Spy Gives Insider View: Lazarevic says Croatian war directed from Belgrade
Day 118
Spy Gives Insider View: Lazarevic says Croatian war directed from Belgrade
Day 118
Just about the only Serbian linkage with the war in Croatia to which Slobodan Lazarevic didn't testify was a tete a tete with Slobodan Milosevic in which he laid out a plan for realizing a Greater Serbia. The witness, formerly known as C-001, was an operative of the Yugoslav Army's intelligence arm, KOS, from 1968 through 1995. Speaking in fluent English after requesting the Court to remove protective measures, Mr. Lazarevic testified that Serbian authorities in Serbia proper ran the war in Croatia and kept it going for their own purposes – to divert dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation at home -- by undermining international peace initiatives.
Not only did Serbian authorities run the war in Croatia, according to Mr. Lazarevic. They started it. In 1990, he visited the site of the log rebellion near Knin a supposedly spontaneous blockade by local Serbs marking the withdrawal from Croatian police authority. From talking with the men on the barricades, he discovered that from 75 to 80% of them were non-locals. This was later confirmed by his long time superior in KOS, Nikola Zemunja, who told him most of them were from Belgrade and were being paid 100 Deutschmarks per day for their 'rebellion.'
According to the witness, the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (ARSK) was financed and supplied by Belgrade. 100% of its officers were officers of the Yugoslav Army (JNA, later VJ) who retained their JNA pay and positions while serving with the ARSK. In fact, Mr. Lazarevic testified there was actually only one army, consisting of the JNA, ARSK and VRS (Army of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia). In addition, the head of the local police intelligence service (Pajic) reported on a daily basis to Jovica Stanisic, head of the Serbian MUP State Security Division and called him 'daddy.' His nickname for Milosevic was 'boss.'
The prosecution introduced a chart drawn by Mr. Lazarevic, showing the connections and interconnections among the various forces in the RSK and authorities in Serbia. Though still a JNA officer, he served in the ARSK's 21st Corps, which came into being along with other units following the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia under the Vance Peace Plan. In fact, the JNA merely changed uniforms overnight.
The 21st Corps, like all other corps within the ARSK, had an anti-terrorist unit, consisting of 40 to 45 young men with criminal records who were used to do the 'dirty jobs,' i.e. scaring people, creating disturbances, killing Muslims, Croats and Serbs. It was this unit who killed a local mayor, Dmitar Obradovic, because he favored peaceful cohabitation of Serbs within Croatia. Mr. Lazarevic's sources were members of the Anti-Terrorist unit who had carried out the murder.
Anti-terrorist units were also used to create disturbances to undermine the peace process. A member of the Banja Anti-Terrorist unit told him how he murdered an elderly couple and dumped their bodies in a well on the pretext that they were signaling Croatian forces with a candle in their window. Mr. Lazarevic accompanied members of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to the site, after they received a complaint. They determined it was not possible to see a lighted candle in the window from the position of Croatian forces two kilometers distant across the river.
Another unit that operated just inside Bosnia was drawn from Serbian MUP special forces, Arkan's Tigers, ARSK's 21st Corps, and Fikret Abdic's army in Western Bosnia. Named 'Pauk' (spider), it was a vehicle that allowed the 21st Corps to fight against the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps while denying any participation. Franko Simatovic (aka Frenkie) maintained his headquarters nearby. Simatovic was head of the special operations unit of the State Security Division of the Serbian MUP and a deputy to Jovica Stanisic.
The witness testified to meeting Zjelko Raznatovic (Arkan) on at least one occasion, when he interrupted a meeting in early 1992 that was trying to find ways to ameliorate the difficulties of daily life for people in the area. Arkan stormed in and said, 'You should be going out fighting instead of planting trees.' Those in the meeting seemed afraid of him.
Mr. Lazaravic said there were two strains in KOS, one that favored violence to get rid of Croats in the area and the other that favored forcing them out alive. The decision on which of the two to use in any given operation was made in Belgrade. In one case, the witness attended a meeting where the JNA planned an attack on Cetingrad because it had a strong Croatian immigrant community from Sweden that was actively organizing politically. The more violent faction wanted to encircle the town, use artillery and saturation bombing against it, then 'clean up.' The other favored leaving an escape route. The decision was left to 'Belgrade HQ,' which in this case opted for the escape route.
Mr. Lazarevic served as a liaison to the international organizations, notably the United Nations in the region and the ECMM. When the UN and ECMM deployed to monitor implementation of JNA withdrawal form the Krajina, Mr. Lazarevic and his superiors realized they would need to hire interpreters and other functionaries from the local population. They demanded that they be provided names of prospective employees so they could determine if they had criminal records. In fact, they contacted all prospective employees and only gave their okay if the prospects agreed to provide intelligence to KOS on international activities. Any who refused, according to Mr. Lazarevic, were 'discredited and not able to work for the UN.'
Not only did local interpreters for international organizations act as KOS spies. So did members of the ECMM and the international UN staff. It was Mr. Lazarevic's job to recruit these individuals, a process that involved cultivating friendly relations, providing assistance, finding the weakest links and, at times, blackmail. According to the witness, 'Some readily accepted to work with the Serb side . . . for ideological reasons,' and others for the money.
Mr. Lazarevic's work also included assuring that the EMCC 'could move freely, but to make it as difficult as possible for them to see anything they wanted to see.' They were escorted at all times in the field by police or military and Mr. Lazarevic monitored them the rest of the time from their hotel, where he also stayed. His orders, that they not be allowed to carry out their task, came down the line from Stanisic in Belgrade.
Mr. Lazarevic was also present at four international meetings in 1993, where the international community attempted to broker a peace agreement. His delegation, which was supposedly composed of officials from the RSK, in fact included three KOS members including himself and took orders directly from Belgrade. The procedure for each meeting was similar. The delegation arrived in Belgrade 48 hours before they were to leave for the meeting. Members of the delegation were briefed by their appropriate superiors in the military (Perisic), security (Stanisic) or political (Milosevic's cabinet) hierarchy. They then left together for the meetings (2 in Geneva, 1 in Vienna, 1 in Norway), where they were in touch throughout with Belgrade officials. But their major instruction remained the same: 'Don't agree to anything.' If necessary, they could sign an agreement with the proviso that it would have to be confirmed by the RSK Assembly, which of course it never would be. According to the witness, it was obvious to all the delegation that 'Belgrade had no intention of settling the matter between the RSK and Croatia,' because it diverted the Serbian population from dissatisfaction over political and economic matters at home.
From his testimony, it appeared the delegation generally understood that Milosevic called the shots. While they conferred by telephone with Zoran Lilic in Belgrade over political matters, he was known as 'the postman,' because he was carrying messages from Milosevic. Relishing his role as insider telling all, the former spy added, 'I don't believe Lilic made any decision in his entire life.' The prosecutor might agree with him as he appears still to be waffling over testifying against Milosevic in the case.
Goran Hadzic, then President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, provided a similar indication of Milosevic's power, according to the witness, when Mr. Lazarevic addressed him as 'Mr. President' to the Canadian and U.S. Ambassadors during a recess in the Norway conference. Hadzic replied, 'Tell him I'm not a president, I'm just a dispatcher.' Hadzic had met with Milosevic prior to the meeting and been given special instructions not to complete anything.
Another strategy to undermine the peace process was the creation of a 'psychosis of fear.' This was done using the anti-terrorist units to mine the recently reopened railway with an anti-tank mine that killed and wounded many people, effectively stopping efforts to re-establish normal connections between warring parties; mining a soccer field to prevent a game with UN staff; and mining a water tower which killed a Serb farmer. The RSK authorities officially complained to the UN, blaming Croats for these actions carried out by Serbian forces.
Mr. Lazarevic began his testimony relating a discussion with General Mile Mrksic where the general bragged that the Vukovar Hospital operation was 'one of his very important military victories.' To him, the hospital had been taken by Croatian military forces so he ordered Slivancanin to destroy them, or as he colloquially put it, 'Kill those shits.' The JNA stormed the hospital, rounded up over 250 people and handed them over to paramilitaries who killed them.
He ended his first day of testimony with another chilling story. In early 1994, he was asked to find 100 bodies of Croatians to exchange for 100 bodies of soldiers from the Banja Corps killed in the Bihac pocket, as their relatives were anxious to reclaim the bodies. Only 90 were available from recent combat operations. He went looking for 10 more. Pajovic, second in command of the Serbian MUP units, directed two Croat prisoners to dig in a designated spot. They uncovered four badly decomposed bodies, whose hands were tied with wire. He took them, nevertheless. For the remainder, he approached Arkan's men in the Pauk unit. They only had live prisoners, but overnight they came up with dead ones. In the end, he only had 99 Croat bodies. The Bosnia 5th Corps handed over 100 Serb bodies but took one back. The exchange was to be one for one.
Mr. Lazarevic is neither the first nor the last insider to testify against Milosevic. His motives, as yet, are unkown, though he has been given a new identity and will be relocated to an undisclosed country. But there is little doubt he has so far provided the kind of insider evidence many have hoped for. He was there. He was a long time member of the intelligence community. He was actively involved in events. He associated with political and military commanders and attended high level meetings. He was one step away from the inner chamber. From that vantage point, ultimate power appeared to reside behind Milosevic's door. It's a shame they didn't have that tete a tete. Regardless, his testimony has proven extremely important, and is some of the most damaging to Milosevic. It continues Wednesday.
Not only did Serbian authorities run the war in Croatia, according to Mr. Lazarevic. They started it. In 1990, he visited the site of the log rebellion near Knin a supposedly spontaneous blockade by local Serbs marking the withdrawal from Croatian police authority. From talking with the men on the barricades, he discovered that from 75 to 80% of them were non-locals. This was later confirmed by his long time superior in KOS, Nikola Zemunja, who told him most of them were from Belgrade and were being paid 100 Deutschmarks per day for their 'rebellion.'
According to the witness, the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (ARSK) was financed and supplied by Belgrade. 100% of its officers were officers of the Yugoslav Army (JNA, later VJ) who retained their JNA pay and positions while serving with the ARSK. In fact, Mr. Lazarevic testified there was actually only one army, consisting of the JNA, ARSK and VRS (Army of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia). In addition, the head of the local police intelligence service (Pajic) reported on a daily basis to Jovica Stanisic, head of the Serbian MUP State Security Division and called him 'daddy.' His nickname for Milosevic was 'boss.'
The prosecution introduced a chart drawn by Mr. Lazarevic, showing the connections and interconnections among the various forces in the RSK and authorities in Serbia. Though still a JNA officer, he served in the ARSK's 21st Corps, which came into being along with other units following the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia under the Vance Peace Plan. In fact, the JNA merely changed uniforms overnight.
The 21st Corps, like all other corps within the ARSK, had an anti-terrorist unit, consisting of 40 to 45 young men with criminal records who were used to do the 'dirty jobs,' i.e. scaring people, creating disturbances, killing Muslims, Croats and Serbs. It was this unit who killed a local mayor, Dmitar Obradovic, because he favored peaceful cohabitation of Serbs within Croatia. Mr. Lazarevic's sources were members of the Anti-Terrorist unit who had carried out the murder.
Anti-terrorist units were also used to create disturbances to undermine the peace process. A member of the Banja Anti-Terrorist unit told him how he murdered an elderly couple and dumped their bodies in a well on the pretext that they were signaling Croatian forces with a candle in their window. Mr. Lazarevic accompanied members of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to the site, after they received a complaint. They determined it was not possible to see a lighted candle in the window from the position of Croatian forces two kilometers distant across the river.
Another unit that operated just inside Bosnia was drawn from Serbian MUP special forces, Arkan's Tigers, ARSK's 21st Corps, and Fikret Abdic's army in Western Bosnia. Named 'Pauk' (spider), it was a vehicle that allowed the 21st Corps to fight against the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps while denying any participation. Franko Simatovic (aka Frenkie) maintained his headquarters nearby. Simatovic was head of the special operations unit of the State Security Division of the Serbian MUP and a deputy to Jovica Stanisic.
The witness testified to meeting Zjelko Raznatovic (Arkan) on at least one occasion, when he interrupted a meeting in early 1992 that was trying to find ways to ameliorate the difficulties of daily life for people in the area. Arkan stormed in and said, 'You should be going out fighting instead of planting trees.' Those in the meeting seemed afraid of him.
Mr. Lazaravic said there were two strains in KOS, one that favored violence to get rid of Croats in the area and the other that favored forcing them out alive. The decision on which of the two to use in any given operation was made in Belgrade. In one case, the witness attended a meeting where the JNA planned an attack on Cetingrad because it had a strong Croatian immigrant community from Sweden that was actively organizing politically. The more violent faction wanted to encircle the town, use artillery and saturation bombing against it, then 'clean up.' The other favored leaving an escape route. The decision was left to 'Belgrade HQ,' which in this case opted for the escape route.
Mr. Lazarevic served as a liaison to the international organizations, notably the United Nations in the region and the ECMM. When the UN and ECMM deployed to monitor implementation of JNA withdrawal form the Krajina, Mr. Lazarevic and his superiors realized they would need to hire interpreters and other functionaries from the local population. They demanded that they be provided names of prospective employees so they could determine if they had criminal records. In fact, they contacted all prospective employees and only gave their okay if the prospects agreed to provide intelligence to KOS on international activities. Any who refused, according to Mr. Lazarevic, were 'discredited and not able to work for the UN.'
Not only did local interpreters for international organizations act as KOS spies. So did members of the ECMM and the international UN staff. It was Mr. Lazarevic's job to recruit these individuals, a process that involved cultivating friendly relations, providing assistance, finding the weakest links and, at times, blackmail. According to the witness, 'Some readily accepted to work with the Serb side . . . for ideological reasons,' and others for the money.
Mr. Lazarevic's work also included assuring that the EMCC 'could move freely, but to make it as difficult as possible for them to see anything they wanted to see.' They were escorted at all times in the field by police or military and Mr. Lazarevic monitored them the rest of the time from their hotel, where he also stayed. His orders, that they not be allowed to carry out their task, came down the line from Stanisic in Belgrade.
Mr. Lazarevic was also present at four international meetings in 1993, where the international community attempted to broker a peace agreement. His delegation, which was supposedly composed of officials from the RSK, in fact included three KOS members including himself and took orders directly from Belgrade. The procedure for each meeting was similar. The delegation arrived in Belgrade 48 hours before they were to leave for the meeting. Members of the delegation were briefed by their appropriate superiors in the military (Perisic), security (Stanisic) or political (Milosevic's cabinet) hierarchy. They then left together for the meetings (2 in Geneva, 1 in Vienna, 1 in Norway), where they were in touch throughout with Belgrade officials. But their major instruction remained the same: 'Don't agree to anything.' If necessary, they could sign an agreement with the proviso that it would have to be confirmed by the RSK Assembly, which of course it never would be. According to the witness, it was obvious to all the delegation that 'Belgrade had no intention of settling the matter between the RSK and Croatia,' because it diverted the Serbian population from dissatisfaction over political and economic matters at home.
From his testimony, it appeared the delegation generally understood that Milosevic called the shots. While they conferred by telephone with Zoran Lilic in Belgrade over political matters, he was known as 'the postman,' because he was carrying messages from Milosevic. Relishing his role as insider telling all, the former spy added, 'I don't believe Lilic made any decision in his entire life.' The prosecutor might agree with him as he appears still to be waffling over testifying against Milosevic in the case.
Goran Hadzic, then President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, provided a similar indication of Milosevic's power, according to the witness, when Mr. Lazarevic addressed him as 'Mr. President' to the Canadian and U.S. Ambassadors during a recess in the Norway conference. Hadzic replied, 'Tell him I'm not a president, I'm just a dispatcher.' Hadzic had met with Milosevic prior to the meeting and been given special instructions not to complete anything.
Another strategy to undermine the peace process was the creation of a 'psychosis of fear.' This was done using the anti-terrorist units to mine the recently reopened railway with an anti-tank mine that killed and wounded many people, effectively stopping efforts to re-establish normal connections between warring parties; mining a soccer field to prevent a game with UN staff; and mining a water tower which killed a Serb farmer. The RSK authorities officially complained to the UN, blaming Croats for these actions carried out by Serbian forces.
Mr. Lazarevic began his testimony relating a discussion with General Mile Mrksic where the general bragged that the Vukovar Hospital operation was 'one of his very important military victories.' To him, the hospital had been taken by Croatian military forces so he ordered Slivancanin to destroy them, or as he colloquially put it, 'Kill those shits.' The JNA stormed the hospital, rounded up over 250 people and handed them over to paramilitaries who killed them.
He ended his first day of testimony with another chilling story. In early 1994, he was asked to find 100 bodies of Croatians to exchange for 100 bodies of soldiers from the Banja Corps killed in the Bihac pocket, as their relatives were anxious to reclaim the bodies. Only 90 were available from recent combat operations. He went looking for 10 more. Pajovic, second in command of the Serbian MUP units, directed two Croat prisoners to dig in a designated spot. They uncovered four badly decomposed bodies, whose hands were tied with wire. He took them, nevertheless. For the remainder, he approached Arkan's men in the Pauk unit. They only had live prisoners, but overnight they came up with dead ones. In the end, he only had 99 Croat bodies. The Bosnia 5th Corps handed over 100 Serb bodies but took one back. The exchange was to be one for one.
Mr. Lazarevic is neither the first nor the last insider to testify against Milosevic. His motives, as yet, are unkown, though he has been given a new identity and will be relocated to an undisclosed country. But there is little doubt he has so far provided the kind of insider evidence many have hoped for. He was there. He was a long time member of the intelligence community. He was actively involved in events. He associated with political and military commanders and attended high level meetings. He was one step away from the inner chamber. From that vantage point, ultimate power appeared to reside behind Milosevic's door. It's a shame they didn't have that tete a tete. Regardless, his testimony has proven extremely important, and is some of the most damaging to Milosevic. It continues Wednesday.
