Milosevic 'Key Figure in Serbian Tragedy,' Insider Testifies

When Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice introduced the testimony of the UN Dutch Battalion second in command, Lt. Col. Robert Franken, with a statement that Milosevic had expressed knowledge terrible crimes committed at Srebrenica, the Accused loudly protested. Before beginning his cross examination, he took the opportunity to clarify his position on Srebrenica, which he earlier referred to as “the ugliest thing that happened' in the war.

“I want to make a remark to what Mr. Nice said that allegedly I accepted the crimes in Srebrenica. How can I accept what I know nothing about? I do know that police in Serbia when they first learned [of crimes in Srebrenica]. . . arrested [Drazen] Erdemovic. [He was turned over to the ICTY, pled guilty and served his sentence]. That's what I know. That I'm interested in the real truth being known, yes. In Serb military tradition, to kill prisoners of war is among the most dishonorable of acts. If it happened, it could only have been done by someone who was an enemy to the Serbs, the Muslims and mad to boot.”

Later, he added that he did not believe the massacres could have been planned, nor that they were part of the political and military strategy of the Republika Srpska (RS). And, he added, “they had nothing to do with Serbia and Yugoslavia [the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY]”.

Lt. Col. Franken, however, testified that on July 17, he attended a meeting where ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross) complained of difficulties getting its vehicles across the border from Serbia. VRS Col. Radoslav Jankovic cleared it up with a single telephone call, the witness testified. While this shows a connection between the RS and FRY authorities, it provides only the most circumstantial evidence that FRY authorities were aware of what was going on across the border. At the end of cross examination, Milosevic asked Lt. Col. Franken directly whether there was an indication that “the action” was launched in cooperation with Belgrade, either militarily or politically. The Colonel answered, “I don’t have any proof the action was launched in cooperation with Belgrade.”

When discussing Srebrenica, it is important to remember there are several separate, though overlapping, events: 1) the VRS (RS Army) attack on the safe area of Srebrenica and its fall, 2) formation of a column of able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men, headed by the ABiH (Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) 28th Division, trying to break through the VRS lines, 3) the forced evacuation of women, children and some elderly men, and 4) the detention, transfer and execution of the remaining Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Lt. Col. Franken was not present for the executions and could only testify to his concerns and his knowledge about the forced evacuation of the women and children, the separation of the men and boys and events leading up to their disappearance.

Milosevic spent considerable time questioning him about events before the fall of Srebrenica. He attempted to show that Dutch Bat (and its predecessors) were not successful in demilitarizing the Safe Area, as required by their UN mandate. In his statement, Lt. Col. Franken admitted, 'Demilitarization was not complete but circumstances were so dangerous I wouldn't have dreamt of handing over my personal weapons if I was obliged to. . . .' He also told the Court that “the VRS repeatedly shelled the enclave,” while he only had knowledge of Bosniak action outside the enclave on two occasions, one where burning houses were observed, the other involving an ambush and killing of seven VRS soldiers.

Lt. Col. Franken also explained the limited parameters of his mission and the wholly inadequate resources he was given to carry it out. In May 1992, UN troops were sent to “protect” 6 UN designated Safe Areas in Bosnia, places where civilian refugees could go to escape the fighting. The safe areas quickly became part of both sides’ war strategies. The VRS controlled surrounding areas and, therefore, access to the Safe Areas for transports of food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies. The Bosniaks, as the witness noted, didn’t hand over all their weapons. They reportedly used the Safe Areas as bases for launching attacks on the Serb-controlled countryside, while the VRS shelled the safe areas.

Attacked on July 6, 1995 the Safe Haven of Srebrenica quickly fell to the VRS, before a disorganized 28th Division of the Bosnian Government Army. A segment of the 28th Division, together with a large number of unarmed men who felt they were in danger if they were taken prisoner, attempted to break through the VRS encirclement to reach ABiH held territory in Tuzla. At the same time, the VRS rounded up the remaining people in the Safe Area, separating out men between the ages of 16 and 70. When the town of Srebrenica fell, including the UN base there, its inhabitants fled to the UN base at Potocari, also part of the Safe Area. That UN base at Potocari was soon overwhelmed with 30,000 civilians, inside and outside the UN compound. It was a chaotic and panic-filled situation, of which the Court only got a glimpse from a series of short video clips. One showed a UN vehicle with refugees spilling out of the inside and completely covering every available space on the outside. It was to have carried patients from the Srebrenica hospital, but had to return a second time to collect them. Another clip showed women and children on a bus and a column of men being directed toward other vehicles. Probably 99% of the faces on the video monitor are of men who would be dead within a few hours or days.

Lt. Col. Franken testified that Dutch Bat was faced with a crisis of massive proportions. They had only enough food to feed 400 people for two days. Water was wholly inadequate. The temperature was between 30 and 35 degrees centigrade. The VRS had already taken Dutch Bat soldiers hostage – and threatened to kill them if NATO airstrikes weren’t stopped (airstrikes were initiated following the VRS attack against Gorazde, another safe area). Dutch Bat had 150 soldiers under arms with a couple hundred more providing other kinds of support. It had only 16% of the arms and ammunition it should have had and the VRS had taken 16 to 17 of its jeeps, as well as UN APCs (armored personnel carriers). The small battalion (and the refugees) was at the mercy of the VRS and its own UN superiors, who refused to authorize action to protect the refugees.

When Mladic told the Dutch Bat commanders his troops would separate out all Bosnian men and boys from 16 to 70 years of age to interrogate them about war crimes, Lt. Col. Franken said he “became extremely anxious” for their fate. His soldiers had reported seeing the bodies of nine Bosniaks who were executed in a field near the “white house,” where VRS interrogations took place. On their return, his soldiers who had escorted the first refugee convoys out of the area told of numerous bodies lying along the road. He learned of another execution in the compound. And he began receiving reports that men who were supposedly bused to Kladanj had not arrived. All Lt. Col. Franken could think to do was to begin listing the names of all the Bosnian Muslim men remaining and faxing them to Tuzla and The Hague. The list only reached 251. Their fate of these 251 men remains unknown to this day.

When he heard the prisoners of war were being mistreated in the white house, Lt. Col. Franken complained to Col. Jankovic. Jankovic acknowledged it, but said he was dealing with 6000 captured men. The witness pointed out its close relationship to the number believed to have been killed in the Srebrenica massacre (7,000 to 10,000). The VRS never accounted for these 6000 men.

Franken’s concern about the fate of the separated Bosnian Muslim men and boys was heightened by General Ratko Mladic’s threats, conveyed to Dutch Bat Commander Ton Karremans. The prosecution showed video clips of a meeting between Mladic and Karremans, discussing the fate of the refugees. In the first, Mladic demands, “I need a clear position on whether you want to survive.” At this point, the Accused interrupted the court proceedings to claim that Mladic had corrected himself to say “whether you want to stay.” However, two additional video clips clarified Mladic’s meaning. In one, he addresses a young man who is supposed to represent the refugees: “Have I made myself clear, Nesib? The future of your people is in your hands and not only on this territory.” In a video clip of a 12th of July meeting, Mladic addresses the Bosnian Muslim delegation again: “You can either survive or disappear.” Under questioning by Judge Robinson, Milosevic acknowledged that Mladic was not asking whether they wanted to stay or leave, but whether they wanted to survive or disappear.

On re-examination, Prosecutor Nice asked Lt. Col. Franken what Mladic’s ultimatums showed about his level of control. “He was supreme commander,” the witness replied. “It doesn’t show he was locally in technical control, but in operational control.”

In one line of cross examination, Milosevic attempted to establish that many of the bodies found in mass graves were men who died in combat or trying to break through the VRS encirclement. Lt. Col. Franken said he could only speculate, but there “should have been quite some casualties” in the breakthrough attempt. Milosevic then asked, 'Is it also true that instead of surrendering and acquiring the status of POW's, the commander of the 28th Division chose the worst possible solution by ordering a breakthrough . . . ?' While the witness said he didn’t know, the Prosecutor clarified the matter when he asked him on re-examination, “Did those who broke out survive?” The witness answered, “Part of them.” Mr. Nice then asked, “Did those who surrendered?” The witness answered simply, “No.”

Milosevic asked the former commander to confirm that “a large number of the casualties who were victims of armed conflict were later included in the number of victims allegedly executed.” After Lt. Col. Franken said he could not confirm that, Judge May interrupted to ask the Accused if it was his position that the people in the mass graves were trying to break out of the compound and were killed in combat? Milosevic responded that he was only trying to establish the truth. Then he concluded, “We have established that the large number killed in combat were part of the casualties.” In fact, it has not been established. The witness lacked firsthand knowledge about the column of men trying to break through the VRS lines. He didn’t know if any or how many were armed, or if they put up a fight or were simply shot trying to get through. Lt. Col. Franken told Milosevic that he could only speculate. In addition, the 6000 men held by the VRS have not been accounted for. Yet Milosevic has now taken it to be the established truth that a large number of the Srebrenica dead were combat casualties. It has not been established by legal standards.

In another line of questioning, Milosevic tried to establish the events at Srebrenica had not been planned in advance, but on site, under the direction of the UN. The witness responded that measures Dutch Bat tried to take to evacuate the refugees “were massively harassed and prevented by the VRS.” When Milosevic asserted that the VRS evacuation was done within the framework of the UN plan, the former commander replied, “The fact that [Yasushi] Akashi [Special Representative of the UN Secretary General] sends a telegram that the population is allowed to go to Tuzla is not evidence the VRS didn’t plan the operation.”

While not yet established in this trial, evidence in other ICTY trials indicates planning of the forced deportations and mass executions was more or less contemporaneous with the VRS Takeover of Srebrenica. It did not, however, involve the UN, which didn't force any of the refugees to leave. Nonetheless, Dutch Bat has been faulted for cooperating in the evacuation (forced ethnic cleansing) of 30,000 or more refugees from the enclave and for assisting in the separation of men and boys between 16 and 70 years of age allegedly for interrogation about their participation in war crimes. Lt. Col. Franken didn't testify about Dutch Bat's ignominious role in assisting the VRS operation. One is left with the question, 'if he was 'extremely anxious' about what would happen to the men and boys who were separated out, why did he (and Col. Karremans) allow Dutch Bat to facilitate the process?

Milosevic also questioned the Dutch Bat Commander about Bosnian Muslim fighters putting on UN uniforms and firing from UN positions at VRS positions in an effort to draw fire against Dutch Bat to force them to respond -- to protect themselves, and, by so doing, to protect the refugees as well. Given Dutch Bat's orders limiting its mission to self-defense and the vulnerability of thousands of refugees in the enclave, the Bosniak efforts are a logical strategy in a desperate situation. Lt. Colonel Franken testified that Bosniak forces used this tactic only in the final days, likely taking UN uniforms from the abandoned Dutch Bat post in Srebrenica town.

The ICTY has accumulated substantial evidence about Srebrenica over years of investigation and exhumation of mass graves. Most recently, three accused -- one commander, one intelligence officer and a local political official -- have pled guilty, two to crimes committed in Srebrenica. They have given extensive evidence about the events from July 6 -19, 1995, including who gave orders, who participated and what the military chain of command was. They have also testified under oath that following the fall of the Safe Area of Srebrenica, the VRS executed thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners of war. It is expected that at least some of their evidence will be introduced in the Milosevic trial. Perhaps, it will provide what Milosevic says he is seeking -- to establish the truth about what happened at Srebrenica. His knowledge and participation remain an open question.