Caucasus Hopeful After Peace Deal, But Spoilers Loom
The US-brokered agreement leverages major business projects to resolve a long-standing conflict. But can it survive the dangers ahead?
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The peace treaty signed on August 8, 2025 by Armenian premier Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev under the auspices of US President Donald Trump marked a historic step after decades of conflict.
The comprehensive deal was followed by a series of US State Department agreements signed separately with Armenia and Azerbaijan on security, energy, technology and strategic development.
At the heart of this is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a US framework that proposes linking Armenia and Azerbaijan through new transit and economic corridors that aim to resolve long-standing conflict through large-scale infrastructure, trade and regional integration projects.
The move marks the beginning of more direct and proactive US regional leadership, highlighting shifting power balances long dominated by Russia and with implications extending beyond the South Caucasus to the broader Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions.
Ahmad Alili, director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre (CPAC) in Baku, Azerbaijan, noted that confidence-building measures between Armenia and Azerbaijan could spill over into broader cooperation.
“A stabilised South Caucasus could rebrand itself as a secure, reliable link between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East,” he told IWPR. “This would open up virtually limitless opportunities for cooperation and investment.”
But despite its geopolitical and diplomatic significance, the agreement leaves major questions unanswered – not least the glaring absence of a human element to the process.
Borders remain closed, particularly between Armenia and Turkey. Trade ties are absent, and people-to-people contact between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is virtually non-existent.
In this sterile scenario, can the process survive, especially given internal political tensions that further complicate the deal’s prospects?
Extra-regional Powers
Russia, long Armenia’s main security guarantor, initially praised the deal while highlighting its own contribution to its success and implicitly seeking acknowledgment and inclusion.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear in comments to journalists in September that the treaty had been borne from the 2020–2022 agreements between the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
However, introducing a note of cynicism, he continued, “As it turns out, far from everything has been agreed upon. There is a genre in foreign policy where something needs to be made bright and presented attractively in the media space.
“I believe that such a method has its place in certain situations, but if nothing follows from it, it will remain just a flash in the pan.”
Mehriban Rahimli, a consultant on Azerbaijan for the US German Marshall Fund, noted Russia’s extensive scope for interference, not least through malign influence operations.
“Armenia’s parliamentary elections in mid-2026 provide Russia an opportunity to interfere, potentially through disinformation or support for pro-Russian factions, to undermine the project if it threatens Moscow’s regional influence,” he said.
Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, appears content with an agreement that strengthens its strategic corridor through Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani enclave within Armenian territory. But Tehran warned that the planned transit route through Armenia could threaten Iran’s security and limit its access to the Caucasus.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian travelled to Yerevan shortly after the signing of the deal for reassurances that Armenia would have exclusive jurisdiction over routes through its territory.
"We believe that leadership in the region should be Caucasian, and transferring problems outside the region to extra-regional powers will further complicate the situation in the region,” Pezeshkian told journalists.
Both Russian and Iranian officials have highlighted the importance of strategic projects they have been pursuing in the region. For Russia, this is the North-South Corridor, while Iran refers to a similar or parallel initiative, the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor.
Alili identified potential threats from these two state actors that would attempt to advance their own agendas.
“The biggest sources of instability in the South Caucasus are Russia and Iran who are likely to exploit grievances to derail implementation. Both are unhappy with the stronger American and Turkish presence in the region,” Alili told IWPR.
“Tehran and Moscow are advancing the “3+3” platform - Russia, Turkey, and Iran on one side, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the other - with one key idea: no external presence in the region. By external, they mean the US and Europe, while considering themselves regional actors.”
Peace Without People?
None of the documents signed as part of this historic deal specifically address improvements in people-to-people relations, even under U S mediation.
Some fear that without addressing societal reconciliation through education, culture, or economic exchange, the deal risks entrenching hostility rather than healing it.
“So far, the peace deal has primarily functioned at the level of governments and international mediators, while people-to-people relations remain marked by deep wounds, mistrust, and trauma from years of conflict and violence,” said Gulnara Shahinian, an independent human rights expert in Yerevan, Armenia. “Formal agreements can help by halting violence, opening borders, and creating frameworks for cooperation, but they do not automatically heal divisions within societies.”
Past treaties illustrate these challenges. The 2019 Paris agreement, which aimed to prepare populations for peace, ultimately failed, culminating in a large-scale war in 2020 over Nagorny Karabakh.
“The government media dominance allows to direct public opinions in both countries in any direction be that conducive to peace or under opposite towards renewed war,” said Rahimli. “But the second option represents higher risks for the governments because both populations are tired of decades long animosity.”
The absence of projects of civil and public interest, for example on the joint preservation of sites of cultural heritage and addressing the issues of legacies of war, is striking. With many reconciliation mechanisms dismantled, including international development programmes and humanitarian funding, it remains unclear how grassroots dialogue will be fostered.
“Deep-seated mistrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, fueled by nationalist rhetoric and historical grievances, continues to obstruct reconciliation and negatively impact regional security,” said IWPR Armenia project manager Knarik Mkrtchyan.
“To reduce the hostility and construct positive peace, broader and more comprehensive efforts are required,” she continued. “For example, educational reforms that promote mutual understanding and reduce hate and harmful narratives, cultural and religious heritage protection, ensuring that each side’s cultural legacy is respected and restored, address the gendered impact of the conflict to develop relevant recovery and reintegration policies and most importantly ensure transparency and public diplomacy efforts, where leaders consistently use language of peace and reconciliation rather than threat and dominance.”
“Opportunities exist,” agreed Shahinian, noting that leaders and external actors needed to ensure peace dividends reach ordinary citizens.
“The region could shift from recurring conflict to sustainable stability,” she said, adding,
“[The deal] may stop hostilities at the state level, but real peace will depend on parallel processes that humanise the other side and gradually transform societal attitude. Without this human-centred approach, a formal peace risks remaining fragile."
