Strengthening Top-Down Rule in Kyrgyzstan

Pavel Dyatlenko

Reporter

Friday, 13 November, 2009

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President Kurmanbek Bakiev has now made it abundantly clear how he thinks Kyrgyzstan should be run – by means of a gradual but unstoppable consolidation of the power held by the executive, more specifically himself.

Bakiev detailed a plan for overhauling to the institutions of government in a speech to officials on October 20. Many of the executive functions previously held by the prime minister and his government – including foreign affairs, the national security agency, and oversight of economic reforms – now go upstairs to a greatly strengthened presidential office. One of the side benefits, according to Bakiev, is that streamlining the system will allow numerous government jobs to be cut at a time when the national budget is under severe strain.

Yet the basic ambition of centralising political power is not a new thing; rather, it has been a constant feature of Bakiev’s five years in power.

The intention of his reforms is quite clearly to achieve a greater measure of state control over society, not to develop Kyrgyz society; to strengthen the vertical hierarchy of executive power the president, rather than achieve a balance between the various branches of power; to narrow the space in which politics takes place; and to sideline and ghettoise the opposition.

This course of action is intended to provide a stable future for Kyrgyzstan’s current ruling elite, the idea being that this will allow a modernisation process to be set in train, carefully managed and regulated from top down. If that process is successful, President Bakiev could go down in history as a reformer.

Work on restructuring the institutions of government is only now getting into gear. However, President Bakiev is already reaping the rewards in terms of brushing up his image. The very announcement of the reform package was something of a statement to the public that he was determined to live up to the pledges he made while campaigning for re-election in July.

Another motive for underlining his commitment to serious action is to offset, insofar as that is possible, the damage done by Kyrgyzstan’s mounting economic crisis. His speech effectively cleared him of blame by showing that he was already working hard to improve governance reform, while a government seen as primarily culpable for past failings stepped down to clear the way for the changes.

Cutting the number of public servants in government, and consequently slashing spending in this area, can be seen as yet another step designed to increase Bakiev’s popularity and show that the state – or rather the president himself – is concerned for the national good at a difficult time.

How effective these steps will be is another matter, since a substantial institutional restructuring coupled with the process of laying off civil servants and finding other jobs for them is going to be a costly exercise, especially when the state is so short of cash. Any real savings in expenditure will be felt only in the longer term.

The net result of the governance reforms is to strengthen the president at the expense of the prime minister. The new Presidential Institution includes the foreign minister and the new post of state advisor for defence, security, and law and order.

Another branch is the Central Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovations, which will give Bakiev direct control over macroeconomic planning and resource allocation – seen as crucial not only to economic development but also to ensuring political and social stability.

The agency is to be headed by Bakiev’s son Maxim. Under the right circumstances, that could offer the younger Bakiev a springboard to stand for election in 2014, creating a seamless transition of power from father to son.

Having entered his second term, President Bakiev is not eligible to stand for a third time and he has said publicly that he will not try to engineer a change to the rules to allow him to do so. Now 32, Maxim Bakiev will have surpassed the minimum age limit of 35 by the time the next election comes round. He has five years to make his name in politics.

Meanwhile, the new prime minister, Daniyar Usenov, finds his powers severely curtailed compared with those of his predecessor. The new cabinet is greatly reduced, and several key agencies are transferred to the Presidential Institution – the foreign ministry, the National Security Service, the financial police and the intellectual property agency.

Usenov’s remaining ministries and departments are mostly headed either by the previous incumbents or by people reshuffled from similar posts. There is no one from the opposition. Even the newcomers are familiar faces from national- or regional-level government, so none of these appointments is likely to rock the boat.

If there is a change discernible in the new government, it is in favour of younger technocrats in their thirties.

While the government is relegated to the role of mere implementer, President Bakiev has filled the void by establishing what might best be termed “pseudo-institutions” tied into his office.

Take for example the new Kurultay or Assembly which is supposed to offer a platform for debate among a wide cross-section of society. In reality, its members will be carefully selected, so that it becomes a superficial body which is merely there to ingratiate the presidency with the public. Furthermore, as an ostensibly elected assembly, it will undermine the already weak authority and role of Kyrgyzstan parliament.

One of the most noteworthy features about the reforms to date has been the complete absence of political parties from the process. That applies not only to the opposition, but also to the president’s own Ak Jol party, which dominates parliament.

None of the new government appointments is a senior party figure, and Ak Jol’s role has been limited to lending its support to Usenov – who has no party affiliations himself – when he was nominated for the post of prime minister.

The exclusion of parties shows how minimal a role they really play in the current political system of Kyrgyzstan.

Pavel Dyatlenko is an expert at the Polis Asia Centre, a think-tank in Bishkek.