Prosecution Does Creditable Job in Croatia & Bosnia Cases Against Milosevic
Prosecution Does Creditable Job in Croatia & Bosnia Cases Against Milosevic
More than two years after it began, the Prosecution will soon rest its case in chief against Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It was not a perfect case. None are. It was beset by many obstacles, including threats to witnesses, documents withheld by a government and a self-represented accused who refused to play by the rules, while requiring extensive time off due to health problems. Nonetheless, the Prosecution did a creditable job proving the charges against Milosevic, though no one but the judges can decide how successful they were. A major exception is the charge of genocide. At least in public session, the Prosecution produced no direct evidence showing the Accused had the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslims. Whether he was complicit in genocide is another matter, however.
For his part, Milosevic, while refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Tribunal, nevertheless assumed the role of his own counsel so that he might present his view of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars that destroyed it. His participation in a proceeding he considered illegitimate resulted in internal contradictions throughout the trial. Perhaps in an attempt to draw him in further but also because he lacked professional skills, the Court granted him substantial time and leeway in cross examination, which considerably added to the length of the Prosecution's case. Because his goal was to write Serbian and Yugoslav history, he often made speeches instead of asking questions. Whether that served his larger cause is unknown. It did not provide a good defence. Still, he occasionally showed he was capable of conducting a proper cross examination, and he was occasionally successful in discrediting or exposing inconsistencies in testimony.
The above observations and the comments that follow should in no way be considered legal conclusions or to have any other validity for the Milosevic trial itself. They are commentary only, based on the view of one trial observer. It is important to note at the outset that, in order to protect witnesses, a fair amount of evidence was presented in closed session and is not available to the public. There is no way of knowing whether it supported the Prosecution's charges or whether Milosevic was able to discredit it on cross examination. As substantial as the public record is, it remains incomplete. In any event, the three judges, uninfluenced by journalists and observers, will alone decide whether the Prosecution has proven its case.
Following the presentation of the bulk of the Prosecution's Kosovo case, CIJ posted an assessment on this website. Except for a brief update based on evidence of a few additional witnesses, we will not review that part of the case again. Please refer to: 'Where's The Smoking Gun?' September 13, 2002; 'Kosovo Review Update,' February 18, 2004.
In general, both the Croatia and Bosnia cases differed in several respects from the Prosecution's Kosovo case. Most notably, there were far fewer crime base witnesses who testified in court. In part, this derives from the fact that a large number of the crimes have been established in other trials before the ICTY. The Prosecution also relied more on documents, intercepts, transcripts from other trials and written witness statements in this part of the case. To an extent, the Prosecution sought this method of presenting its case due to the breadth of its charges and the Court's imposition of strict time limits, which grew even shorter as a result of the lengthy cross examination the Court permitted the Accused.
There were also more witnesses requiring protective measures, from name, voice and visual anonymity to completely closed sessions. (70 by 1/17/04) There appeared to be a correlation between fear and the ethnicity of the witness, with a high number of Serbs needing protection in order to testify against the former leader of the Serb nation. Some received threats to themselves and their families, including one witness who withdrew from testifying and another who concluded his testimony in closed session after receiving threats. Yet another was willing to face contempt of court charges rather than expose himself and his family to danger.
The picture that emerges from the Prosecution’s anticipated 284 trial days and approximately 300 witnesses is one of a man driven by power, who seizes a particular historical moment and uses it to achieve his goal. Milosevic saw rising Serb nationalism as a vehicle he could ride to power and glory. That the path left vast destruction in its wake, like a bulldozer cutting through a rainforest, was of little consequence. The end was all.
The Prosecution produced a line of witnesses who testified that Milosevic was the most powerful figure in Yugoslavia throughout its decade of war – from insiders and participants in the alleged joint criminal enterprise to other Balkan leaders and international interlocutors. As Borisav Jovic, one time head of Milosevic's political party and former president of the presidency of Yugoslavia, told the Court, “For more than a decade, Milosevic was the absolute authority in Serbia over politics and the party [Socialist Party of Serbia].” He was also the man in charge of the Croatian Serbs, according to Milan Babic, one of the most prominent political leaders in the Krajina, and Milan Milanovic, Deputy Minister of Defense in the self-proclaimed Serb autonomous region in Croatian territory nearest Serbia. The Serbian president conspired with Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb leader, long before the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, ultimately giving him the order to prepare for war, recorded in an intercepted telephone conversation and dramatically played in court. And it was Milosevic, when his power at home became threatened by Western sanctions, who assumed the role of peacemaker. International negotiators, as well as UN personnel trying to deal with a humanitarian disaster, looked to him to impose a settlement on his brother Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. Zoran Lilic, figurehead President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), explained that the international community never approached him to help resolve issues but turned to the President of Serbia instead, 'Everything was in the hands of Mr. Milosevic and the international community accepted that.'
Milosevic wielded power through securing control of essential political and military institutions, including the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, its State Security Service and specialized units, including paramilitaries, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the media. Control of the SPS first and foremost gave him access to control other institutions with the power to appoint and dismiss top personnel. Control of financial institutions gave him the power of the purse strings. He supported and supplied Serb armies and political institutions in both Croatia and Bosnia. As Radovan Karadzic said, 'Without Serbia nothing would have happened, we don't have the resources and would not have been able to make war.' [May 1994 Republika Srpska Assembly Transcript]
These conclusions are based on the testimony of four top insiders, contemporary political leaders, such as Ante Markovic, the last Prime Minister of the SFRY, UN commanders and international negotiators like Lord David Owen, whose name became enshrined on one of the peace plans. They are also supported by substantial documentation, including military orders and records showing that the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian police, Serbian and local territorial defense, and paramilitaries constituted one military force, with joint or unitary command during combat operations. Milosevic was at the apex of this structure. Following Milan Babic's testimony to this effect, Judge Patrick Robinson asked him directly, 'Are you saying that Mr. Milosevic was Commander-in-Chief of the JNA?' To which, Mr. Babic replied, 'Yes. Formally this was the Presidency of the SFRY, but de facto it was Milosevic.'
Some of the most remarkable evidence came in the form of verbatim transcripts of Bosnian Serb Assembly Sessions, including Milosevic’s own words which testify to his and Serbia’s involvement in the Bosnian Serb efforts to ethnically cleanse significant parts of Bosnia of its non-Serb population and claim it for an enlarged Serbian state.
“. . . Since you are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money transfer, that we intend to introduce the same money, that we intend to have every possible link and transaction between the economies, as well as that we are going to stabilize the entire unified area of the economy, in which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally, educationally, and in every other aspect. . . . Let me tell you in the end, do not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them and helped with all our powers and with all our capacities, for the cost of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue to help you, that is not disputed.”
Momcilo Krajisnik, Bosnian Serb presidency member, also proclaimed to his colleagues that the goal of one state for all Serbs had been agreed by the Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian Serbs and Serbia.
The Assembly minutes reveal Ratko Mladic, head of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), reading a detailed list of all the military supplies received from the Yugoslav Army (JNA/VJ) throughout the war, an amount he concluded met 90% of their needs. Milosevic’s control over the army was asserted by a number of political and military leaders, including General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, head of military intelligence and a member of the alleged joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse parts of Croatia and Bosnia. There is an issue of when Milosevic secured control of the JNA, with General Vasiljevic claiming he did not assume complete control until January 1992. Others, such as Borisav Jovic, testified to his de facto control or significant influence at a much earlier date through control of key military leaders and political party appointments. This is important to link Milosevic to crimes in Vukovar and Dubrovnik.
Some of the most crucial evidence against Milosevic was his own admission that he supported the armies of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. When Milosevic was arrested in Yugoslavia, he was charged by local authorities with misappropriation of federal customs funds for his personal use. His sworn, written answer to the charge was that he used the funds to support the Bosnian and Croatian Serb armies. This directly contradicts his oft-repeated assertion that Serbia and he himself were not involved in the Bosnia and Croatia conflicts. As a result of the admission, he has offered a fall back position, that financial support Serbia and the FRY provided was to assure that the families of soldiers would not go hungry. The amount, however, was far in excess of any amount spent on humanitarian relief.
Milosevic also exercised considerable control of state financial institutions. As Ante Markovic, Yugoslavia's last Prime Minister, testified, Milosevic orchestrated the 'biggest robbery of the century' when he effected the transfer of 2.5 billion deutschmarks from the Yugoslav National Bank to the National Bank of Serbia to defeat Markovic's federal reform program. After he learned of it, Mr. Markovic confronted Milosevic. When the Accused denied it, the Prime Minister retorted, 'I said not a single detail in Serbia happens without his knowledge let alone daylight robbery.' After Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, Milosevic gained control of the Federal Assembly and, thereby, the federal budget, according to Mr. Markovic.
Sometime after sanctions were imposed on the FRY, Milosevic assumed the mantel of peacemaker and mediator between the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs and the international community. He complained repeatedly in court that his success in that role was being unfairly used against him – to show his control over the primary protagonists. It was also shown, however, that he was the one responsible for starting the war in Croatia (through operatives of his State Security Service and military intelligence) and the one who directed Karadzic to launch it in Bosnia (recorded on an intercepted telephone call). Again, his own words incriminate him. In at least two telephone intercepts played in court, Milosevic discussed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia with Karadzic, 'You see, they [Slovenia and Croatia] want to step out and are carrying out these things exactly the way we planned it.' In another call, Milosevic says to Karadzic, 'Now there is only one question left, to have disintegration in line with our inclinations.' He goes on to say he would let Slovenia go immediately and the others as soon as they settle the issue of borders with 'us.' The Court has not yet ruled on whether to accept the intercepts as evidence. However, their content was supported by the testimony of JNA General Milosav Djordjevic, when he confronted Milosevic directly in court, 'On June 27, 1990, you discussed how to get rid of Slovenia and half of Croatia. That is the truth.'
As for negotiations, Hervoje Sarinic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman’s special envoy, and others, including Croatian Serb leaders Milan Babic and Milan Milanovic, testified that Milosevic negotiated on behalf of the Croatian Serbs and dictated to them the terms of an acceptable settlement. He negotiated and signed the Vance Plan, which imposed a cease fire and UN peacekeepers in Croatia, on their behalf. When it came down to a final settlement at Dayton, Milosevic hardly involved the Croatian Serbs at all. Rather, they were informed by Jovica Stanisic, Milosevic’s number two man and head of the Serbian State Security Service, that Milosevic had relinquished their territory to Croatia. It should not have come as a surprise, since a half year before, the Serbian leader had abandoned them to the onslaught of the Croatian Army in Operation Storm, creating 200,000 Croatian Serb refugees. Indeed, Milan Babic told the Court that he knew much earlier that Milosevic’s planned Serbian state did not include any of Croatia. After a meeting with Tudjman, Milosevic pulled out a map and drew a line down the middle of Bosnia with his thumbnail, explaining what would be Serbian and what Croatian territory. Tudjman, he said, “needed” territory taken by the Croatian Serbs. At least four other witnesses testified to the two leaders’ division of Bosnia at the March 1991 Karadjordjevo meeting, including Ante Markovic to whom they both admitted it.
Though not as easily and not all the time, Milosevic also spoke for the Bosnian Serbs. While Radovan Karadzic addressed the Accused as “Mr. President” and Milosevic called him “Radovan,” their relationship was not strictly a superior/subordinate one. Nevertheless, Milosevic was the one to whom the international community turned when they wanted cooperation from the Bosnian Serbs. As Dr. Michael Williams, aide to Yasushi Akashi, UN Secretary General's Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia, put it, “[Milosevic] was the dominant political figure” in the Balkans with “profound influence on the political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs in 1994.” Though General Philippe Morillon testified that Milosevic’s influence ended when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for which he strongly advocated, this was contradicted by Dr. Williams, U.S. General Wesley Clark and others who came on the scene after the General left. Lord Owen himself said that Milosevic's power over the Bosnian Serbs fluctuated over time, but was again at a high in the summer of 1995. In Dayton, for example, Milosevic literally gave away Krajisnik’s farm without asking or telling him about it. Moreover, it was Milosevic who secured the release of 400 hostages held by the Bosnian Serbs and, later, two French pilots.
Having established Milosevic’s control and influence, the Prosecution was required to establish that crimes were committed and to connect Milosevic to them. Establishing the crimes was not difficult as many of them have been proven in other trials before the ICTY. For some like Vukovar, however, where no trial has yet been completed, facts on the ground became more important in the Milosevic trial.
Still, a lessened need to prove crimes, together with the need to focus on leadership responsibility for planning and implementing the policy that necessitated the crimes, led to a relative absence of victim witness voices during this phase of the Milosevic trial. Unlike the Kosovo case where the numerous crimes underlying the ethnic cleansing operation were described by victims and witnesses in court, in the Croatia and Bosnia cases their testimonies were largely submitted in written form, through transcripts from other trials or sworn statements. While essential to prove a leadership case, in some ways it mirrored the distance and unreality with which Milosevic and his associates regarded the human tragedy that was a necessary consequence of their policy.
Yet, the impact of the crimes on real people was not totally absent from the chamber. B-1701 was a survivor of the Bratunac massacre, where at least 74 civilians were alleged to have been killed by JNA, paramilitaries and a special police unit from Serbia when the municipality was ethnically cleansed. B-1701 testified that he was beaten with an ax handle on his head, witnessed the executions of friends at close range, was forced to carry their bodies and dump them in the river, then kneel down with others to be executed in turn. He saw his friend's head blown off and felt part of his brain splatter on his neck. He survived, but just barely, after lying in the water for four hours pretending to be dead. When he told his story in Court, Witness B-1701's voice broke. He was reliving that day 11 years before in all its horror. Yet, he was able to complete his testimony and respond to Milosevic's pointless questions about the local SDA (Party of Democratic Action) of which he was not a member. When Milosevic finally turned to the crimes about which B-1701 had testified, he insisted the JNA could not have been involved because they don't wear socks on their heads. Rather than dignify this comment with a response, the witness took the opportunity to confront Milosevic. 'We lived as brothers in the old days, when we used to say Comrade Milosevic. Everything changed when you came to power.'
B-1701’s testimony demonstrates both the difficulty for survivors who are retraumatized when they testify and the satisfaction they might derive from personally confronting the Accused.
Several survivors of the brutal camp system that Serb authorities in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia set up also testified. Robert Hausvicka was captured on his way to assist in the defense of Dubrovnik, the world heritage protected site that was shelled and laid siege to by the JNA and units under its control. Imprisoned in two camps, one in Bosnia and one in Montenegro, Mr. Hausvicka described a regime so vicious that he broke under interrogations, not only telling everything he knew but inventing things as well. He experienced sustained beatings, electric shocks to his head and lower extremities, and beatings by rods to the bottoms of his feet. Like others, he was forced to watch mock executions and forced boxing matches among the prisoners. The prisoners slept on a wood floor and used a bucket for a toilet. On cross examination, Milosevic referred to these experiences as “those frustrating events.” Milosevic’s cross examination of the witness demonstrates why he would better have been served by professional counsel instead of representing himself. At one point the Accused asked the witness who killed all the soldiers in the Dubrovnik theater of war, if there were so few Croatian fighters. Mr. Hausvicka responded, “I will give you a specific answer, if you agree.” Milosevic agreed, “Of course, whatever you want,” leaving the witness an opening for his accusation, “My answer is ‘you’.”
The siege of Dubrovnik, a protected world heritage site, was in itself a crime. Its stari grad (old center) was a demilitarized warren of cobbled streets and alleys, winding through stone churches and red roofed houses, with one fountain dating back to Roman times. Having laid waste to a swath of villages along the Dalmatian coast from Montenegro northward, the JNA attacked Dubrovnik by land, sea and air, causing extensive damage to the old town. While Milosevic maintains that the JNA was merely returning fire, two strong pieces of evidence belie his claim. Admiral Miodrag Jokic, commander of naval forces, admitted responsibility for the worst attack on Dubrovnik on December 6, 1991. Milo Djukanovic, former president of Montenegro, formally apologized for Montenegro’s role in the assault (a large Montenegrin contingent accompanied JNA forces). The former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, civilian and military defenders of the besieged city, and others provided corroboration. When Ante Markovic confronted Milosevic (in Tudjman's presence) about the JNA's shelling of Dubrovnik, the Accused denied it was happening. If it was, he said, he would know about it and stop it. By this statement, Milosevic unwittingly admitted his control over the JNA in the autumn of 1991.
The Court also heard testimony about a number of massacres, including Vukovar, the Lovas minefield, and Srebrenica. Extensive evidence was also given about the siege warfare practiced by the Bosnian Serbs, a strategy not much seen since WWII, according to one witness. Siege warfare is a direct attack against a civilian population. In addition to being subjected to shelling and shooting, the population is cut off from the outside world and denied access to the basics needed to sustain life – food, water and medicine. The Prosecution may well argue that the use of siege warfare was part of the genocidal campaign against the Bosnian Muslims, in that it constituted the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part. [Article 4.2.c of the ICTY Statute]
Sarajevo and Srebrenica, among others, were two cities placed under siege by Bosnian Serb forces early in the war. Both figure in the Prosecution’s charges of genocide and complicity in genocide. An estimated 10,000 people died in Sarajevo during the 3 ½ years of siege. In 1993, dozens of people in Srebrenica were dying daily from wounds, sickness and malnutrition. The head of a UN mission to the region, Diego Arria described it as “slow motion genocide.” He and others also told the Court that Milosevic knew about the situation and agreed that if Bosnian Serb forces took Srebrenica there would be a bloodbath. Lord David Owen and General Philippe Morillon testified that international pressure was brought to bear on Milosevic who convinced the Bosnian Serbs to pull back. Milosevic's intervention prevented similar all-out assaults on Gorazde and Bihac, for which the UN mission had similar fears if they were taken by Serb forces who had 'an appalling record of brutality in dealing with civilians under their control,' according to Dr. Williams, Akashi's aide. Though not with appreciation, the Bosnian Serbs acknowledged Milosevic's role in restraining them. For example, a Bosnian Serb Assembly member addressed his colleagues at an October 1995 Assembly Session, 'President Krajisnik said that Milosevic prevented the offensive, so that we couldn't take Bihac.'
With evidence of Milosevic’s power to stop potential Bosnian Serb genocide against the Bosnian Muslims and his failure to do so in Srebrenica in 1995, the Prosecution seeks to prove he is guilty of complicity in genocide. The knowledge of Bosnian Serb genocidal intent and capability combined with his continued substantial support – military, financial and moral – of the Bosnian Serbs would make Milosevic an aider and abettor to the crime of genocide, according to the Prosecution’s theory. For complicity, the Prosecution need not prove that Milosevic had or shared an intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part (the legal standard for genocide). They need only establish that he knew the Bosnian Serbs who led this campaign had that intent and he made a significant contribution to its implementation. As David Harland, UN Civil and Political Officer for Sarajevo from 1993 to 1999, testified, if Serbia had seriously limited its substantial military and financial support to the VRS, 'the siege [of Sarajevo] would have been ended' without the consequent loss of life. Addressing Milosevic directly, he said, 'You certainly gave the impression that the Bosnian Serb military were very amenable to influence by you or others in Belgrade. The fact that nothing was done to restrain the VRS at Sarajevo and other places, including Srebrenica, we took as meaning you either acquiesced [in] or supported it.'
While another trial chamber (Prosecution v. Krstic) has established that genocide occurred when approximately 7500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed following the fall of Srebrenica, this Trial Chamber may decide otherwise. Trial chambers are only bound to follow legal rulings of the Appellate Chamber. Until the Appeals Chamber rules on the genocide issue, other ICTY trial courts are free to make their own reasoned interpretation and application of the law. Nevertheless, in addition to accepting selected testimony from the Krstic trial, the Milosevic Trial Chamber has evidence before it that could support a legal conclusion that genocide occurred in Bosnia, including but not limited to Srebrenica.
Miroslav Deronjic, the politician Karadzic appointed Civilian Commissioner of Srebrenica during its takeover, provided key testimony of Karadzic’s genocidal intent with regard to the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. Before the assault on the safe haven was complete, Karadzic told Deronjic the people gathering there would all have to be killed. A little while later, an emissary from the VRS Main Staff (Ljubisa Beara, indicted for genocide in Srebrenica, still at large) arrived in Srebrenica to confirm orders that all prisoners were to be killed. Others, including a Bosnian Serb policeman, corroborated this testimony.
Some of the most damning evidence was captured on videotape after the fall of the Srebrenica safe area and just before the mass deportation and massacre. General Ratko Mladic, commander of the operation, addresses several people whom he has designated representatives of the Bosnian Muslims: 'I need a clear position on whether you want to survive.' Later, he repeats his demand to a young man who insists he cannot represent the 30 to 40,000 refugees gathered near the UN base. 'Have I made myself clear, Nesib? The future of your people is in your hands and not only on this territory.' And again, 'You can either survive or disappear.'
A young Bosnian Serb Army soldier, ordered to be an executioner or lose his own life, testified about shooting prisoner after prisoner for four hours, along with other soldiers, until he simply could not do it anymore. Drazen Erdemovic was indicted by the Tribunal, pled guilty and served a sentence reduced because the Court found his crimes were committed under extreme duress. Erdemovic told the Court that he received his orders from the VRS Main Staff (commanded by General Ratko Mladic) and that an operation the size of the Srebrenica massacre – entailing the rounding up, detention, killing and burial of at least 7000 men and boys over a 5 day period -- could not have occurred without organization from the top.
The record contains indications that the Bosnian Serb leaders intended genocide early on. In July 1992, Radovan Karadzic addressed the Bosnian Serb Assembly about fears of an Islamic state dominating the Bosnian Serbs, 'This conflict was incited so that the Muslims would not exist.' In a telephone intercept, Karadzic complained about Bosnian Muslim resistance, 'They must know there are 20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo. This is not normal. They will disappear. Sarajevo will be a melting pot in which 300,000 Muslims will die.'
As noted above, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate Milosevic shared the Bosnian Serb leaders' genocidal intent (if the Court finds it existed). Zoran Lilic, close ally of Milosevic, testified that he investigated Srebrenica and reported to Milosevic that no one from the leadership of Serbia or the FRY had anything to do with the massacre. Milosevic, Lilic said, was more than angry, shaken when he said, 'These crazy Serbs from Pale. I can't believe they did something like this.' General Sir Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR Bosnia chief in 1995, testified that he met with Milosevic, Mladic and others a few days after the killing in Srebrenica had begun. Milosevic directed Mladic to go with the General to sort out recovery of Dutch Bat soldiers and access to prisoners. Milosevic was clearly Mladic's superior, he told the Court. However, he was unable to say whether Milosevic knew about or was involved in the massacres. David Harland, another UN officer in Bosnia at the time, testified that Ambassador Carl Bildt told him he had seen Mladic with Milosevic in Belgrade around this time. Asserting that Mladic had to know about the massacres, Mr. Harland commented, 'It seems surprising he would fail to mention the deaths of 7000 people to you.'
While the public evidence does not support a conclusion that Milosevic shared the genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serb leaders, it does disclose that he had years of experience with the strategies and excesses of their military forces. According to witnesses, he restrained Bosnian Serb forces in Gorazde, Bihac, Sarejevo and even Srebrenica in 1993. As Dr. Williams testified about UN fears for Gorazde should it fall to the Bosnian Serbs, 'they had an appalling record of brutality of dealing with civilians under their control.' Lord David Owen, who prided himself on his neutrality, told the Court that Milosevic shared his serious concern about what would happen to the civilian population of Srebrenica if the Bosnian Serbs took the enclave. Pressed by the international community, Milosevic prevented a takeover at that time. The question is why didn't he stop Mladic in 1995? Noting that thousands of civilians had been killed in Srebrenica, General Wesley Clark asked him this exact question, shortly after the massacres as Milosevic was trying to convince the General he could deliver the Bosnian Serbs' agreement on a peace deal. Milosevic responded that he had tried, but Mladic wouldn't listen to him. Though Milosevic now denies saying that, it is evidence that he knew of the massacre before it happened.
Assuming the Court finds Milosevic could have stopped Mladic from executing thousands of prisoners at Srebrenica but chose not to , can he be held responsible for acquiescence in genocide that was foreseeable? Likely not for genocid
For his part, Milosevic, while refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Tribunal, nevertheless assumed the role of his own counsel so that he might present his view of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars that destroyed it. His participation in a proceeding he considered illegitimate resulted in internal contradictions throughout the trial. Perhaps in an attempt to draw him in further but also because he lacked professional skills, the Court granted him substantial time and leeway in cross examination, which considerably added to the length of the Prosecution's case. Because his goal was to write Serbian and Yugoslav history, he often made speeches instead of asking questions. Whether that served his larger cause is unknown. It did not provide a good defence. Still, he occasionally showed he was capable of conducting a proper cross examination, and he was occasionally successful in discrediting or exposing inconsistencies in testimony.
The above observations and the comments that follow should in no way be considered legal conclusions or to have any other validity for the Milosevic trial itself. They are commentary only, based on the view of one trial observer. It is important to note at the outset that, in order to protect witnesses, a fair amount of evidence was presented in closed session and is not available to the public. There is no way of knowing whether it supported the Prosecution's charges or whether Milosevic was able to discredit it on cross examination. As substantial as the public record is, it remains incomplete. In any event, the three judges, uninfluenced by journalists and observers, will alone decide whether the Prosecution has proven its case.
Following the presentation of the bulk of the Prosecution's Kosovo case, CIJ posted an assessment on this website. Except for a brief update based on evidence of a few additional witnesses, we will not review that part of the case again. Please refer to: 'Where's The Smoking Gun?' September 13, 2002; 'Kosovo Review Update,' February 18, 2004.
In general, both the Croatia and Bosnia cases differed in several respects from the Prosecution's Kosovo case. Most notably, there were far fewer crime base witnesses who testified in court. In part, this derives from the fact that a large number of the crimes have been established in other trials before the ICTY. The Prosecution also relied more on documents, intercepts, transcripts from other trials and written witness statements in this part of the case. To an extent, the Prosecution sought this method of presenting its case due to the breadth of its charges and the Court's imposition of strict time limits, which grew even shorter as a result of the lengthy cross examination the Court permitted the Accused.
There were also more witnesses requiring protective measures, from name, voice and visual anonymity to completely closed sessions. (70 by 1/17/04) There appeared to be a correlation between fear and the ethnicity of the witness, with a high number of Serbs needing protection in order to testify against the former leader of the Serb nation. Some received threats to themselves and their families, including one witness who withdrew from testifying and another who concluded his testimony in closed session after receiving threats. Yet another was willing to face contempt of court charges rather than expose himself and his family to danger.
The picture that emerges from the Prosecution’s anticipated 284 trial days and approximately 300 witnesses is one of a man driven by power, who seizes a particular historical moment and uses it to achieve his goal. Milosevic saw rising Serb nationalism as a vehicle he could ride to power and glory. That the path left vast destruction in its wake, like a bulldozer cutting through a rainforest, was of little consequence. The end was all.
The Prosecution produced a line of witnesses who testified that Milosevic was the most powerful figure in Yugoslavia throughout its decade of war – from insiders and participants in the alleged joint criminal enterprise to other Balkan leaders and international interlocutors. As Borisav Jovic, one time head of Milosevic's political party and former president of the presidency of Yugoslavia, told the Court, “For more than a decade, Milosevic was the absolute authority in Serbia over politics and the party [Socialist Party of Serbia].” He was also the man in charge of the Croatian Serbs, according to Milan Babic, one of the most prominent political leaders in the Krajina, and Milan Milanovic, Deputy Minister of Defense in the self-proclaimed Serb autonomous region in Croatian territory nearest Serbia. The Serbian president conspired with Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb leader, long before the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, ultimately giving him the order to prepare for war, recorded in an intercepted telephone conversation and dramatically played in court. And it was Milosevic, when his power at home became threatened by Western sanctions, who assumed the role of peacemaker. International negotiators, as well as UN personnel trying to deal with a humanitarian disaster, looked to him to impose a settlement on his brother Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. Zoran Lilic, figurehead President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), explained that the international community never approached him to help resolve issues but turned to the President of Serbia instead, 'Everything was in the hands of Mr. Milosevic and the international community accepted that.'
Milosevic wielded power through securing control of essential political and military institutions, including the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, its State Security Service and specialized units, including paramilitaries, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the media. Control of the SPS first and foremost gave him access to control other institutions with the power to appoint and dismiss top personnel. Control of financial institutions gave him the power of the purse strings. He supported and supplied Serb armies and political institutions in both Croatia and Bosnia. As Radovan Karadzic said, 'Without Serbia nothing would have happened, we don't have the resources and would not have been able to make war.' [May 1994 Republika Srpska Assembly Transcript]
These conclusions are based on the testimony of four top insiders, contemporary political leaders, such as Ante Markovic, the last Prime Minister of the SFRY, UN commanders and international negotiators like Lord David Owen, whose name became enshrined on one of the peace plans. They are also supported by substantial documentation, including military orders and records showing that the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian police, Serbian and local territorial defense, and paramilitaries constituted one military force, with joint or unitary command during combat operations. Milosevic was at the apex of this structure. Following Milan Babic's testimony to this effect, Judge Patrick Robinson asked him directly, 'Are you saying that Mr. Milosevic was Commander-in-Chief of the JNA?' To which, Mr. Babic replied, 'Yes. Formally this was the Presidency of the SFRY, but de facto it was Milosevic.'
Some of the most remarkable evidence came in the form of verbatim transcripts of Bosnian Serb Assembly Sessions, including Milosevic’s own words which testify to his and Serbia’s involvement in the Bosnian Serb efforts to ethnically cleanse significant parts of Bosnia of its non-Serb population and claim it for an enlarged Serbian state.
“. . . Since you are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money transfer, that we intend to introduce the same money, that we intend to have every possible link and transaction between the economies, as well as that we are going to stabilize the entire unified area of the economy, in which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally, educationally, and in every other aspect. . . . Let me tell you in the end, do not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them and helped with all our powers and with all our capacities, for the cost of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue to help you, that is not disputed.”
Momcilo Krajisnik, Bosnian Serb presidency member, also proclaimed to his colleagues that the goal of one state for all Serbs had been agreed by the Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian Serbs and Serbia.
The Assembly minutes reveal Ratko Mladic, head of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), reading a detailed list of all the military supplies received from the Yugoslav Army (JNA/VJ) throughout the war, an amount he concluded met 90% of their needs. Milosevic’s control over the army was asserted by a number of political and military leaders, including General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, head of military intelligence and a member of the alleged joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse parts of Croatia and Bosnia. There is an issue of when Milosevic secured control of the JNA, with General Vasiljevic claiming he did not assume complete control until January 1992. Others, such as Borisav Jovic, testified to his de facto control or significant influence at a much earlier date through control of key military leaders and political party appointments. This is important to link Milosevic to crimes in Vukovar and Dubrovnik.
Some of the most crucial evidence against Milosevic was his own admission that he supported the armies of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. When Milosevic was arrested in Yugoslavia, he was charged by local authorities with misappropriation of federal customs funds for his personal use. His sworn, written answer to the charge was that he used the funds to support the Bosnian and Croatian Serb armies. This directly contradicts his oft-repeated assertion that Serbia and he himself were not involved in the Bosnia and Croatia conflicts. As a result of the admission, he has offered a fall back position, that financial support Serbia and the FRY provided was to assure that the families of soldiers would not go hungry. The amount, however, was far in excess of any amount spent on humanitarian relief.
Milosevic also exercised considerable control of state financial institutions. As Ante Markovic, Yugoslavia's last Prime Minister, testified, Milosevic orchestrated the 'biggest robbery of the century' when he effected the transfer of 2.5 billion deutschmarks from the Yugoslav National Bank to the National Bank of Serbia to defeat Markovic's federal reform program. After he learned of it, Mr. Markovic confronted Milosevic. When the Accused denied it, the Prime Minister retorted, 'I said not a single detail in Serbia happens without his knowledge let alone daylight robbery.' After Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, Milosevic gained control of the Federal Assembly and, thereby, the federal budget, according to Mr. Markovic.
Sometime after sanctions were imposed on the FRY, Milosevic assumed the mantel of peacemaker and mediator between the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs and the international community. He complained repeatedly in court that his success in that role was being unfairly used against him – to show his control over the primary protagonists. It was also shown, however, that he was the one responsible for starting the war in Croatia (through operatives of his State Security Service and military intelligence) and the one who directed Karadzic to launch it in Bosnia (recorded on an intercepted telephone call). Again, his own words incriminate him. In at least two telephone intercepts played in court, Milosevic discussed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia with Karadzic, 'You see, they [Slovenia and Croatia] want to step out and are carrying out these things exactly the way we planned it.' In another call, Milosevic says to Karadzic, 'Now there is only one question left, to have disintegration in line with our inclinations.' He goes on to say he would let Slovenia go immediately and the others as soon as they settle the issue of borders with 'us.' The Court has not yet ruled on whether to accept the intercepts as evidence. However, their content was supported by the testimony of JNA General Milosav Djordjevic, when he confronted Milosevic directly in court, 'On June 27, 1990, you discussed how to get rid of Slovenia and half of Croatia. That is the truth.'
As for negotiations, Hervoje Sarinic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman’s special envoy, and others, including Croatian Serb leaders Milan Babic and Milan Milanovic, testified that Milosevic negotiated on behalf of the Croatian Serbs and dictated to them the terms of an acceptable settlement. He negotiated and signed the Vance Plan, which imposed a cease fire and UN peacekeepers in Croatia, on their behalf. When it came down to a final settlement at Dayton, Milosevic hardly involved the Croatian Serbs at all. Rather, they were informed by Jovica Stanisic, Milosevic’s number two man and head of the Serbian State Security Service, that Milosevic had relinquished their territory to Croatia. It should not have come as a surprise, since a half year before, the Serbian leader had abandoned them to the onslaught of the Croatian Army in Operation Storm, creating 200,000 Croatian Serb refugees. Indeed, Milan Babic told the Court that he knew much earlier that Milosevic’s planned Serbian state did not include any of Croatia. After a meeting with Tudjman, Milosevic pulled out a map and drew a line down the middle of Bosnia with his thumbnail, explaining what would be Serbian and what Croatian territory. Tudjman, he said, “needed” territory taken by the Croatian Serbs. At least four other witnesses testified to the two leaders’ division of Bosnia at the March 1991 Karadjordjevo meeting, including Ante Markovic to whom they both admitted it.
Though not as easily and not all the time, Milosevic also spoke for the Bosnian Serbs. While Radovan Karadzic addressed the Accused as “Mr. President” and Milosevic called him “Radovan,” their relationship was not strictly a superior/subordinate one. Nevertheless, Milosevic was the one to whom the international community turned when they wanted cooperation from the Bosnian Serbs. As Dr. Michael Williams, aide to Yasushi Akashi, UN Secretary General's Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia, put it, “[Milosevic] was the dominant political figure” in the Balkans with “profound influence on the political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs in 1994.” Though General Philippe Morillon testified that Milosevic’s influence ended when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for which he strongly advocated, this was contradicted by Dr. Williams, U.S. General Wesley Clark and others who came on the scene after the General left. Lord Owen himself said that Milosevic's power over the Bosnian Serbs fluctuated over time, but was again at a high in the summer of 1995. In Dayton, for example, Milosevic literally gave away Krajisnik’s farm without asking or telling him about it. Moreover, it was Milosevic who secured the release of 400 hostages held by the Bosnian Serbs and, later, two French pilots.
Having established Milosevic’s control and influence, the Prosecution was required to establish that crimes were committed and to connect Milosevic to them. Establishing the crimes was not difficult as many of them have been proven in other trials before the ICTY. For some like Vukovar, however, where no trial has yet been completed, facts on the ground became more important in the Milosevic trial.
Still, a lessened need to prove crimes, together with the need to focus on leadership responsibility for planning and implementing the policy that necessitated the crimes, led to a relative absence of victim witness voices during this phase of the Milosevic trial. Unlike the Kosovo case where the numerous crimes underlying the ethnic cleansing operation were described by victims and witnesses in court, in the Croatia and Bosnia cases their testimonies were largely submitted in written form, through transcripts from other trials or sworn statements. While essential to prove a leadership case, in some ways it mirrored the distance and unreality with which Milosevic and his associates regarded the human tragedy that was a necessary consequence of their policy.
Yet, the impact of the crimes on real people was not totally absent from the chamber. B-1701 was a survivor of the Bratunac massacre, where at least 74 civilians were alleged to have been killed by JNA, paramilitaries and a special police unit from Serbia when the municipality was ethnically cleansed. B-1701 testified that he was beaten with an ax handle on his head, witnessed the executions of friends at close range, was forced to carry their bodies and dump them in the river, then kneel down with others to be executed in turn. He saw his friend's head blown off and felt part of his brain splatter on his neck. He survived, but just barely, after lying in the water for four hours pretending to be dead. When he told his story in Court, Witness B-1701's voice broke. He was reliving that day 11 years before in all its horror. Yet, he was able to complete his testimony and respond to Milosevic's pointless questions about the local SDA (Party of Democratic Action) of which he was not a member. When Milosevic finally turned to the crimes about which B-1701 had testified, he insisted the JNA could not have been involved because they don't wear socks on their heads. Rather than dignify this comment with a response, the witness took the opportunity to confront Milosevic. 'We lived as brothers in the old days, when we used to say Comrade Milosevic. Everything changed when you came to power.'
B-1701’s testimony demonstrates both the difficulty for survivors who are retraumatized when they testify and the satisfaction they might derive from personally confronting the Accused.
Several survivors of the brutal camp system that Serb authorities in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia set up also testified. Robert Hausvicka was captured on his way to assist in the defense of Dubrovnik, the world heritage protected site that was shelled and laid siege to by the JNA and units under its control. Imprisoned in two camps, one in Bosnia and one in Montenegro, Mr. Hausvicka described a regime so vicious that he broke under interrogations, not only telling everything he knew but inventing things as well. He experienced sustained beatings, electric shocks to his head and lower extremities, and beatings by rods to the bottoms of his feet. Like others, he was forced to watch mock executions and forced boxing matches among the prisoners. The prisoners slept on a wood floor and used a bucket for a toilet. On cross examination, Milosevic referred to these experiences as “those frustrating events.” Milosevic’s cross examination of the witness demonstrates why he would better have been served by professional counsel instead of representing himself. At one point the Accused asked the witness who killed all the soldiers in the Dubrovnik theater of war, if there were so few Croatian fighters. Mr. Hausvicka responded, “I will give you a specific answer, if you agree.” Milosevic agreed, “Of course, whatever you want,” leaving the witness an opening for his accusation, “My answer is ‘you’.”
The siege of Dubrovnik, a protected world heritage site, was in itself a crime. Its stari grad (old center) was a demilitarized warren of cobbled streets and alleys, winding through stone churches and red roofed houses, with one fountain dating back to Roman times. Having laid waste to a swath of villages along the Dalmatian coast from Montenegro northward, the JNA attacked Dubrovnik by land, sea and air, causing extensive damage to the old town. While Milosevic maintains that the JNA was merely returning fire, two strong pieces of evidence belie his claim. Admiral Miodrag Jokic, commander of naval forces, admitted responsibility for the worst attack on Dubrovnik on December 6, 1991. Milo Djukanovic, former president of Montenegro, formally apologized for Montenegro’s role in the assault (a large Montenegrin contingent accompanied JNA forces). The former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, civilian and military defenders of the besieged city, and others provided corroboration. When Ante Markovic confronted Milosevic (in Tudjman's presence) about the JNA's shelling of Dubrovnik, the Accused denied it was happening. If it was, he said, he would know about it and stop it. By this statement, Milosevic unwittingly admitted his control over the JNA in the autumn of 1991.
The Court also heard testimony about a number of massacres, including Vukovar, the Lovas minefield, and Srebrenica. Extensive evidence was also given about the siege warfare practiced by the Bosnian Serbs, a strategy not much seen since WWII, according to one witness. Siege warfare is a direct attack against a civilian population. In addition to being subjected to shelling and shooting, the population is cut off from the outside world and denied access to the basics needed to sustain life – food, water and medicine. The Prosecution may well argue that the use of siege warfare was part of the genocidal campaign against the Bosnian Muslims, in that it constituted the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part. [Article 4.2.c of the ICTY Statute]
Sarajevo and Srebrenica, among others, were two cities placed under siege by Bosnian Serb forces early in the war. Both figure in the Prosecution’s charges of genocide and complicity in genocide. An estimated 10,000 people died in Sarajevo during the 3 ½ years of siege. In 1993, dozens of people in Srebrenica were dying daily from wounds, sickness and malnutrition. The head of a UN mission to the region, Diego Arria described it as “slow motion genocide.” He and others also told the Court that Milosevic knew about the situation and agreed that if Bosnian Serb forces took Srebrenica there would be a bloodbath. Lord David Owen and General Philippe Morillon testified that international pressure was brought to bear on Milosevic who convinced the Bosnian Serbs to pull back. Milosevic's intervention prevented similar all-out assaults on Gorazde and Bihac, for which the UN mission had similar fears if they were taken by Serb forces who had 'an appalling record of brutality in dealing with civilians under their control,' according to Dr. Williams, Akashi's aide. Though not with appreciation, the Bosnian Serbs acknowledged Milosevic's role in restraining them. For example, a Bosnian Serb Assembly member addressed his colleagues at an October 1995 Assembly Session, 'President Krajisnik said that Milosevic prevented the offensive, so that we couldn't take Bihac.'
With evidence of Milosevic’s power to stop potential Bosnian Serb genocide against the Bosnian Muslims and his failure to do so in Srebrenica in 1995, the Prosecution seeks to prove he is guilty of complicity in genocide. The knowledge of Bosnian Serb genocidal intent and capability combined with his continued substantial support – military, financial and moral – of the Bosnian Serbs would make Milosevic an aider and abettor to the crime of genocide, according to the Prosecution’s theory. For complicity, the Prosecution need not prove that Milosevic had or shared an intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part (the legal standard for genocide). They need only establish that he knew the Bosnian Serbs who led this campaign had that intent and he made a significant contribution to its implementation. As David Harland, UN Civil and Political Officer for Sarajevo from 1993 to 1999, testified, if Serbia had seriously limited its substantial military and financial support to the VRS, 'the siege [of Sarajevo] would have been ended' without the consequent loss of life. Addressing Milosevic directly, he said, 'You certainly gave the impression that the Bosnian Serb military were very amenable to influence by you or others in Belgrade. The fact that nothing was done to restrain the VRS at Sarajevo and other places, including Srebrenica, we took as meaning you either acquiesced [in] or supported it.'
While another trial chamber (Prosecution v. Krstic) has established that genocide occurred when approximately 7500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed following the fall of Srebrenica, this Trial Chamber may decide otherwise. Trial chambers are only bound to follow legal rulings of the Appellate Chamber. Until the Appeals Chamber rules on the genocide issue, other ICTY trial courts are free to make their own reasoned interpretation and application of the law. Nevertheless, in addition to accepting selected testimony from the Krstic trial, the Milosevic Trial Chamber has evidence before it that could support a legal conclusion that genocide occurred in Bosnia, including but not limited to Srebrenica.
Miroslav Deronjic, the politician Karadzic appointed Civilian Commissioner of Srebrenica during its takeover, provided key testimony of Karadzic’s genocidal intent with regard to the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. Before the assault on the safe haven was complete, Karadzic told Deronjic the people gathering there would all have to be killed. A little while later, an emissary from the VRS Main Staff (Ljubisa Beara, indicted for genocide in Srebrenica, still at large) arrived in Srebrenica to confirm orders that all prisoners were to be killed. Others, including a Bosnian Serb policeman, corroborated this testimony.
Some of the most damning evidence was captured on videotape after the fall of the Srebrenica safe area and just before the mass deportation and massacre. General Ratko Mladic, commander of the operation, addresses several people whom he has designated representatives of the Bosnian Muslims: 'I need a clear position on whether you want to survive.' Later, he repeats his demand to a young man who insists he cannot represent the 30 to 40,000 refugees gathered near the UN base. 'Have I made myself clear, Nesib? The future of your people is in your hands and not only on this territory.' And again, 'You can either survive or disappear.'
A young Bosnian Serb Army soldier, ordered to be an executioner or lose his own life, testified about shooting prisoner after prisoner for four hours, along with other soldiers, until he simply could not do it anymore. Drazen Erdemovic was indicted by the Tribunal, pled guilty and served a sentence reduced because the Court found his crimes were committed under extreme duress. Erdemovic told the Court that he received his orders from the VRS Main Staff (commanded by General Ratko Mladic) and that an operation the size of the Srebrenica massacre – entailing the rounding up, detention, killing and burial of at least 7000 men and boys over a 5 day period -- could not have occurred without organization from the top.
The record contains indications that the Bosnian Serb leaders intended genocide early on. In July 1992, Radovan Karadzic addressed the Bosnian Serb Assembly about fears of an Islamic state dominating the Bosnian Serbs, 'This conflict was incited so that the Muslims would not exist.' In a telephone intercept, Karadzic complained about Bosnian Muslim resistance, 'They must know there are 20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo. This is not normal. They will disappear. Sarajevo will be a melting pot in which 300,000 Muslims will die.'
As noted above, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate Milosevic shared the Bosnian Serb leaders' genocidal intent (if the Court finds it existed). Zoran Lilic, close ally of Milosevic, testified that he investigated Srebrenica and reported to Milosevic that no one from the leadership of Serbia or the FRY had anything to do with the massacre. Milosevic, Lilic said, was more than angry, shaken when he said, 'These crazy Serbs from Pale. I can't believe they did something like this.' General Sir Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR Bosnia chief in 1995, testified that he met with Milosevic, Mladic and others a few days after the killing in Srebrenica had begun. Milosevic directed Mladic to go with the General to sort out recovery of Dutch Bat soldiers and access to prisoners. Milosevic was clearly Mladic's superior, he told the Court. However, he was unable to say whether Milosevic knew about or was involved in the massacres. David Harland, another UN officer in Bosnia at the time, testified that Ambassador Carl Bildt told him he had seen Mladic with Milosevic in Belgrade around this time. Asserting that Mladic had to know about the massacres, Mr. Harland commented, 'It seems surprising he would fail to mention the deaths of 7000 people to you.'
While the public evidence does not support a conclusion that Milosevic shared the genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serb leaders, it does disclose that he had years of experience with the strategies and excesses of their military forces. According to witnesses, he restrained Bosnian Serb forces in Gorazde, Bihac, Sarejevo and even Srebrenica in 1993. As Dr. Williams testified about UN fears for Gorazde should it fall to the Bosnian Serbs, 'they had an appalling record of brutality of dealing with civilians under their control.' Lord David Owen, who prided himself on his neutrality, told the Court that Milosevic shared his serious concern about what would happen to the civilian population of Srebrenica if the Bosnian Serbs took the enclave. Pressed by the international community, Milosevic prevented a takeover at that time. The question is why didn't he stop Mladic in 1995? Noting that thousands of civilians had been killed in Srebrenica, General Wesley Clark asked him this exact question, shortly after the massacres as Milosevic was trying to convince the General he could deliver the Bosnian Serbs' agreement on a peace deal. Milosevic responded that he had tried, but Mladic wouldn't listen to him. Though Milosevic now denies saying that, it is evidence that he knew of the massacre before it happened.
Assuming the Court finds Milosevic could have stopped Mladic from executing thousands of prisoners at Srebrenica but chose not to , can he be held responsible for acquiescence in genocide that was foreseeable? Likely not for genocid
