Stampede of Insiders to Courtroom I?

The second member of Milosevic's alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) to ethnically cleanse parts of Croatia testified against him in The Hague this week. General Aleksandar Vasiljevic headed the Yugoslav Army's Military Intelligence division during the war in Croatia. The first JCE member to testify was Milan Babic, President of the Serbian Krajina. General Vasiljevic's testimony was as damning as that of Mr. Babic. Indeed, he corroborated Mr. Babic's testimony that Serbia armed and trained the Croatian Serbs, under the direction of the Accused, and that Yugoslav Army (JNA) officers were transferred to head units of the Krajina territorial defense (TO) and later the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (ARSK). According to General Vasiljevic, 13,000 Yugoslav Army officers served in the local Serb armies in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina from mid-1992 until the end of the conflict.

Milosevic's main defense to the Croatia indictment is that Serbia was not involved in the war in Croatia and, therefore, he as President of Serbia had nothing to do with it either. While General Vasiljevic's testimony shredded this defense, he also testified that the Accused's public pronouncements to that effect had a serious negative impact on conscription in Serbia. Whatever the reason, the army could not raise enough soldiers to accomplish its three main goals in the Croatia conflict: to separate the parties in conflict, to protect JNA blockaded in barracks and to protect endangered people. The last goal was changed in September 1991 to 'protection of endangered Serbs' in Banija, Lika and Kordun.

As early as 1990, however, Franko Simatovic (aka 'Frenki'), on behalf of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), began training volunteers in the Krajina. Frenki is also named in the Milosevic indictment as a member of the Joint Criminal Enterprise. In early 1991, Serbian State Security brought Dragan Vasiljkovic (aka 'Captain Dragan') from Australia for the same purpose and set him up in a camp at Golubic in Croatia. There were also training camps in Serbia for awhile.

Political parties in Serbia also formed volunteer groups to aid the war in Croatia. One of these was the Serbian Radical Party, headed by Vojislav Seselj, another named member of the Joint Criminal Enterprise. While his position as chief of military intelligence would have provided him with a plethora of sources, General Vasiljevic based his testimony about Seselj on the BBC special, 'Death of Yugoslavia.' In it, Seselj says on camera that Jovica Stanisic, head of Serbia's Security Service (DB), engaged him to rally volunteers in Slavonia, Croatia, and that the DB provided him with weapons to arm them. The General concluded by pointing out that 'he [Seselj] never denied it.'

Another source of soldiers was the Serbian MUP. At a meeting held in October 1991 to address the lack of troops, the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Serbia (TO) offered its help. Subsequently, Serbian TO troops were sent to the Slavonian battlefield. According to the General, that could not have been done without an order from the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.

In December 1991, the Yugoslav Secretary of Defense, General Veljko Kadijevic, another member of the JCE, ordered the volunteer groups (aka 'paramilitaries') disbanded after reported looting in Vukovar. They were then brought under the official control of the JNA. Except Arkan's Tigers. Arkan was a special case, as demonstrated by the fact that he was allowed to enter the Serbian Ministry of Defense building in Belgrade with his weapon, while General Vasiljevic had to check his. When the General asked why, he was told, 'Well, you're not Arkan.' To pull Arkan's Tigers into the joint command, JNA officers contacted Radovan Stojicic, aka 'Badza', another member of the alleged JCE. Badza subordinated Arkan's Tigers into a unit of the Serbian MUP he was setting up.

Eventually, the forces fighting in Croatia were unified under JNA command, according to General Vasiljevic. During wartime, the principle of unitary command necessarily comes into play. The JNA takes its orders from the Secretariat of Defense, which acts as staff to the Supreme Command. The chain of command leads to the Presidency of Yugoslavia, which at that time consisted of eight members, four of whom Milosevic controlled.

Two letters produced by the Prosecution were evidence of Milosevic's direct influence on the JNA. One was a letter from Milan Martic, Interior Minister of the RSK, to Milosevic, President of Serbia, dated June 9, 1993. In it he requests Milosevic to 'use your authority and position' to secure promised ammunition, spare parts and requested officers from the JNA. He also suggests that Serbian television should report more on the RSK in the evening news. General Vasiljevic explained the significance of the letter: 'It would be natural for Martic . . . in regard to problems with the JNA, to address the President of FRY. If he addresses Milosevic . . . he's addressing the person he believes has factual influence and can issue an order through the General Staff to answer the request.' Martic is another named member of the JCE. He has been indicted and awaits trial at the ICTY.

The second letter is from Goran Hadzic, President of the RSK, also addressed to Milosevic and dated 24 June 1993: 'Dear Mr. President: I draw your attention to problems we are unable to solve by ourselves and which represent urgent problems of the Army of the RSK.' The problems involved military procurement, technical maintenance of weapons, and minimum ammunition. Hadzic goes on to ask Milosevic to 'please exercise your authority and influence to realize this request of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.' When Mr. Nice asked the General if his comments on this letter were substantially the same as his comments on Martic's letter, he replied simply, 'Yes.'

The prosecutor offered additional documentary evidence showing JNA supply and support of the Krajina Serb forces, as well as continued social benefits for JNA officers serving in the RSK TO. There was also a document from the Serbian MUP ordering how war booty, stolen by its special unit operating in the RSK, should be treated.

Evidence against Milosevic is mounting. To effectively challenge it, he is going to have to do more than repeat that he was President of Serbia and Serbia was not involved in the war in Croatia. His personal attacks against witnesses will prove less and less effective -- even with his home audience -- as high level witnesses and authenticated documents corroborate his direct involvement. That his fellow Serbs and alleged co-conspirators are the ones contradicting him should make it harder for him to claim that all Serbs are on trial in the case brought against him. If the audience back home begins to listen carefully, they won't be able to avoid hearing that the charges are specifically against him for what he did to their former homeland in their name.

There were those who resisted, as General Vasiljevic's testimony also made plain. The problem of inadequate numbers of fighting men continued to plague the war in Croatia. While conscripts in Serbia refused the call up, soldiers in the field deserted in significant numbers. The JNA was forced to place more reliance on irregular forces, including criminals released from Serbian prisons (according to testimony of a previous witness). The military resistance of thousands of Serbian men is a story that has received too little attention. While their reasons were likely varied, their sheer numbers demonstrate a sizeable public that did not believe in Milosevic's wars. Rather than reassessing the war policy, Milosevic and the rest of the JCE sought out the dregs of society to fight for them. Nevertheless, criminal elements cannot be blamed for all the atrocities, though their involvement likely added to them. The purpose of the JCE was a crime against humanity in itself, i.e. the forcible removal of non-Serb citizens from one-third of Croatia -- by whatever means.

The prosecution has alleged that at least 16 people were involved in the joint criminal enterprise that killed thousands of citizens in Croatia. Only three of them have been publicly indicted, including Milosevic and Arkan, who has since been killed. [Milan Martic surrendered in May 2002 and is awaiting trial.] Two members have now testified for the prosecution in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Is it far fetched to imagine that others may follow, considering that the ICTY will end its investigations within a few years and is projected to close its doors by 2008. Twenty-seven indictees currently are awaiting trial. Twenty-three additional indictees remain at large. It stands to reason that the OTP must be selective in choosing whom to prosecute from here. This fact cannot have escaped those named, but not yet indicted, as part of the joint criminal enterprise with Milosevic. It might occur to some that if they voluntarily come forward and provide evidence, they may be one of the lucky ones to escape prosecution -- at least by the ICTY. It just might start a stampede of insiders to Courtroom I.