The Trouble With Insiders II: Aleksandar Vasiljevic

By definition, insider witnesses were at one time close to the Accused. They have information that can implicate the Accused in crimes, crimes in which they themselves may have participated. They often share the same worldview as the Accused. They testify for a variety of reasons -- revenge, self-interest to avoid being prosecuted, a sense of justice, patriotism, wanting their story on the record.

Because of this, they present a challenge for any prosecutor. Along with important incriminating information which may not be obtainable from any other source may come information that does not particularly favor the prosecution's case. A good prosecutor, however, will take the risk, relying on his or her ability to assist the court in sorting the wheat from the chaff -- by argument or through other witnesses and documentary evidence. Somewhat less risk is involved when a case is being tried to experienced professional judges who are well-practiced in weighing all types of testimony, as is the case with the ICTY.

After General Aleksandar Vasiljevic's last day of testimony, lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice must be reviewing the pluses and minuses to decide whether the General's helpful testimony outweighed his testimony that was not so helpful. It must be noted at the outset that a significant amount of the witness's testimony was given in private session. Any conclusions drawn herein are subject to that important caveat. It should also be noted that Milosevic conducted a fairly professional cross examination, eliciting important concessions from the General.

The General contradicted a number of prior witnesses (or vice versa). One was Slobodan Lazarevic, military intelligence operative, who provided significant testimony about the Yugoslav Army (JNA) and Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) involvement in instigating a conflict in the Serbian Krajina region of Croatia. When Milosevic asked the General whether Lazarevic had ever been a member of KOG (colloquially known as KOS), the military intelligence agency in which Vasiljevic served for several decades, the last few years as its chief, Vasiljevic said categorically no. He added that it was absolutely impossible for Lazarevic to have been a member without him (Vasiljevic) knowing.

Vasiljevic also denied testimony from another former KOG member, Mustafa Candic. Mr. Candic testified that he was present when General Vasiljevic angrily denounced Milosevic's attempt to have all JNA generals sign loyalty oaths to him as President of Serbia. On the stand, in response to a question by Milosevic, the General denied ever having done it.

In answer to Milosevic's questions, General Vasiljevic testified that Croats burned tires in Dubrovnik to garner international attention and sympathy for intervention. When prosecutor Geoffrey Nice gave him the opportunity to say the tires might have been attached to cars that were burning, as shown in a videotape seen by the Trial Chamber, he refused. 'I only know that tires were set on fire, not that cars were set on fire. I meant there was a kind of arson in order to alarm the international public. That is the information I received.' He did concede it was not first or second hand information but was received from his operatives.

Re-examination also gave him the opportunity to state unequivocally that military action was coming from the Old Town of Dubrovnik, which a number of Croatian defenders have denied in court. If true, it provides some justification for the JNA firing on this protected cultural monument. Mr. Nice pulled himself out of that by getting the General to admit he didn't receive reports on battlefield logistics. They were a matter for the other arm of military intelligence.

Possibly more frustrating for the prosecution was General Vasiljevic's characterization of JNA arming Croatian Serbs as 'completing the newly formed territorial defense units' (TO). He also explained why he disagreed with General Kadijevic who wrote that the JNA goal in Croatia was to liberate the Serb nation where it lived. Calling it 'highly simplified,' Vasiljevic explained that Serbs needed defending because there had been massive arming of Tudjman's political party (HDZ), resulting in 19 new Croat police stations surrounding majority Serb areas. Yet he refused to say the JNA provided weapons to local Serbs or paramilitary units. It provided them to the TO, he said. Still, when Mr. Nice pressed him to say what level of authority would be necessary for the JNA to release weapons to the Serbs in Croatia, he replied it would have to come from the (federal) Presidency (which he earlier testified that Milosevic controlled).

When Nice asked if he agreed with Milosevic that only Serbian opposition parties were forming paramilitaries, the General said yes. He wouldn't agree that these parties were sympathetic to the Serbian government's policies. They were trying to score political points by defending Serbs, he said.

The General insisted he knew nothing of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch reports on humanitarian law violations in Croatia and Kosovo. He did, however, know about the Martinovic case in Kosovo which was used to stir up fear and hatred against Albanians. The General described it as a rape case, where Mr. Martinovic was stripped and a bottle was forced up his anus. The General did not mention the controversy surrounding the case concerning evidence Mr. Martinovic's wounds were self-inflicted.

General Vasiljevic also stubbornly resisted the prosecutor's questions about the JNA's role in the massacre at Ovcara of people it took from the Vukovar Hospital. Mr. Nice asked what level of authority JNA officers would need in order to hand over people in their custody to a paramilitary unit (which they did. The paramilitaries massacred 250 of them at Ovcara farm). The General avoided a direct answer. Instead, he said there were people in the TO who were capable of uncontrolled acts.

In cross examination, General Vasiljevic testified that he personally participated in recording and videotaping Croatian Minister of Defense Martin Spegelj as he discussed importation of illegal weapons and arming paramilitaries. The edited videotape was shown several times on Serbian television and did much to arouse fear among Serbs of a new Ustasha threat. On re-examination, Mr. Nice was unable to shake his testimony that the videotape was 100% authentic and 'absolutely trustworthy.'

While one might conclude from all this that the prosecution made a mistake by calling General Vasiljevic, it's important to remember that his testimony also provided a strong link between Milosevic, the Croatian Serbs, the JNA, the Serbian MUP and TO and the war in Croatia. Another part of the equation is that the Court will weigh the General's testimony with that of other witnesses, a number who have given contrary testimony on some of the above issues. In addition, the prosecutor isn't finished with its Croatia case. We can expect to hear from at least some additional witnesses who are able to deny or confirm parts of the General's testimony. In the end, it is precisely the Court's job to weigh the credibility of witnesses and evidence. Where witnesses provide contradictory testimony, the Court will consider which they found more believable on a particular point, whether there is additional evidence that supports one or the other, reasons either may have to lie or hold misconceptions, etc.

Mr. Nice did elicit several important pieces of testimony from General Vasiljevic on his re-examination. For example, the General clearly stated that if the JNA had wanted to, it could have prevented Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia by force. As we've heard in other testimony, including from Milosevic on an intercepted telephone call, Milosevic's plan for an enlarged Serbia didn't include Slovenia, which had few Serbs among its population. He was happy to see it go, as well as all non-Serb parts of Croatia.

In weighing General Vasiljevic's testimony, the Court will surely consider his answer to Mr. Nice's last question. The prosecutor asked if the evidence showed that 80,000 people were compelled to leave Kosovo and 3500 plus bodies of Kosovar Albanians killed in the war were exhumed from mass graves, would he make any comment to explain the gap between these figures and 'the much more modest ones you're dealing with [likely given in private session].' To which the witness responded, 'I don't know figures involved in Kosovo. I know about the killed and wounded of the VJ. I was in headquarters. I didn't have any information, figures that would indicate a policy of expelling Albanians. I confine [myself] to my own line of work. I believe nothing similar was taking place in the military leadership.'

General Aleksandar Vasiljevic is named as a member of the joint criminal enterprise through which Milosevic is alleged to have committed crimes in Kosovo.