Silent Witness: What the Public Doesn't Hear

According to an insider witness, Slobodan Milosevic was up to his eyebrows in the war in Croatia, at least in the self-styled Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (SBWS). Milan Milanovic, former Deputy Defense Minister of SBWS, testified that when he assumed that position he was placed on the payroll of the Army of Yugoslavia, the same as all civilian staff of the SBWS Defense Ministry. He continued receiving his salary from Belgrade until the end of 1995, beginning of 1996.

Even before the Defense Ministry was put on Belgrade’s payroll, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) became both Serbianized and the dominant force in the region, exercising more power than civilian authorities of the SBWS. By August 1991, the majority of non-Serbs in the JNA had left and been replaced by Serbs. As significant, the JNA took on the Serb cause, though Milosevic likes to characterize it as a multi-ethnic federal army that was legitimately stationed throughout the disintegrating Yugoslavia, and engaged in separating warring parties. According to Mr. Milanovic, by August, and possibly as early as May, 1991, the JNA was the army of the Serb nation.

Around the same time, Radovan Stojicic (“Badza”) was sent from a special anti-terrorist unit in the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) to organize and head the SBWS Territorial Defense (TO). When Prosecutor Hildegard Urtz-Retzlaff asked Mr. Milanovic whether Badza was a volunteer, he replied, “I think he did not come as a volunteer.' When she asked why, the witness who became close friends with Badza said, 'Because he never said he had come as a volunteer. And on the ground that our understanding was that he had been sent by official authorities of Serbia.'

As he often does, Milosevic provided the opening for the witness to clarify and add to his direct testimony. On cross examination, Mr. Milanovic asserted, “Not for a moment was it my understanding he was there as a volunteer.” Not only did he get weapons, equipment, and his salary from Serbia. On completion of his task, he was appointed Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs in Serbia. Of the15 men he brought with him, 10 worked for the Serbian State Security Service (DB).

When Badza took over the TO, he improved its position vis-à-vis the JNA, though it remained subordinated to the JNA in all military operations. Volunteers from Serbia, paramilitaries and police also became members of the TO and were thus subordinated to the JNA. On cross examination, Milosevic elicited the following facts, showing Serbian involvement in the Croatian war: From August to November or December 1991, the JNA had 36,000 troops in SBWS. Of the 20,000 fighters in the TO, 3000 to 4000 were ‘volunteers’ from Serbia. Also a unit of 100 Croatian Serb police who had been dismissed by Croatian authorities formed a special unit within the Serbian MUP and were sent to fight in SBWS. After, they returned to Serbia where many still remain employed in the Serbian MUP, according to Mr. Milanovic.

The witness told the Court he believed Mr. Stojicic was close to the Accused, who addressed him familiarly as Badza. Mr. Milanovic was present during telephone calls between the two and, on one occasion, listened in when Badza put Milosevic on the speaker phone. The occasion was a complaint from Mr. Milanovic over General Momcilo Perisic’s withdrawal of Yugoslav Army (VJ) forces from the border region. Milosevic had Badza wait while he called “Momcilo.” The two overheard Milosevic say to Perisic, “It’s not for you to think. Just return the troops to where they were.” The VJ returned to the border.

Following his appointment as Deputy Minister of Defense, Mr. Milanovic received a 'red telephone,' installed by workers from Serbia -- either the PTT (telephone company) or Serbian MUP. The line gave him direct access to members of the Serbian Government, including Milan Milutinovic then Foreign Affairs Minister, and the Serbian MUP. However, when he did something to displease Belgrade, the line was cut off.

The war in SBWS ended in November 1991. When the Vance Peace Plan was signed in 1992, the SBWS TO was more or less demilitarized, the JNA/VJ took off their uniforms and turned in their weapons, as the United Nations Protection Force took over. But Milosevic’s involvement didn’t diminish. He continued to have the last word on affairs in the SBWS that interested him. It was in SBWS delegations to Belgrade that the witness met Milosevic on several occasions.

At an early meeting, the witness remembers visiting Milosevic with a delegation to discuss the implementation of the Vance Peace Plan and preparations for arrival of international figures. Another meeting concerned elections for the president of the RSK (Republic of Serbia Krajina, of which SBWS was a part). In the initial round, Mr. Milanovic didn’t support Milosevic’s candidate, Milan Martic. After receiving a call from Mr. Stojicic, now back in Serbia with the MUP, Mr. Milanovic agreed to support Martic and Martic subsequently won. Later, Milosevic called Milanovic when he refused to replace the commander of the 11th Corps, as Martic wanted. The Accused told Mr. Milanovic he should give in, and he did.

On another occasion, Badza called the witness to Belgrade to talk with Milosevic about a complaint from General Perisic, after Mr. Milanovic refused 20 officers Perisic had sent him. When the witness explained that the officers did not meet their specialized needs, Milosevic told the witness he would talk to Perisic.

Mr. Milanovic testified that he headed the RSK negotiating team with Croatia and the international community in 1995 and 1996. The team consulted with Milosevic both before and after the sessions. The Accused demonstrated his power when he made Goran Hadzic part of the team, despite the fact that the RSK had not appointed him. The witness believes that Hadzic worked “behind our backs,” in other words, he was Milosevic’s man on the team.

After the Serbian Krajina fell in 1995, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith brought a peace plan to Mr. Milanovic, which he promised to review. When the television station reported that he had signed the proposal, Milanovic was again called to Belgrade to a meeting with Milosevic. Also attending were Chief of the Serbian DB Jovica Stanisic, Badza and Minister of Internal Affairs Zoran Sokolovic. Mr. Milanovic reported that the television had gotten it wrong. He hadn’t signed any proposal, merely taken it to review. From this it seems he was not permitted to sign a peace agreement for the RSK without Belgrade’s knowledge and approval.

Mr. Milanovic was also involved in negotiating the Erdut Agreement to resolve the issue of the RSK while Milosevic headed the negotiating team at Dayton. Croatian President Tudjman did not want to sign Dayton until the RSK issue was resolved. On the eve of signing the Erdut Agreement, the witness received a message from Milosevic via Zika Jovanovic, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying he should sign. Though the Erdut agreement provided for a transitional period under UN operation, it eventually led to the return of the SBWS to Croatia. Mr. Milanovic went to see Badza, who called Stanisic in Dayton, who sent a telegram: “I’ve tried everything with the President, but we have lost SBWS. God save them.” Despite Badza’s advice not to sign the agreement, the next day Milanovic signed. When he later met with Milosevic, the President told him he had done the right thing, despite criticism from 'Milosevic's associates.' He continued meeting with Milosevic over implementation of the Erdut Agreement.

The final example Mr. Milanovic gave of Milosevic’s power over the affairs of the SWBS had to do with his own fate. When Hadzic and others wanted to get rid of him but found they could not, they turned to Milosevic. Despite his years of carrying out Milosevic's wishes even when it subjected him to severe criticism, at a meeting in Belgrade Milosevic proposed Mr. Milanovic withdraw from his post. He did the next day.

In addition to the numerous concrete examples of Milosevic’s involvement in the SBWS given by the witness, he assisted the prosecution in authenticating documents and intercepted telephone calls. A number of the documents concerned Serbian funding for the SBWS TO, police, and social welfare in the amounts of billions of dinars (given currency fluctuation and devaluations during that period, it is impossible to assign a value to these dinars in euros, marks or dollars). When Milosevic later pressed him, insisting the money was for humanitarian assistance, Mr. Milanovic replied, “I know the money came from the FRY and filled the coffers of our budget for the purposes you mention (health care, education, pensions). It was mostly spent on the army and police.”

Milosevic also managed to elicit the following comment from the witness, when asked if the JNA had command over the ARSK (Army of the Republic of Serbia Krajina) or VRS (Bosnian Serb Army): “I do know that the Serb Army of the Krajina was dependent on the JNA. . . . I think the commanders of the ARSK depended on the General Staff of the JNA.” He did allow that he had no information that the General Staff commanded any operation of the ARSK.

The Accused began his cross examination by trying to secure Mr. Milanovic’s agreement that Croatian Serbs were the victims of Croatian aggression, that Serb fears grew as Croats eliminated their rights from the constitution and revived symbols of WWII Ustasha and began arming themselves. While agreeing that the Croatian HDZ party when it assumed power removed Serbian rights under the constitution, the witness refused to play Milosevic’s game of good Serbs vs. bad Croats. Instead, he said propaganda on both sides increased tensions and fears, leading both sides to arm themselves. When Milosevic asked whether Croatia’s blockade of JNA barracks didn’t justify Serb fears, the witness said fear was justified on both sides. Milosevic later asked about the plight of Serb refugees and Mr. Milanovic said there were both Croat and Serb refugees.

Milosevic pointed to the blockade of JNA barracks in Vukovar by Croatian forces as evidence of Croat aggression. The witness responded that it was in the context of fighting. But the JNA only responded to fire, Milosevic contended, as it sought to deblock the barracks. Mr. Milanovic said he thought that was true at the beginning, but then the JNA made the decision to attack the town of Vukovar. Milosevic rarely makes any distinction between civilian and military targets.

Concerning the massacre of several hundred men and boys at Ovcara farm following the fall of Vukovar, Mr. Milanovic testified that he knew nothing about it at the time. When Milosevic tried to elicit his agreement that the JNA, the MUP of Serbia or the Serb leadership knew nothing about it either, the witness abruptly corrected him. “I said Radovan Stojicic Badza had nothing to do with it. I did not say the JNA. It was stationed there. An Army brigade was there. The entire region was under JNA control.”

Milosevic offered that the same was true of Lovas (where 50 Croatian prisoners were forced to walk through a minefield) – neither the JNA nor any individual linked with Serbia had anything to do with it. Mr. Milanovic agreed the same was true at Lovas as at Ovcara, but he reached an entirely different conclusion that Mr. Milosevic. “A state of war was proclaimed. War law prevailed. All civilians bearing arms were under the command of the JNA.”

In cross examination, the Accused appeared to be shifting his defense strategy. Rather than maintain that Serbia, the FRY and he himself were not involved with their co-nationals in Croatia, he now states that they were – but it was “normal” and perfectly legal. The substantial financial resources funneled to the RSK were solely for humanitarian purposes, Milosevic said. Fifty thousand Croatian Serb pensioners had nothing, so Yugoslavia provided the money. The witness said the vast majority of the funds went for the army and police.

Milosevic also asked if it wasn't normal for Zivota Panic, Chief of the General Staff for the JNA/VJ, to issue a conscription order for the RSK, as if it were merely one state extending a courtesy to enforce the orders of a neighboring state. It is hardly a normal situation where one of those states is at war and the other proclaims its neutrality. It gives rise to the question of whether Panic would also have ordered the return of Bosniak or Croat conscripts to serve in the armies of their countries of origin.

The Accused directed the witness's attention to a request from the RSK Minister of the Interior to the MUP of Serbia and Mr. Stojicic to extend the training for two members of a special sabotage squad. Milosevic attempted to analogize this to the training JNA soldiers received in the armies of other states. Similarly, a letter seeking an okay for two RSK policemen to enter Serbia to collect cash in Belgrade and take it back across the border to Knin he described as normal procedure in any state. The Accused also characterized as normal a request from the RSK National Bank to the National Bank of Yugoslavia for a grant of 10 billion dinars in cash. Salaries were always paid in cash, Milosevic offered. Therefore it was not unusual to carry cash across the border.

What Milosevic has done is in some ways remarkable. He has admitted that Serbia provided extensive assistance to the RSK during its war with Croatia, a war in which Milosevic says Serbia was not involved. Serbia provided substantial financial resources for its government, including military and police, services. It provided special military training and assisted with military mobilization. All this Milosevic has admitted. His defense seems to be, so what? It's not a crime. But if all this was done in support of criminal activity, then it too is criminal and those who authorized it are accountable under the law. From Milosevic's recent cross examination, it appears he will focus his defense on the nature of the enterprise, whether it was criminal or not.

Mr. Milanovic's testimony, however, raises the Accused from a supporting player to director. He didn't 'just' supply money and military know-how. He sent his crack special anti-terrorist unit with their boss to organize and command SBWS military actions. He saw that his loyalists were placed in positions of power. His security service operated throughout the SBWS. From his office in Belgrade, he made war and, when it didn't serve him any longer, he ordered peace. He left Serbs in the SBWS to their fate -- either as refugees or citizens of a state with which they had only recently made war.

Mr. Milosevic was not 'just' altruistically supporting his brother Serbs. He was directing them in an enterprise which he designed, whether alone or with others.