What Next for Moldova?

Tatiana Puiu

IWPR media expert

Friday, 8 November, 2024

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The election win by Moldova’s pro-European president Maia Sandu has been over-shadowed by the clear domestic divisions her victory has highlighted. Her comfortable win over opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo in the second round was primarily due to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora, where more than 82 per cent of votes were cast in her favour. Within the country, the popular vote swung behind the Kremlin-friendly Stoianoglo. IWPR’s Moldova media expert Tatiana Puiu explains how a key priority will be winning over domestic voters, especially considering their vulnerability to disinformation.

What are Sandu’s most immediate challenges and what will be her most urgent moves to address them?

Maia Sandu’s first four years in power were marked by turbulence, as Russia's war in Ukraine escalated regional tensions and significantly impacted Moldova’s economic vulnerabilities and security concerns. In addition to these ongoing external challenges, the most recent presidential elections underscored a significant internal divide. The diaspora and the urban population, particularly in Chișinău, predominantly supported Sandu. In contrast, rural areas and smaller towns leaned towards Alexandr Stoianoglo. This split reflects the different priorities and perspectives of these groups.

She has acknowledged that her government had made mistakes, and identified judicial reform as aa key priority to ensure transparency, accountability and independence and thus restoring public confidence and combating corruption.

Whether Sandu can fulfill her promise to unite Moldova over the next four years will depend on how quickly and effectively she can take action, considering complex challenges, including external geopolitical pressures.

While Sandu’s win demonstrates great support for her pro-European agenda, the tiny margin of the referendum on accession held on the same day as the first round of the presidential election (voter turnout was 50.72 per cent) indicates that almost half of the population remains sceptical about EU membership.

What is the likely impact of indications that the Moldovan diaspora ensured Sandu’s success – and the clear divisions in voting preference between Chisinau and the regions?

Voter turnout abroad reached a record high, with over 328,855 citizens participating in the second round of the presidential elections, including mail-in votes. The Moldovan diaspora in Russia was notably active, with the Central Election Commission reporting 4,999 voters at each of the two polling stations in Moscow. High participation was also observed in Italy, France, and Romania.

Sandu’s overwhelming victory in the diaspora fueled criticism from the opposition, who argued that she won due to the diaspora’s influence. Within Moldova, Stoianoglo secured 51.33 per cent of the vote, while Sandu garnered 48.67 per cent. The Socialist Party, which nominated Stoianoglo, accused Sandu of being an illegitimate president and labeled her as the “president of the diaspora”.

Much of Stoianoglo’s lead in Moldova came from high turnout from breakaway Transnistria with more than 26,000 voters crossing the river to vote and favoring Stoianoglo by over 79 per cent. Stoianoglo managed to achieve an overwhelming victory also in autonomous Gagauzia, where 97 per cent of voters cast their ballots for him.

What evidence of malign influence or interference emerged during the votes?

These elections were marked by significant allegations of voter bribery. On the night following the first round, Sandu claimed that 300,000 votes had been bought. The police reported that 130,000 citizens were involved in a network set up by supporters of the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, via which participants received compensation for their votes. According to police reports, 39 million US dollars had been sent to Moldova from Russia for this purpose. These events highlighted the challenges faced by Moldovan institutions responsible for protecting the electoral process as they struggled to counter the influence of well-organised networks that used both disinformation and financial incentives to sway voter turnout.

Authorities highlighted specific actions believed to support Stoianoglo, such as chartered flights that transported Moldovan expatriates to Belarus, Azerbaijan and Turkey to vote, suggesting a coordinated effort to increase his voter base. The Moldovan foreign ministry reported that overseas voting stations in Frankfurt, Germany, as well as in Liverpool and Northampton in the United Kingdom, which served expatriate citzens, were targeted by false bomb threats “intended solely to disrupt the voting process”.

Stanislav Secrieru, a Sandu national security adviser, described the interference as “massive” and with significant potential to impact the election outcome. This sentiment was echoed by Prime Minister Dorin Recean, who noted that voters across the country had received anonymous death threats intended to dissuade them from casting their ballots.

Furthermore, Moldovan authorities pointed to a series of cyberattacks targeting the national voter record systems. These attacks were seen as coordinated efforts to create confusion and chaos at polling stations, potentially undermining voter confidence. According to Secrieru, Moldova’s cybersecurity agency also reported that the voter information site run by the country’s Central Election Commission was temporarily unavailable on the day of the vote due to a DDoS attack. Other coordinated cyberattacks reportedly targeted the connectivity of Moldova’s national voter record systems and disrupted links between polling stations domestically and abroad.

International observers said in a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions that the “interference from abroad, including the offering of illicit monetary incentives to influence voters, that marred the first-round campaign continued to reverberate in the period leading to the second round”. This foreign interference was identified as predominantly coming from the Russian Federation and pro-Russian political forces.

Has the pro-Kremlin opposition been strengthened by the tight results?

The Kremlin's longstanding goal of re-establishing its dominant influence over Moldova has consistently included supporting pro-Russian politicians. Despite Sandu’s re-election, her opponent Stoianoglo secured a significant percentage, reflecting substantial support for pro-Russian sentiments within the country.

Stoianoglo's campaign tactics, which featured an emphasis on European integration similar to Sandu’s pro-European stance, were strategic. By presenting himself as a unifying figure aiming to bridge societal divisions, Stoianoglo sought to appeal to voters who supported EU integration. This approach, which involved adopting pro-European rhetoric while subtly aligning with Kremlin-friendly views, was intended to split the pro-European vote and weaken Sandu's support base. However, his strategy included framing himself as a unifying figure who sought to bridge gaps within Moldovan society.

The Socialist party announced on November 4 that it did not recognise the results from overseas polling stations and declared Stoianoglo the “true winner,” emphasising that he received the majority of votes cast within Moldova. They further indicated plans to consult with other political parties and civil society to create a "common strategy for depoliticising state institutions and ensuring fair conditions during election campaigns” ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections.

It is clear that the Kremlin is prepared to pursue multiple avenues in the future to derail Moldova’s European path.

What can we expect to see in the political scene ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections?

Since Moldova is a parliamentary republic, the president’s powers are mainly focused on foreign policy, while also holding the role of supreme commander of the armed forces. Next summer’s elections could significantly change the balance of power in the legislature, which means Sandu may need to collaborate with a new parliamentary majority and government. Experts predict that neither party nor any other is likely to secure an outright majority, making a coalition the most probable outcome.

Jone Blikra, head of the PACE election observer delegation, said that the presidential elections “confirmed how deeply divided Moldova truly is. The president-elect will need to build bridges to heal these societal rifts, especially with parliamentary elections on the horizon next year”.

The key question is whether this coalition will be pro-European. This will depend on various factors, both internal and external. Moldovan voters have shown that they expect quick results, and if these expectations are not met, their trust in the government can quickly erode.