Primakov Testifies Milosevic Was Balkans' Peacemaker
Primakov Testifies Milosevic Was Balkans' Peacemaker
Yevgeny Primakov, former Russian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of Intelligence, was the third high level Russian official to testify on behalf of Slobodan Milosevic in his trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Primakov was Prime Minister until May 1999, when President Boris Yeltsin fired him.
Like his colleagues before him, Primakov presented the hard line Russian view that Kosovo Albanian terrorists precipitated the fighting in Kosovo, which the U.S. supported as useful in its larger plan to place NATO forces in the rump Yugoslavia and to complete its disintegration. He also said that in discussions with him, the Accused always favored a peaceful solution for Kosovo, as he had for ending the war in Bosnia.
However, Primakov, as the Russian representative on the six-nation Contact Group, also conceded on cross examination that Russia supported Contact Group statements condemning use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators, as well as condemning KLA terrorism. Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice read a passage from a book the witness authored, criticizing the Serbian police for a series of incidents 'cleansing the terrain.' In Court, Primakov explained what he meant: 'Based on our assessment, the KLA (Kosova Liberation Army) based in Albanian settlements attacked Serb settlements then returned to their bases in Albanian settlements. At the time, they started the operation to expel KLA from Albanian settlements. It frequently took the form of cleansing the terrain. Civilians from both ethnic groups suffered.'
Similarly, Nice quoted from the June 17, 1998 joint statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Milosevic, in which Milosevic agreed to 'refrain from taking any repressive measures against peaceful populations,' among other things, asking the witness, 'Did you yourself accept there was a need for the Yugoslav President to say he would refrain from taking repressive measures against peaceful populations?' Primakov limited his answer to 'You quoted correctly.'
The witness earlier told the Court that during 1998, the West, in particular the U.S., was taking an ever more rigid stance on Kosovo, despite the fact there was still room for negotiating. This appeared consonant with his view, based on assessments by the Russian Intelligence Service, that the U.S. intended to use NATO intervention in Bosnia as a model for future interventions outside NATO's sphere of influence. 'The future has confirmed it,' he testified.
Taking this further, Primakov told the Court that after the Clinton Administration came to power, 'it became ever more apparent that their course was to weaken Serbia, to not allow it to gain strength and possibly even to complete the process of full disintegration.' This was based on the belief of Western colleagues that Milosevic was pursuing a policy to create a Greater Serbia, a belief 'I absolutely don't share.' Primakov testified that, during his first meeting with Milosevic in January 1993, he asked him point blank 'if he nurtured plans of a Greater Serbia. He answered emphatically 'no.'' He said a Greater Serbia could only be achieved with great bloodshed, 'and I'm not prepared to do that.'
On cross examination, the Prosecutor challenged Primakov's testimony about this conversation. In his book, the former Russian Prime Minister gave a different version: 'The conversation moved onto plans for a Greater Serbia. I emphasized in current conditions this was utterly unachievable even at the cost of much blood spilled. Mr. Milosevic agreed. I told Mr. Milosevic whether someone wanted this or not that was the reality. . . .' Confronted with what he wrote vs. what he said in Court, Primakov said he could not see any discrepancy, even when Nice pointed out that in his book Primakov, not Milosevic, said a Greater Serbia was unachievable. Regardless, it shows the concept was under discussion by the two men.
According to Primakov, it was in his first conversation with the Accused that he convinced Milosevic to go to Geneva to help persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). In answer to Milosevic's question, the former Prime Minister described how he viewed Milosevic at that time: 'You didn't want to see any damage to the interests of Serbs in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I felt at the same time, you wanted a peaceful solution. A reflection of your later stance at Dayton.' Admitting he did not participate in Dayton, Primakov testified that he had asked then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright whether she believed success could have been achieved at Dayton without Milosevic. 'She answered unequivocally, 'No, without Milosevic we could not have achieved a positive outcome.''
According to Primakov, Milosevic got involved in trying to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VOPP, but the Bosnian Serb Assembly ultimately rejected it. Milosevic, Primakov said, imposed an economic blockade against the Republika Srpska as a result. This was evidence that Milosevic had no plans for a Greater Serbia.
On cross examination, Nice read from stenographic notes of an August 25, 1995 meeting of the FRY Supreme Defense Council, at which Milosevic was present, where it was stated: 'The blockade was merely a formality. Aid flowed daily.' Primakov responded that Milosevic never told him that. Nice also pointed out that the blockade was ordered well over a year after Bosnian Serb rejection of the VOPP, making it highly unlikely it was imposed as a punishment for rejecting the VOPP.
In addition, the Prosecutor read from the official notes of the Council's meeting the day after Milosevic supposedly assured Primakov a Greater Serbia policy was out of the question. 'There has to be integrity of the Serbian people. We de facto have that because objectively and according to all our relations, such as political, military, economic, cultural and educational, we have that integrity. The question is how to get recognition of that unity now. . . . How to turn the situation that de facto exists . . . into being de facto and de jure' whether it takes six months or a year. Balking at being questioned about this, Primakov merely said Milosevic had never spoken to him about it.
On Kosovo, Primakov testified that the failure of the Rambouillet peace negotiations was a foregone conclusion. The FRY was 'indisputably' given an ultimatum to accept international military forces in Kosovo or face NATO bombing. 'Behind it was the obvious intent of NATO to bring its forces to Kosovo.' On cross examination, Nice read a February 24, 1999 letter from Ratko Markovic, head of the Serbian delegation at Rambouillet, to the conference's international organizers in which the Serbian delegation agreed to discuss the scope and size of the international presence necessary to implement the agreement. Nice asserted that Milosevic reversed his support for the Rambouillet agreement the day before the letter was dated, effectively making any agreement impossible. Primakov insisted the stumbling block was insertion of the word 'military' before 'international presence.'
Milosevic made the mistake of asking the witness whether 'we in Belgrade did anything to provoke NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia.' Rather than a forthright and simple 'no,' Primakov testified that 'certain excesses could support the argument that a vicious circle of violence was not interrupted. At the same time, according to our information and my conversations with you, I observed you personally and Belgrade trying to rein in the forces that could be drawn into the circle of violence.'
Primakov, like the prior witnesses, equated the massive refugee flow with NATO bombing. That the largest refugee flow occurred just after NATO bombing started was sufficient for them to conclude it was the cause. When Nice pointed out that the Court has heard evidence of Serbian forces driving people out after killing some and systematically confiscating identity documents, the witness insisted that NATO bombing was the major cause. As for taking identity documents, he pled ignorance. Unlike the prior witnesses, however, Primakov did agree there were instances of Albanians being driven out of Kosovo by violence and human rights violations.
Primakov testified about a trip he made to Belgrade at the behest of French President Jacques Chirac only six days after NATO bombing began. Chirac sent him to determine whether there were any signals from Milosevic that might stop the bombing, such as allowing return of refugees, ceasing hostilities, restarting negotiations and allowing international monitoring. Primakov says Milosevic agreed, but before he could return to present them, NATO bombed Belgrade airport and all deals were off. Though the witness was not more specific about concessions, those mentioned do not include the one sticking point at Rambouillet -- an international military presence in Kosovo.
Like his colleagues before him, Primakov presented the hard line Russian view that Kosovo Albanian terrorists precipitated the fighting in Kosovo, which the U.S. supported as useful in its larger plan to place NATO forces in the rump Yugoslavia and to complete its disintegration. He also said that in discussions with him, the Accused always favored a peaceful solution for Kosovo, as he had for ending the war in Bosnia.
However, Primakov, as the Russian representative on the six-nation Contact Group, also conceded on cross examination that Russia supported Contact Group statements condemning use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators, as well as condemning KLA terrorism. Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice read a passage from a book the witness authored, criticizing the Serbian police for a series of incidents 'cleansing the terrain.' In Court, Primakov explained what he meant: 'Based on our assessment, the KLA (Kosova Liberation Army) based in Albanian settlements attacked Serb settlements then returned to their bases in Albanian settlements. At the time, they started the operation to expel KLA from Albanian settlements. It frequently took the form of cleansing the terrain. Civilians from both ethnic groups suffered.'
Similarly, Nice quoted from the June 17, 1998 joint statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Milosevic, in which Milosevic agreed to 'refrain from taking any repressive measures against peaceful populations,' among other things, asking the witness, 'Did you yourself accept there was a need for the Yugoslav President to say he would refrain from taking repressive measures against peaceful populations?' Primakov limited his answer to 'You quoted correctly.'
The witness earlier told the Court that during 1998, the West, in particular the U.S., was taking an ever more rigid stance on Kosovo, despite the fact there was still room for negotiating. This appeared consonant with his view, based on assessments by the Russian Intelligence Service, that the U.S. intended to use NATO intervention in Bosnia as a model for future interventions outside NATO's sphere of influence. 'The future has confirmed it,' he testified.
Taking this further, Primakov told the Court that after the Clinton Administration came to power, 'it became ever more apparent that their course was to weaken Serbia, to not allow it to gain strength and possibly even to complete the process of full disintegration.' This was based on the belief of Western colleagues that Milosevic was pursuing a policy to create a Greater Serbia, a belief 'I absolutely don't share.' Primakov testified that, during his first meeting with Milosevic in January 1993, he asked him point blank 'if he nurtured plans of a Greater Serbia. He answered emphatically 'no.'' He said a Greater Serbia could only be achieved with great bloodshed, 'and I'm not prepared to do that.'
On cross examination, the Prosecutor challenged Primakov's testimony about this conversation. In his book, the former Russian Prime Minister gave a different version: 'The conversation moved onto plans for a Greater Serbia. I emphasized in current conditions this was utterly unachievable even at the cost of much blood spilled. Mr. Milosevic agreed. I told Mr. Milosevic whether someone wanted this or not that was the reality. . . .' Confronted with what he wrote vs. what he said in Court, Primakov said he could not see any discrepancy, even when Nice pointed out that in his book Primakov, not Milosevic, said a Greater Serbia was unachievable. Regardless, it shows the concept was under discussion by the two men.
According to Primakov, it was in his first conversation with the Accused that he convinced Milosevic to go to Geneva to help persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). In answer to Milosevic's question, the former Prime Minister described how he viewed Milosevic at that time: 'You didn't want to see any damage to the interests of Serbs in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I felt at the same time, you wanted a peaceful solution. A reflection of your later stance at Dayton.' Admitting he did not participate in Dayton, Primakov testified that he had asked then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright whether she believed success could have been achieved at Dayton without Milosevic. 'She answered unequivocally, 'No, without Milosevic we could not have achieved a positive outcome.''
According to Primakov, Milosevic got involved in trying to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VOPP, but the Bosnian Serb Assembly ultimately rejected it. Milosevic, Primakov said, imposed an economic blockade against the Republika Srpska as a result. This was evidence that Milosevic had no plans for a Greater Serbia.
On cross examination, Nice read from stenographic notes of an August 25, 1995 meeting of the FRY Supreme Defense Council, at which Milosevic was present, where it was stated: 'The blockade was merely a formality. Aid flowed daily.' Primakov responded that Milosevic never told him that. Nice also pointed out that the blockade was ordered well over a year after Bosnian Serb rejection of the VOPP, making it highly unlikely it was imposed as a punishment for rejecting the VOPP.
In addition, the Prosecutor read from the official notes of the Council's meeting the day after Milosevic supposedly assured Primakov a Greater Serbia policy was out of the question. 'There has to be integrity of the Serbian people. We de facto have that because objectively and according to all our relations, such as political, military, economic, cultural and educational, we have that integrity. The question is how to get recognition of that unity now. . . . How to turn the situation that de facto exists . . . into being de facto and de jure' whether it takes six months or a year. Balking at being questioned about this, Primakov merely said Milosevic had never spoken to him about it.
On Kosovo, Primakov testified that the failure of the Rambouillet peace negotiations was a foregone conclusion. The FRY was 'indisputably' given an ultimatum to accept international military forces in Kosovo or face NATO bombing. 'Behind it was the obvious intent of NATO to bring its forces to Kosovo.' On cross examination, Nice read a February 24, 1999 letter from Ratko Markovic, head of the Serbian delegation at Rambouillet, to the conference's international organizers in which the Serbian delegation agreed to discuss the scope and size of the international presence necessary to implement the agreement. Nice asserted that Milosevic reversed his support for the Rambouillet agreement the day before the letter was dated, effectively making any agreement impossible. Primakov insisted the stumbling block was insertion of the word 'military' before 'international presence.'
Milosevic made the mistake of asking the witness whether 'we in Belgrade did anything to provoke NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia.' Rather than a forthright and simple 'no,' Primakov testified that 'certain excesses could support the argument that a vicious circle of violence was not interrupted. At the same time, according to our information and my conversations with you, I observed you personally and Belgrade trying to rein in the forces that could be drawn into the circle of violence.'
Primakov, like the prior witnesses, equated the massive refugee flow with NATO bombing. That the largest refugee flow occurred just after NATO bombing started was sufficient for them to conclude it was the cause. When Nice pointed out that the Court has heard evidence of Serbian forces driving people out after killing some and systematically confiscating identity documents, the witness insisted that NATO bombing was the major cause. As for taking identity documents, he pled ignorance. Unlike the prior witnesses, however, Primakov did agree there were instances of Albanians being driven out of Kosovo by violence and human rights violations.
Primakov testified about a trip he made to Belgrade at the behest of French President Jacques Chirac only six days after NATO bombing began. Chirac sent him to determine whether there were any signals from Milosevic that might stop the bombing, such as allowing return of refugees, ceasing hostilities, restarting negotiations and allowing international monitoring. Primakov says Milosevic agreed, but before he could return to present them, NATO bombed Belgrade airport and all deals were off. Though the witness was not more specific about concessions, those mentioned do not include the one sticking point at Rambouillet -- an international military presence in Kosovo.
