Comment: Myth of Pro-Akaev Uzbeks Shattered

Why the Uzbek community of south Kyrgyzstan supported the “tulip revolution” rather than clinging to a regime which thought it had their unqualified backing.

Comment: Myth of Pro-Akaev Uzbeks Shattered

Why the Uzbek community of south Kyrgyzstan supported the “tulip revolution” rather than clinging to a regime which thought it had their unqualified backing.

Sunday, 20 November, 2005

As a journalist in southern Kyrgyzstan, I found myself at the epicentre of the turbulent events in Osh and Jalalabad that led up to the March 24 ousting of President Askar Akaev.


Until the protest movement began gathering strength, the received wisdom was that the Uzbek community who account for a sizeable proportion of the population of southern Kyrgyzstan would unquestionably support President Askar Akaev. Many analysts, and the government itself, believed Uzbeks and other minorities had invested all their hopes for the future in the administration.


While the Akaev administration wanted to be seen to be inclusive, and rhetorically termed Kyrgyzstan "our common home”, it liked to portray its opponents as narrow-minded Kyrgyz nationalists who would never win the votes of minorities who feared their intentions.


For a long time, that may have been at least partially true. Some Uzbeks still harbour deep-rooted concerns about what would happen to them if a dyed-in-the-wool Kyrgyz nationalist came to power and persecutions began.


Many simply believed Akaev was the best of a bad lot.


The “tulip revolution” has demonstrated the radical shift away from the regime that the Uzbeks have undergone. It has also given the lie to scaremongering that the disturbances could ignite communal violence between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south of the country.


As an ethnic Uzbek from Osh, for whom Kyrgyzstan is home, I can give a first-hand account of how the community gradually became drawn into the protests.


After first-round elections were held in Karasuu on February 27, people began rallying in support of two candidates, Baiysh Yusupov and Arap Tolonov. Yusupov was the authorities' favoured candidate as he was running for the pro-presidential party Alga Kyrgyzstan. Supporters of Arap Tolonov blocked the Osh-Karasuu road – and eight out of ten of them were Uzbeks, although he, like his opponent, is a Kyrgyz.


I remember how during the election campaign in early February, Roza Otunbaeva, co-leader of the Atajurt movement, went to address supporters of Anvar Artykov, an ethnic Uzbek candidate.


As Otunbaeva spoke to the voters in their own Uzbek language, I realised things had started moving, and people began to warm to her. “Roza is great, she’s a heroic woman!” said a community elder.


The demonstrations in Osh took off after the first round of voting was over. About a third of the people who came out onto the city square were Uzbeks who supported Artykov. The demands they made were mostly not political, but calls for fair elections.


At the same time, supporters of Duyshenkul Chotonov, the deputy leader of the Ata Meken party, began demanding the resignation of Askar Akaev. Other protesters began to arrive at the same view: Akaev should resign, and only then could there be honest elections.


I saw Artykov, Chotonov, Otunbaeva and Topchubek Turgunaliev, a leading human rights activist, all speaking.


When Turgunaliev told people he preferred “a kindred Uzbek who upholds the truth to a corrupt Kyrgyz”, Uzbeks began to have greater confidence in the opposition.


This process of winning over the Uzbeks took a very short time, as opposition politicians showed they had no intention of ever expelling the Uzbeks and that they regarded Kyrgyzstan as their homeland, too.


In a short space of time, the two communities have developed a mutual understanding and a willingness to live together.


Initially, urban Uzbeks did not take an active part in the Osh protests. After March 15, Uzbek businessmen began sending food to the protesters. One donated around 10,000 soms (250 US dollars) for food, but did so anonymously. Another donated a bull to provide meat for the revolution.


After the Osh regional administration was taken over on March 18, the number of urban Uzbeks taking part in the demonstrations increased, and they began to chant slogans directly against Akaev. There were many women and teenagers among the protesters.


The women, including many who had come in from nearby villages, said they were longer prepared to put up with a situation where their husbands and sons had to spend much of the year as migrant labour in Russia because there was no work at home.


“Our husbands are in Russia, and my daughter-in-law hasn’t seen my son for a year. Is that a normal life? There is no work and nothing changes,” one woman shouted into my dictaphone.


“We used to think that Kyrgyz and Uzbeks would never be able to live on friendly terms. But now we have achieved it, and this happened because we have common problems,” said one Uzbek elder. “We are all badly off, and all our children are working in distant lands.”


Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south are united by common problems – unemployment, corruption, and a shortage of water, land and food.


Many Uzbeks have realised that the Akaev era is over, and that they might find better opportunities in the new world. The are placing great hopes in the new regime, including the creation of new workplaces, fair employment policies and an end to corruption, which has reached unprecedented levels in the south in recent years.


There are highly qualified lawyers of my age who make a living as taxi drivers. One of them explained why, “I don’t want to buy the position of prosecutor for 50,000 [US] dollars, and then recoup the money by taking bribes myself.”


There is considerable sympathy with the leading opposition figure Kurmanbek Bakiev, who is interim prime minister and acting president. There is a sense he is in touch with his fellow-southerners’ concerns and will be more likely to respond to them, Some people even say his surname is Uzbek, not Kyrgyz, so he could share a common ancestry with them.


Uzbeks are still wary of some other politicians, for example the northerner Felix Kulov, because of his past work in the security services. Two southern Kyrgyz politicians, Omurbek Tekebaev, the new speaker, and Adakhan Madumarov, are also under suspicion here because of nationalist remarks they have made in the past.


Although many male elders would not be against Roza Otunbaeva standing for president, some Uzbek women are against this because they think their sex should behave in a traditional manner and stay out of politics.


The appointment of Artykov, an Uzbek, as governor of the Osh region is a clear sign that the Kyrgyz have confidence in their Uzbek compatriots.


In the south, there was none of the looting seen in Bishkek, because Osh and Jalalabad are relatively small cities where everyone knows everyone. Anyone seen stealing in public would be easily identified, and the shame would dog their family for years to come.


Another restraining factor was that if a business belonging to an Uzbek was attacked by a Kyrgyz, or vice versa, the ethnic angle could rapidly escalate into bloody intercommunal conflict.


The only places that suffered were linked to Akaev associates. The offices of the Areopag communications firm, said to be owned by an Akaev family member, were robbed, as was a cafe belonging to Aidar Bakiev (no relation of the prime minister) who heads a youth movement and is known to be an ardent supporter of Akaev.


All in all, I have been very surprised by how the Uzbeks have acted. I never expected them to go against the system. But it turned out that everyone wanted change. That makes me happy to have been born here in Kyrgyzstan.


Alisher Saipov is a correspondent for the Fergana news agency.


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