Milosevic Questions Srebrenica Survivor
Day 255
Milosevic Questions Srebrenica Survivor
Day 255
One of the most important pieces of evidence in the trial against Slobodan Milosevic came before the Court again today when Robert J. Donia, prosecution expert, returned to complete cross examination that was interrupted on September 12. The evidence consists of excerpts from the transcripts of Republika Srpska Assembly Sessions from 1992 to 1995. Dr. Donia reviewed the transcripts and submitted his summary report to the Court. [See CIJ Articles: 'Transcripts Reveal Milosevic Involvement in Bosnian War,' September 12, 2003; 'Bosnian Serbs Plan Ethnic Cleansing, Cover Up Crimes,' September 13, 2003; 'Milosevic Questions Expert's Neutrality and Expertise,' September 14, 2003] Today's questioning centered on Srebrenica.
Turning to some of the more damaging excerpts, Mr. Milosevic questioned the witness about Radovan Karadzic's premonitory statement on Srebrenica during the 30th Session, held July 20 - 21, 1993. '[I]f we had entered Srebrenica, those people entering would be those whose families were killed, 1,200 Serbs were killed; there would be blood to the knees, and we might lose the state for that.' Milosevic asked Dr. Donia, 'If someone has awareness of how disastrous such an act would be in 1993, surely they would have had the same awareness later on.' It was a rather odd proposition for Milosevic to put forward, since the transcripts also establish that Karadzic authorized the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) to attack and take the Safe Haven of Srebrenica in July 1995, almost exactly two years later. Rather than supporting an argument that Karadzic couldn't have ordered the attack on Srebrenica, it supports the position that he knew a bloodbath would occur when he ordered the VRS to take it.
The witness also pointed out that Karadzic did not stop the takeover of Srebrenica in 1993 because of any concern about what would happen to its Bosniak population, but because of the effect their massacre would have on the RS's attempts to achieve international recognition as an independent state. Dr. Donia explained that the situation changed in 1995. By then, the RS's major concern was not international diplomatic recognition, but being overrun militarily by combined forces of the Croat and Bosniak armies. The attack on Srebrenica was an attempt to gain territory, while the massacres that followed were predicted two years earlier.
Dr. Donia pointed to the two speeches Milosevic gave to the RS Assembly on May 9, 1993, advocating that they approve adoption of the Vance Owen Peace Plan. The first speech was made for the international media, he testified. In it, Milosevic asserted that victory had been achieved and was reflected in the VOPP. The main goal, he said, was freedom and equality for the Serbs and that had been won. By the time he gave the second speech in closed session, his tenor had changed dramatically.
In the interim, RS Assembly members rose to speak against the VOPP, accusing Milosevic of having betrayed and abandoned them. Two members spoke of Serb soldiers dying with pictures of Milosevic on their chests. Dobrica Cosic reminded them all that Serbs everywhere shared the same goal of a unified polity, a goal they had pursued through seven wars over two centuries.
When Milosevic rose to speak again, he referred to himself as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and embraced the Bosnian Serb goal as one he shared. The VOPP, he said, did not achieve that goal. 'The question was asked, which I find unacceptable: Whether we give up on our goal? I shall tell you no! We do not give up on our goal. The question, if we look at the plan, is not whether the plan represents completion of the goal. Of course it does not. The question is, though, whether the plan represents a way towards the final goal. The goal was completed in many aspects, but not in all of them. But it represents the way towards the ultimate goal, of course it does. But we should employ our heads a little more, our brains, and we should spill a little less blood.' With his second speech, Milosevic transformed the goal he supported from equality and freedom for the Serbs to unity of the Serbs in a political entity, according to Dr. Donia.
In court, Milosevic loudly protested, insisting that he had advocated the goals of freedom and equality. He brandished a newspaper article purportedly quoting his speech in full (though he did not say whether it was the first or second speech). The Accused virtually repeated his second speech in court, ending by asserting that his goal was to stop the war.
Whatever his goal, his speech before the RS Assembly merely establishes that, at least when it served him, he formulated his interests to reflect those of the Bosnian Serbs. He appealed to them as part of a single entity -- the nation of Serbs -- because he wanted something from them, approval of the VOPP. However, if he or his audience considered that he was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, it didn't result in their obeying his wishes. The Assembly overwhelmingly rejected the VOPP.
If Milosevic's influence over the Bosnian Serbs was at a low point in May 1993, it appears to have surged shortly afterward, at least according to the testimony of Lord David Owen last week. Lord Owen testified that he contacted Milosevic when he learned the Bosnian Serbs were planning to attack Srebrenica in July 1993. Milosevic, he said, shared his concern that there would be a massacre of the Bosnian Muslims if the VRS proceeded. It was Milosevic's intercession with Mladic, according to Lord Owen, that stopped the attack from going forward. [See CIJ Article, 'Former Negotiator Describes Milosevic, the Peacemaker,' November 4, 2003]
If Lord Owen is correct that Milosevic's influence on the Bosnian Serbs had substantially increased by summer 1995, one wonders why he didn't intervene then as he had in 1993. The Prosecution would like to show that his failure to do so gave him a share in criminal responsibility for Srebrenica. To establish that, the linkage between Milosevic and Karadzic and/or Mladic needs to be clearer. As Karadzic said in the 34th Assembly Session (August 27 - October 1, 1993), 'I must say to you that they [Milosevic and Serbia] are very cautious with us. They highly respect us. I cannot say that they don't exert pressure, but they don't exert pressure in the form of ultimatums. They converse with us, and they show great patience with us. They would rather persuade us than to exert pressure. And Milosevic is, I must tell you, cunning as a snake and he has helped a great deal to make things happen in that way. Naturally he helped on the basis of constitutional principles.' With all this dissembling, clarity isn't easy.
Of course, the prosecution need not prove that Milosevic ordered the attack on Srebrenica or the events that followed. But, at a minimum, it must show he was part of and contributed to a joint criminal enterprise that planned the attack on Srebrenica, that members (Milosevic, Karadzic) of the joint criminal enterprise knew it was likely to result in a bloodbath, and he failed to do anything to stop it as he had in 1993. In addition, for complicity in genocide, the Prosecution must prove that at least some members of the joint criminal enterprise had the requisite legal intent to commit genocide and that Milosevic knew about it. For genocide, Milosevic would have to have shared that intent.
So far, the Prosecution has established that Milosevic provided necessary military supplies, officers and training without which the Bosnian Serbs could not have carried out their campaign of ethnic cleansing, that he knew their intentions regarding ethnic cleansing and was aware of excesses and the potential for a massacre at Srebrenica, that he had influence over them which, in the past, and had prevented military attacks on Safe Areas (Srebrenica, Gorazde). It has not yet introduced evidence showing that Milosevic knew in advance of the attack on Srebrenica in 1995. While the Prosecution has shown Mladic was in Belgrade talking to Milosevic on July 7 (before the attack) and July 15 (during the massacres), without more, it is only circumstantial evidence, and not enough to convict someone of genocide or complicity in genocide.
Milosevic does not deny that massacres occurred at Srebrenica, after its fall. He claims variously they were perpetrated by French mercenaries, lunatics or people with 'criminal consciousness.'
Note: It should be remembered that Milosevic has been indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide not only for crimes committed in Srebrenica, but also in 18 other municipalities. The Prosecution advised the Court, however, that due to time constraints, they will only seek to prove genocide charges for six municipalities, including Srebrenica. The initial key for all genocide charges, however, is proving that someone (Karadzic, Mladic, Krajisnik, Plavsic, Milosevic, etc.) had genocidal intent.
Turning to some of the more damaging excerpts, Mr. Milosevic questioned the witness about Radovan Karadzic's premonitory statement on Srebrenica during the 30th Session, held July 20 - 21, 1993. '[I]f we had entered Srebrenica, those people entering would be those whose families were killed, 1,200 Serbs were killed; there would be blood to the knees, and we might lose the state for that.' Milosevic asked Dr. Donia, 'If someone has awareness of how disastrous such an act would be in 1993, surely they would have had the same awareness later on.' It was a rather odd proposition for Milosevic to put forward, since the transcripts also establish that Karadzic authorized the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) to attack and take the Safe Haven of Srebrenica in July 1995, almost exactly two years later. Rather than supporting an argument that Karadzic couldn't have ordered the attack on Srebrenica, it supports the position that he knew a bloodbath would occur when he ordered the VRS to take it.
The witness also pointed out that Karadzic did not stop the takeover of Srebrenica in 1993 because of any concern about what would happen to its Bosniak population, but because of the effect their massacre would have on the RS's attempts to achieve international recognition as an independent state. Dr. Donia explained that the situation changed in 1995. By then, the RS's major concern was not international diplomatic recognition, but being overrun militarily by combined forces of the Croat and Bosniak armies. The attack on Srebrenica was an attempt to gain territory, while the massacres that followed were predicted two years earlier.
Dr. Donia pointed to the two speeches Milosevic gave to the RS Assembly on May 9, 1993, advocating that they approve adoption of the Vance Owen Peace Plan. The first speech was made for the international media, he testified. In it, Milosevic asserted that victory had been achieved and was reflected in the VOPP. The main goal, he said, was freedom and equality for the Serbs and that had been won. By the time he gave the second speech in closed session, his tenor had changed dramatically.
In the interim, RS Assembly members rose to speak against the VOPP, accusing Milosevic of having betrayed and abandoned them. Two members spoke of Serb soldiers dying with pictures of Milosevic on their chests. Dobrica Cosic reminded them all that Serbs everywhere shared the same goal of a unified polity, a goal they had pursued through seven wars over two centuries.
When Milosevic rose to speak again, he referred to himself as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and embraced the Bosnian Serb goal as one he shared. The VOPP, he said, did not achieve that goal. 'The question was asked, which I find unacceptable: Whether we give up on our goal? I shall tell you no! We do not give up on our goal. The question, if we look at the plan, is not whether the plan represents completion of the goal. Of course it does not. The question is, though, whether the plan represents a way towards the final goal. The goal was completed in many aspects, but not in all of them. But it represents the way towards the ultimate goal, of course it does. But we should employ our heads a little more, our brains, and we should spill a little less blood.' With his second speech, Milosevic transformed the goal he supported from equality and freedom for the Serbs to unity of the Serbs in a political entity, according to Dr. Donia.
In court, Milosevic loudly protested, insisting that he had advocated the goals of freedom and equality. He brandished a newspaper article purportedly quoting his speech in full (though he did not say whether it was the first or second speech). The Accused virtually repeated his second speech in court, ending by asserting that his goal was to stop the war.
Whatever his goal, his speech before the RS Assembly merely establishes that, at least when it served him, he formulated his interests to reflect those of the Bosnian Serbs. He appealed to them as part of a single entity -- the nation of Serbs -- because he wanted something from them, approval of the VOPP. However, if he or his audience considered that he was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, it didn't result in their obeying his wishes. The Assembly overwhelmingly rejected the VOPP.
If Milosevic's influence over the Bosnian Serbs was at a low point in May 1993, it appears to have surged shortly afterward, at least according to the testimony of Lord David Owen last week. Lord Owen testified that he contacted Milosevic when he learned the Bosnian Serbs were planning to attack Srebrenica in July 1993. Milosevic, he said, shared his concern that there would be a massacre of the Bosnian Muslims if the VRS proceeded. It was Milosevic's intercession with Mladic, according to Lord Owen, that stopped the attack from going forward. [See CIJ Article, 'Former Negotiator Describes Milosevic, the Peacemaker,' November 4, 2003]
If Lord Owen is correct that Milosevic's influence on the Bosnian Serbs had substantially increased by summer 1995, one wonders why he didn't intervene then as he had in 1993. The Prosecution would like to show that his failure to do so gave him a share in criminal responsibility for Srebrenica. To establish that, the linkage between Milosevic and Karadzic and/or Mladic needs to be clearer. As Karadzic said in the 34th Assembly Session (August 27 - October 1, 1993), 'I must say to you that they [Milosevic and Serbia] are very cautious with us. They highly respect us. I cannot say that they don't exert pressure, but they don't exert pressure in the form of ultimatums. They converse with us, and they show great patience with us. They would rather persuade us than to exert pressure. And Milosevic is, I must tell you, cunning as a snake and he has helped a great deal to make things happen in that way. Naturally he helped on the basis of constitutional principles.' With all this dissembling, clarity isn't easy.
Of course, the prosecution need not prove that Milosevic ordered the attack on Srebrenica or the events that followed. But, at a minimum, it must show he was part of and contributed to a joint criminal enterprise that planned the attack on Srebrenica, that members (Milosevic, Karadzic) of the joint criminal enterprise knew it was likely to result in a bloodbath, and he failed to do anything to stop it as he had in 1993. In addition, for complicity in genocide, the Prosecution must prove that at least some members of the joint criminal enterprise had the requisite legal intent to commit genocide and that Milosevic knew about it. For genocide, Milosevic would have to have shared that intent.
So far, the Prosecution has established that Milosevic provided necessary military supplies, officers and training without which the Bosnian Serbs could not have carried out their campaign of ethnic cleansing, that he knew their intentions regarding ethnic cleansing and was aware of excesses and the potential for a massacre at Srebrenica, that he had influence over them which, in the past, and had prevented military attacks on Safe Areas (Srebrenica, Gorazde). It has not yet introduced evidence showing that Milosevic knew in advance of the attack on Srebrenica in 1995. While the Prosecution has shown Mladic was in Belgrade talking to Milosevic on July 7 (before the attack) and July 15 (during the massacres), without more, it is only circumstantial evidence, and not enough to convict someone of genocide or complicity in genocide.
Milosevic does not deny that massacres occurred at Srebrenica, after its fall. He claims variously they were perpetrated by French mercenaries, lunatics or people with 'criminal consciousness.'
Note: It should be remembered that Milosevic has been indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide not only for crimes committed in Srebrenica, but also in 18 other municipalities. The Prosecution advised the Court, however, that due to time constraints, they will only seek to prove genocide charges for six municipalities, including Srebrenica. The initial key for all genocide charges, however, is proving that someone (Karadzic, Mladic, Krajisnik, Plavsic, Milosevic, etc.) had genocidal intent.
