Prosecution Focuses on Complicity in Genocide Charge

General Philippe Morillon is a somewhat mythic figure in the history of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s. He is best known for going to Srebrenica in 1993 after the Bosnian Serb forces had laid siege to it as part of their ethnic cleansing campaign in Eastern Bosnia. The Serbs’ refusal to allow humanitarian aid convoys into the besieged area had caused a humanitarian catastrophe, with people dying from malnutrition, pneumonia, untreated wounds and other illnesses. Not only food, but medical aid was not allowed in.

Morillon, UNPROFOR Commander for Bosnia at the time, set out for Srebrenica to do something about the untenable situation. Once he arrived, the Bosnian Army soldiers, in their desperation, wouldn’t let him leave. He seized the opportunity to declare his solidarity with the besieged population, climbing onto a tank to assure the people he would not leave until the Serb forces agreed to allow evacuation of the wounded and passage of aid convoys into the enclave.

Eventually, he convinced his “captors” to release him so he could seek Milosevic’s help convincing the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic, he believed, was the only person who could assist him by exercising his influence over Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Mladic, the witness said, was the only person who had real authority in the Republika Srpska – and Milosevic was the only one who could control him. When Morillon met with Milosevic, he urged him in the strongest words to “help me attempt to save the people.” The General told him that if he failed to act, he would be blamed and world public opinion would not forgive him for what would happen in Srebrenica.

When Prosecutor Dermot Groome pressed him to provide details of what he feared could happen, Morillon seemed incapable of doing so. “Something terrible could happen” was as specific as he got. His reluctance at description was reminiscent of yesterday’s witness, B-1804, the Bosnian Serb Army officer who avoided telling the Court in what ways people had been 'deprived of their lives.' Perhaps euphemism and generality serve a psychological need for distance from horrible crimes, whether imagined or remembered. General Morillon concluded that what he feared then happened two years later, something he is still haunted by.

Morillon went to the right man. Bosnian Serb forces soon allowed humanitarian aid into Srebrenica and some of the wounded to leave, though they continued to surround it, controlling the aid as well as water and power supplies for two more years. They did this in spite of the fact that the UN declared Srebrenica a 'safe area' (tragically undefined) and placed a small contingent of UN 'blue helmets' there. Citizens who wished to remain in the enclave were required to turn in their weapons. Perhaps out of prescience that the blue helmets were not going to protect them, some kept their weapons. There were also reports that Naser Oric, Bosnian Muslim Commander, continued to use Srebrenica as a base from which he launched raids against the surrounding Bosnian Serb forces. The failure of demilitarization provided Mladic with an excuse to continue the siege and shelling.

Humanitarian aid kept people alive for two more years until Bosnian Serb forces overran the enclave and completed their ethnic cleansing in 1995. Today, Srebrenica remains a largely Serb municipality.

General Morillon provided important testimony on the role of the FRY and Serbia in the 1993 bombardment of Srebrenica. There was firing into Srebrenica, he said, from across the Drina River in FRY territory. In addition, two unidentified aircraft flying from the FRY flew bombing missions over the besieged enclave. Earlier, in 1992 when the JNA withdrew from Bosnia under the terms of an international agreement, the General testified that there was merely a change in insignia on JNA buildings and uniforms. Those soldiers and officers who did leave, left weapons and equipment behind for their Serb brothers.

In an interesting admission, Milosevic told the Court that he ordered the soldiers ('our children') to leave the weapons because he gave priority to bringing them home safely. The government, he said, opposed him. That may provide a noncriminal reason for leaving the weapons, but it also shows Milosevic's power over the JNA.

As he did later with Srebrenica, General Morillon sought and received Milosevic’s help to temporarily stop the Bosnian Serbs’ shelling of Sarajevo. When he and General Satish Nambiar, UNPROFOR Commander at the time, met with Milosevic, the Serb President said he would use his influence with Radovan Karadzic, President of the RS, to “have the bloody, criminal bombardment stopped.” [Milosevic quoted in Nambiar’s report on the meeting] He would tell them, Milosevic advised the generals, they could not count on continued support from Belgrade if they did not stop. The cease fire was temporary. The siege of Sarajevo resumed and continued with intermittent cease fires until November 1995.

General Morillon told the Court that he felt Karadzic wanted to stop the siege of Sarajevo, but he could not get Mladic to go along. From the General’s point of view, Mladic was responsible for “all misfortunes” that happened in the Bosnian conflict. While he blamed Milosevic for “setting the dogs loose,” he believed the Serbian President lost control of Mladic after the Bosnian Serb Parliament refused to accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, for which Milosevic had strongly advocated. Mladic, Morillon told the Court, didn’t obey anyone but himself, certainly not Karadzic.

As damaging to the prosecution case as this conclusion may appear, it is contradicted by other evidence in the trial, for example, Milosevic's insistence to General Wesley Clark in August 1995 that he could deliver agreement of the Bosnian Serbs to any international settlement. Morillon's direct knowledge ended in July 1993, when he turned over his command and left the region.

Milosevic brought the witness's attention to a 1992 report from then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which he advised the Security Council that the VRS was apparently not under Belgrade's control any longer. General Morillon replied that the stress should be placed on 'apparently.' The Secretary General was in New York, while the General was on the ground, he told the Court. 'In reality we knew very well Belgrade continued to exert its authority on Mladic.'

The Accused charged Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic with responsibility for refusing to let his people leave Sarajevo. At the time, the Bosnian Government controlled no more than 30% of Bosnia, in patches that were not contiguous. While its strategy may have been to keep the remaining areas under its control populated to prevent total disappearance of the state, the Bosnian Serb forces would not consent to ending the sieges without a full evacuation of the Bosniak population. In Sarajevo, Karadzic would have been content to divide the city. General Morillon told the Court that the siege of Sarajevo may have served the interests of the Bosnian Government, but the responsible party was the Bosnian Serbs who would not stop the siege.

While the horrors of the siege of Sarajevo -- where cemeteries replaced flower gardens -- generated international sympathy for the Bosnian Government, it did not translate into the kind of assistance that would have 'leveled the playing field,' allowing the Bosnian Government the arms it needed to defend its citizens. As General Morillon repeatedly told the Court, the Muslim 'David' was facing a Serbian 'Goliath' [not his words]. As noted in earlier testimony, the arms embargo served the interests of those who had weapons at the time, primarily the Bosnian Serbs who inherited -- and continued to be supplied with -- weapons from the JNA/VJ. The Bosnian Government's aim from the start was to involve the international community on their behalf, the General testified. 'What else could they do to defend themselves?'

Milosevic drew a picture of the Bosnian Serbs (and himself) as desiring peace, while the Bosnian Government refused all peace agreements. What he didn't say was that peace at that stage would have legitimized the Bosnian Serbs' military victories, taking and cleansing 70% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was a legitimate state, recognized by the UN. The Bosnian Serbs were fighting for the destruction of that state. At one point in Milosevic's cross examination, General Morillon answered him, 'If you want me to say it was not in President Izetbegovic's interest to comply [establish peace], I agree.' Milosevic concluded, 'He rejected peace.' But the General corrected him, 'He rejected defeat, abdication.'

The Accused also raised the oft-repeated charge that Bosniak forces attacked their own people in order to generate sympathy from the international community in a quest to provoke international intervention. In one case, 16 civilians were killed and another 140 wounded when a shell fell on them while they lined up for bread. Milosevic asserted it had been stage-managed by the Bosniaks for their purposes. It succeeded, he claimed, because three days later the UN imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. General Morillon told the Court that he could not personally tell which side had fired the shell. 'I do not deny it might have been the Bosniaks but I have no evidence of it. Sarajevo was besieged at the time.' As for the February 1994 Markale Marketplace massacre, General Morillon was no longer in the country by that time.

The General told the Court that Bosnian Government forces shelled his residence at one point, but did not try to deny it. Crimes were committed on both sides, he conceded. Milosevic also read selected portions of General Morillon's comments to an inquiry by the French Parliament, many of which appeared critical of the Bosnian Government and Army, while praising Milosevic as aiding the peace process. He asked the witness if he hadn't also said there were no victims or aggressors. Morillon responded that one had to consider his role as an UNPROFOR commander. He was supposed to be neutral.

He was adamant, however, that Serbs should not be demonized. They had been misled and badly used by Milosevic and others, who cultivated hatred through vicious propaganda. 'Unfortunately, it [fear] continued growing because people like you kept reminding people of ancestral massacres through the media.' The General also condemned 'some' in Zagreb and Sarajevo who led people into this 'drama.'

Milosevic tried to get the General to agree with him that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was a civil war caused by premature recognition of secessionist republics by the international community. Morillon responded, 'History will tell. Our presence today at the Tribunal will contribute to shed light on the period. I think the drama came out of memories of atrocities of past and ancestral fears that were fueled and you are one of those responsible for having sowed this fear, for having armed, for having pushed those who were unleashed, became enraged and escaped your control. I am really convinced . . . .'

General Morillon attributed the Srebrenica massacre to hatred generated early in the war by Nasir Oric's 'take no prisoners' campaign against Serb villages. . [Naser Oric has been indicated by the Tribunal on 6 counts of war crimes for the plundering and destruction of at least 50 predominantly Serb villages in Eastern Bosnia and the mistreatment, beating and murder of Serb detainees. He awaits trial in the ICTY Detention Unit.] Milosevic quoted observations the General had made earlier to the effect that Izetbegovic withdrew Oric from Srebrenica one week prior to the Serb attack, that Mladic fell into the 'trap,' that he expected to find resistance and there was none, that he didn't expect a massacre and didn't anticipate the hatred that had accrued among the Bosnian Serb forces. Perhaps to distance himself from his observations, Morillon told the Court that when Srebrenica fell in 1995, he had been out of the region for two years. Milosevic continued quoting the General, who claimed at the time that the Bosnian Government opposed evacuation of the people in Srebrenica to Tuzla. He had said he was not blaming President Izetbegovic. It was the only way Izetbegovic could provoke the international community into helping the Bosnian Muslims.

Even if this were true, however, it in no way justifies the wholesale slaughter that followed. The executioners were Bosnian Serb soldiers. Moreover, the Court has heard testimony from one perpetrator, Drazen Erdemovic, who pled guilty and served his sentence for his part in the execution-style killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims. His sentence was light (originally 10 years, reduced to 5) because the Court concluded that he was not a 'willing executioner,' but obeyed orders only because he feared for his own life. Even then, he finally said 'no more' and refused to continue killing.

The General's belief that the Srebrenica massacres were a spontaneous response to earlier Bosniak atrocities against Bosnian Serbs stands alone in the trial so far and is directly contradicted by testimony of Miroslav Deronjic, close associate to Karadzic and Civilian Commissioner of Srebrenica at the time of the massacres. Deronjic told the Court that Karadzic declared everyone in the enclave should be killed - before the VRS assault on it began. The order was repeated by Ljubisa Beara, an emissary from the VRS Main Staff, during the operation as thousands of people were being rounded up. Deronjic pled guilty to non-Srebrenica related crimes against humanity in Bosnia. Beara has been indicted by the Tribunal for his role in Srebrenica, but remains at large.

For the Prosecution's case, General Morillon's testimony spotlights Milosevic's knowledge that Mladic and his forces had the potential for genocide two years before their actions culminated in the massacre of approximately 7500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Though he was aware of the potential for genocide specifically in Srebrenica and took action to prevent it in 1993, he continued to support and supply the VRS under Mladic's leadership. The issue Morillon muddied for the Prosecution was whether Milosevic had control over Mladic in the period leading up to the July 1995 massacre. That he was not in a position to know favors the Prosecution's position.

From the above it is apparent that the Prosecution, in the last days of its case in chief, is focusing on the charge of complicity in genocide. It does not require the specific intent to destroy a whole or part of an ethnic, national or religious group, which has so far proved elusive in the case against Milosevic. Rather it requires that Milosevic knew that those he conspired with or substantially supported had that intent.

Two more days remain in the Prosecution's case in chief.