Identity and Motive of Baghdad Bank Raiders Still Unclear

Doubts and inconsistencies surface after assault on Iraqi financial centre.

Identity and Motive of Baghdad Bank Raiders Still Unclear

Doubts and inconsistencies surface after assault on Iraqi financial centre.

A day after the assault on the Iraqi central bank, the firefighters were still busy, their faces blackened and their hoses directed at the smouldering building. Water streamed into the structure and smoke poured out.

Amid the din of the traffic and gushing pipes, they worked silently. The ground around them was muddy and the walls drenched, as if by a rainstorm.

Though the summer sun blazed over Baghdad, it seemed winter had returned to Sharaa al-Nahar street.

On the pavement, bloodstains remained from the previous day’s carnage. Men in military uniforms, equipped with guns and explosives, had stormed the bank on the afternoon of Sunday, June 13.

Some of the attackers blew themselves up, others took hostages and hid inside the building. At the end of a siege that lasted late into the evening, at least 25 people had been killed and parts of the bank were burning.

Officials described the raid as a terrorist attack, carried out by al-Qaeda insurgents. Others suggested it was an attempted heist.

Both explanations invite further questions. Despite the use of suicide bombers, the assault does not resemble previous strikes by Sunni insurgents, which typically seek to cause massive casualties as swiftly as possible.

Nor does the raid exactly fit the mould of a robbery. Officials said no money was taken during the assault. Moreover, the route to the central bank is guarded by hundreds of men. In the streets nearby, easier targets abound for the opportunistic raider, including small businesses and jewelry stores.

None of the theories offered for the assault reflect favourably on the Iraqi security forces.

Anxiety over their abilities have been heightened by the planned withdrawal of the bulk of United States troops later this summer, and by the prolonged failure of Iraq’s leaders to form a government after an inconclusive election three months ago.

“The attack tells us that Iraqi forces are unable to take full responsibility for security,” said Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, a political analyst. He added that the conflicting theories offered for the attack suggest “a lack of co-ordination and understanding”.

“Our security agencies are run by politicians who are in dispute, so the differences between them are reflected in our security,” he said.

Outside the bank on Monday, June 14, afternoon, other inconsistencies were apparent. A soldier at a checkpoint on Shorja street insisted all the fires had been put out.

Across the block on Sharaa al-Nahar street, a dozen firefighters were hard at work.

A fireman in muddy rubber boots urged his colleague in a vehicle to hurry up. “It is afternoon now and we still haven’t had any breakfast,” he said.

Asked when he expected to finish, the fireman replied, “probably tonight if we’re lucky – or tomorrow morning.”

DIFFERING ACCOUNTS

Major General Qasim Atta, the head of the Baghdad Operations Command, a body in charge securing the capital, told IWPR the bank had been surrounded by checkpoints, manned by officers under his control.

On June 13, a further 1,000 security personnel from a variety of units had joined the guards stationed around the bank to fight the attackers, he said.

The Baghdad Operations Command, which answers to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has announced an investigation into the raid.

The interior ministry, headed by politicians who competed against Maliki in the recent election, has also said it will carry out an inquiry into the attack. The ministry of national security is expected to produce a report on the raid too.

Initial statements issued by the security services suggested the bank had been attacked by seven men, all of whom were eventually killed. Later reports said the number of attackers might have been higher, and some may have escaped.

“Seven of the gunmen were killed, four were arrested, and there are probably others who escaped. We do not have the exact number for the group but we will know soon,” Atta said, in an interview on June 15.

Witness accounts collected by IWPR indicate at least 14 men took part in the raid, targeting the bank’s two entrances in teams of seven.

Near the bank’s entrance on Sharaa al-Nahar street, a porter in his fifties, giving his name as Abu Shehab, said he saw the start of the raid.

“Seven men dressed in military uniform stopped for lunch at the kebab restaurant,” he said.

“After finishing their food, they shot a young man here,” he went on, pointing to some bloodstains on the pavement. “He did not speak to them or stop them. They shot him just to frighten people.”

As they approached the bank, one of the raiders blew himself up near a generator, setting it on fire, Abu Shehab continued. The other men went into the building.

Shortly afterwards, Abu Shehab said he saw a man in an army officer’s uniform enter the building, accompanied by four firemen. He later heard that four firemen had been shot dead inside the bank by a man in military uniform.

Abu Shehab’s account was confirmed by two men nearby, who also said they had witnessed the attack.

At the other entrance to the bank, on Shorja street, Husam Hammodi, the owner of a nearby clothing store, said he too had seen seven men attack the bank, with one of them blowing himself up at the gate.

“Later, some of the attackers took up sniper positions on the roof of the bank and shot at the security forces,” he said. “Helicopters came and the battle lasted until dark.” A group of men sitting with Hammodi confirmed his account.

INSURGENT THEORY

A woman who was working inside the bank said she heard gunfire and explosions at two-thirty in the afternoon.

“One of my colleagues went out to see what was going on. We heard more gunfire. He did not come back. Later we found he had been killed,” she said.

The woman, who asked not to be identified because of fears for her security, said she remained in her office until five-thirty in the evening.

“I forgot my bag there, I was terrified,” she said. While returning to the bank on June 14 to retrieve her bag, she said she was told by a colleague over the phone that no one would be at work, most likely for the rest of the week.

However, a senior bank official interviewed on June 14 insisted business was back to normal.

“There is some damage to the bank, nothing worth mentioning, and the employees are working there right now,” Mudhir Mohammed Saleh, adviser to the central bank and head of its statistics directorate, told IWPR.

“It is not a problem if some less important employees are staying at home temporarily,” he said, when told that the bank appeared to be deserted on June 14.

“The damaged parts of the bank do not represent the heart of the Iraqi financial system,” Saleh said. “All that is important has been backed up.”

By some shopfronts near the bank, a group of young men sat smoking a nargileh, or water-pipe. They agreed that the raid had been carried out by al-Qaeda.

“I do not think this is a robbery,” said Qasim Mohammed, a man in his late twenties who owns a nearby garment shop. “This bank could not even be looted in the hawasem.” Iraqis use the term hawasem for the period of anarchy that followed the US-led invasion in 2003.

As he spoke, a man wearing an army uniform walked past and smiled at the group. “I know him, we trust him,” Mohammed laughed. “He is not a suicide bomber.”

This story was reported by Abeer Mohammed, IWPR’s local editor in Baghdad. It was edited by Neil Arun, IWPR’s Iraqi Crisis Report editor in Baghdad.

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