencing with burial. Pandurevic wanted to know why the civilian defense wasn't doing the burials, but Obrenovic didn't know. They said no more about the killing and burial operation, but went on to discuss the Zvornik Brigade's predicament in the field.
Pandurevic opposed the idea of a corridor to let the Bosniaks through, saying that no one had the right to trade Serb land. Instead, he ordered additional units to attack and surround the column. Major Obrenovic returned to command the units in the field. By the 16th, the Zvornik Brigade's Fourth Battalion was surrounded and cut off. Pandurevic finally ordered Obrenovic to negotiate a cease fire and open a corridor to allow BH forces through. The corridor, however, was only open for 24 hours and Pandurevic refused a request to keep it open longer to allow all of the BH men to get through. Based on information from the Bosniak commander, Mr. Obrenovic testified that 7000 men made it through the corridor, including 3000 who were armed, before it was cut off. More than a thousand men remained behind VRS lines, were eventually captured and shared the fate of the other prisoners. (The Krstic Trial Chamber found that 2/3 of the column consisted of civilians. It also found that the column was a legitimate military target because of its military component.)
Mr. Obrenovic testified to the on-site burial of battle casualties. He estimated the numbers of killed in battle on both sides at fewer than 100. His testimony directly contradicts the claims of massacre deniers that the mass graves which have been found contained battle casualties rather than captured soldiers and civilians. Moreover, the witness told the Court that after the corridor was closed and following the killing of one of the VRS soldiers, his Commander ordered that prisoners should be killed on the spot. When Mr. McCloskey asked whether that meant in combat or after being captured, Mr. Obrenovic replied, 'I am speaking about both.' While some units ignored the order and took prisoners alive, those prisoners were eventually executed.
Fellow officers also told Obrenovic about killing operations they knew of or participated in. Lazar Ristic said he had responded to an urgent request from Captain Milorad Trbic for men to help deal with a problem at the Orahovac school, where some of the prisoners were attempting to break out. Later, he went to Orahovac to retrieve his men, but was stopped by Drago Nikolic. Ristic told the witness that execution of the prisoners had already begun and that several members of the Zvornik Brigade had participated. Obrenovic took no action against his men. (The Krstic Trial Chamber found that members of the MP of the Zvornik Brigade participated in execution of about 1000 prisoners at Orahovac, and that equipment from the Brigade's Engineering Company was also used in the operation.)
Captain first class Ostoje Stanisic told the witness about a massacre of prisoners at the Petkovci school. Stanisic was distressed at having to use a unit for corpse removal and clean up. The Krstic Trial Chamber also concluded that Zvornik Brigade equipment and its Engineering Company were used at Petkovci to transport prisoners to the execution site and to bury them. In addition, Stanisic confirmed to Obrenovic that Col. Beara had brought prisoners to Orahovac and organized the execution there. He said the 10th Sabotage Detachment took part in both executions.
Mr. Obrenovic identified a half dozen sites where Muslim prisoners were executed and buried: The Petkovci Dam, Orahovac school, Kozluk, two sites in Pilica including the Dom Kultura, and the Kula schoolhouse. He learned about these from his fellow officers in the days following the killings and mass burials.
In mid-September, after becoming suspicious of a requisition for 5 tons of fuel, Obrenovic learned from his commander, Vinko Pandurevic, that it was needed by Popovic for a reburial operation. Apparently, the Corps Command felt the initial burial sites might be discovered. The corpses of prisoners were exhumed and reburied to hide what everyone involved must have known was a crime of massive proportions.
Obrenovic was a cog in a killing machine. He was not the inventor or the operator. Still, he performed his part faithfully. The machine worked well. Had he refused to carry out orders that facilitated the killing operation, no one can say whether it would have had any effect in stopping the machine or even making it less effective. Perhaps others would have followed his lead. Perhaps he would have been removed from duty or shot.
What is haunting is the meeting in Obrenovic's office on July 15. He and his fellow officers discussed at length the predicament of the Zvornik Brigade. They agreed the solution was to open a corridor for the BH soldiers to retreat. They contacted the highest authorities they could reach in both the civilian and military command to get approval for their solution. Though it was rejected on the 15th, their commander partially implemented it the following day.
Obrenovic reported no comparable discussions among his fellow officers about the mass killing operation of Bosnian Muslim prisoners. At most, there were private conversations in which information about the killings and mass burials were shared. To what end, Mr. Obrenovic did not say. The men were clearly more comfortable discussing military strategy. It was part of being an officer. The other less practiced part of being an officer -- assuring adherence to the Geneva Conventions -- was easier and safer to ignore. Mr. Obrenovic, a young man with a once brilliant military career, who faces a potentially long prison sentence, now knows otherwise. His fate should stand as a lesson to all officers and soldiers who may one day be confronted with a soldier's ultimate dilemma.
