Part I: Purge of the Generals Shows Control Over Yugoslav Army in 1992

In response to goading from Milosevic, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic forcefully responded that he wasn't testifying for the prosecution or the accused. His testimony over six days in court made that quite clear. While he established significant pieces in the prosecution's case, his testimony also provided support for some of Milosevic's contentions. To a certain extent, this reflects the fact that General Vasiljevic was 'old army,' a believer in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) at a time when it was breaking up, a time when the President of Serbia seemed to be the only president supporting a unified country. It also reflects the vacillation, confusion and power struggles within the Yugoslav Army as Milosevic jockeyed for control.

Head of Military Intelligence from 1990 to mid-1992, General Vasiljevic is said to be the highest level insider to testify so far. He was not a Milosevic pal (few were), but he was at the top echelon of power in the Army of the SFRY (JNA). As such, he was in a position to provide first hand information about Milosevic's purge of the generals as he consolidated power and control over the JNA. General Vasiljevic was in the second round of generals who were purged, in June 1992. [He voluntarily returned to service as Deputy Head of the Army's Security Services in April 1999 during NATO's attacks on the FRY.].

Milosevic, President of Serbia at the time, first sent an emissary to ask General Vasiljevic for inside information about the JNA generals in 1991. The general said he declined to provide any. Milosevic hit hard on this assertion in cross examination. General Vasiljevic did not back down though he was less explicit in answering Milosevic than he was in giving his direct testimony.

The witness described an attempt in fall 1991 to remove the Federal Secretary of Defense, General Veljko Kadijevic. When the JNA Chief of Staff, General Blagoje Adzic, refused to assume Kadijevic's position and General Vasiljevic convinced the military police to stand down, the attempted coup failed. Nevertheless, three months later, General Kadijevic was gone. In open session, there was no discussion of Milosevic's role, if any, in the two attempts to get rid of Kadijevic, one unsuccessful and one successful. It appears to reflect a change in Milosevic's power over the JNA from the fall of 1991 to the beginning of 1992.

Almost immediately after Kadijevic left as Federal Defense Secretary, Milosevic's power over the JNA increased, according to General Vasiljevic. Kadijevic left in January 1992. By February, the witness was hearing from friends that Milosevic had a list of generals who were to be 'retired.' Eventually, General Adzic showed him the list of 33 generals, which included General Tumanov, General Vasiljevic's deputy. When Vasiljevic complained, Army Chief of Staff Adzic said he had not been consulted. When Vasiljevic pressed him, he picked up the phone and called Milosevic. By law, as a president of one of the constituent Yugoslav republics, Milosevic did not have authority to dismiss generals in the federal army. That authority resided in the president of the federal joint presidency, at that time Branko Kostic.

Milosevic told Adzic to come and see him. When Adzic returned from meeting Milosevic, he had secured the removal from the list of Tumanov and four other generals. At that time, 28 generals were involuntarily retired. A few months later, 38 more were involuntarily retired, including Generals Vasiljevic and Tumanov. Again, the action was taken without consulting the Army Chief of Staff.

When Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice asked whether Milosevic's involvement in the retirement of generals was appropriate, the witness said no, the President of Yugoslavia had that authority by law. 'General Adzic didn't call anyone from the Federal Presidency, but he called Milosevic, knowing where the power lay.'

General Vasiljevic's testimony is evidence that Milosevic had de facto control over the Yugoslav Army at least by February 1992. It also suggests that his power was more limited in the fall of 1991 at the time of the attempted but unsuccessful ouster of Kadijevic as Federal Secretary of Defense. On cross examination, Milosevic secured a major concession from the witness on precisely this point. MILOSEVIC: 'We have established that I could not have influence over military leadership, like Kadijevic [in September 1991].' VASILJEVIC: 'No, I don't think you could.' When Milosevic pressed the witness on whether it was possible for him or anyone from Serbia to influence personnel changes in the federal army, General Vasiljevic responded, 'Until the end of 1991, no.' But the General insisted that Milosevic was behind the forced retirement of 28 generals in February 1992.

At the same time he was consolidating his control over the JNA, Milosevic was providing, supplying and training Serbian forces, including territorial defense, Serbian police (MUP) and paramilitary units, to fight in Croatia, according to earlier testimony by General Vasiljevic. During military operations, all forces were subordinated to the JNA under the principle of unitary command. [See February 5, 2003 CIJ Report: 'Stampede of Witnesses to Courtroom I?']

Milosevic's questionable control over the JNA in 1991 presents an apparent problem in regard to two massacres in Croatia that General Vasiljevic testified about and Milosevic has been charged with responsibility for: the Lovas Minefield and the Vukovar Hospital. Both occurred in 1991 in areas under JNA control. Part II of this report will consider the problems and possibilities of connecting Milosevic to these crimes.