Kyrgyz Find Compromise Works Better than Conflict
Other Central Asian leaders see only chaos and weak leadership in Kyrgyzstan, but they are missing the point – concessions are sign of strength, not weakness.
Kyrgyz Find Compromise Works Better than Conflict
Other Central Asian leaders see only chaos and weak leadership in Kyrgyzstan, but they are missing the point – concessions are sign of strength, not weakness.
Some of Kyrgyzstan’s more authoritarian neighbours have been gloating over political turbulence there, most recently the demonstrations in early November that ended in an agreement on a new constitution.
Selective footage of the disturbances is shown on Kazak television as a lesson to show just where political opposition and popular unrest can lead – the point being that this is definitely to be avoided. People are led to believe that events in Kyrgyzstan are all about a simple regional power-struggle between the north and south of the country.
As these media outlets stress that Kyrgyzstan’s March 2005 revolution and the more recent protests have produced no results, they pass over in silence the terrible events that happened in Andijan in May the same year.
It is true that stability and economic development remain elusive in Kyrgyzstan, and also that regional divisions remain. Nor has the new constitution – the fruit of a compromise deal between President Kurmanbek Bakiev and the opposition – significantly altered the old order.
Yet within Kyrgyzstan, the general mood now that the demonstrations are over is not pessimistic.
In an opposition rally held on Bishkek’s main square from November 2 to 9, political leaders said their supporters would remain there until their demands are met – inter alia, for the resignation of the “tandem”, the alliance of southerner Bakiev with a prime minister from the north, Felix Kulov.
If there was a threat of destabilisation, it was came from an act of provocation on the part of the authorities. Towards the end of a week of opposition protests, public-sector employees were sent out into another big city square for a counter-demonstration. This did not amount to much: a small if vocal group of zealous individuals, assisted by a public address system, and completely surrounded by row upon row of police officers.
In response to this assembly, the opposition rally began to be swelled by people who up until that point had not joined the protests. Groups of pro-opposition and pro-government engaged in minor skirmishes as the former tried to question the latter about what they were up to. Young men from the pro-government camp threw bottles and sticks at their opponents, and police focused their attention on the opposition supporters, driving them away and firing tear-gas projectiles at them. Many young people, some of them children, sustained injuries.
Faced with a mounting threat of large-scale fighting and bloodshed, and fears that violence might be provoked by those who wanted to see the crisis ended by force, the two sides – government and opposition - sat down at the negotiating table and reached an agreement, so that the rally ended peacefully.
This peaceful conclusion of the political crisis is a victory for both sides, and a sign of political maturity and responsibility on the part of both president and opposition. The use of force would only have been countered with more force, and attitudes would have hardened. If that had been allowed to happen, any victorious outcome would have been illusory, and would have come at a high price.
Political leaders in neighbouring states may well have thought that President Bakiev should never have entered into talks with the opposition, still less made concessions to it.
However, they rule their countries under different conditions from those that apply in Kyrgyzstan. Any national leader has to take a realistic view of the extent of his power and the conditions in which he exercises it. Kyrgyzstan has no oil or gas to pay for meeting people’s material needs. Governments in Kyrgyzstan are under pressures that the presidents of more authoritarian states do not have – for example population groups are prepared to go to desperate lengths to protest against deprivation, extortion and injustice.
In some circumstances, making concessions is the wisest possible course of action. It should not be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of either the regime or the opposition that they agreed to hold talks with their fellow-citizens in order to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution.
Kyrgyzstan has again shown that it is able to live up to its reputation for democracy.
However, there are still plenty of problems ahead. The current leadership in Kyrgyzstan has shown itself incapable of adapting to new conditions, and continues to apply an authoritarian style of rule without effecting significant change.
What the government either underestimates or completely fails to understand is that the average citizen has already changed a great deal – he or she is educated, informed and keen to be part of the political decision-making process.
It is no surprise, then, that people are prepared to give the opposition a hearing.
What is interesting about opposition statements is that they contain not just criticism of the government, but also political and economic demands intended to address the central problems facing the country. That suggests that opposition leaders have progressed from personality-based politics to a more genuine search for legitimacy; in other words they are fighting for ideas, not for the victory or defeat of this or that individual or clan.
In fact, the opposition consists of people from both north and south, and the protests cannot be categorised as regionally-based. The north-south divide is actually more a feature of the Bakiev administration.
Because the new constitution was only one item on the protesters’ list of demands, the compromise deal can be seen as a considerable concession on the part of the opposition. Most other issues remain unresolved, leaving some potential for another crisis to emerge.
For the moment, then, we have a situation where the Bakiev government does not have the political will, competence or public support to properly address the problems facing Kyrgyzstan. The opposition, meanwhile, is more ready to come up with solutions, but it lacks the consistency and capacity to refine its ideas and put them into practice.
Despite these problems, though, both of these political elites – government and opposition – are continuing to behave in a responsible manner. They have avoided a descent into civil conflict, they place a value on the lives and well-being of their fellow citizens, and they are demonstrating a commitment to stability.
Gulnara Iskakova is legal expert and associate professor at the American University in Central Asia.
Selective footage of the disturbances is shown on Kazak television as a lesson to show just where political opposition and popular unrest can lead – the point being that this is definitely to be avoided. People are led to believe that events in Kyrgyzstan are all about a simple regional power-struggle between the north and south of the country.
As these media outlets stress that Kyrgyzstan’s March 2005 revolution and the more recent protests have produced no results, they pass over in silence the terrible events that happened in Andijan in May the same year.
It is true that stability and economic development remain elusive in Kyrgyzstan, and also that regional divisions remain. Nor has the new constitution – the fruit of a compromise deal between President Kurmanbek Bakiev and the opposition – significantly altered the old order.
Yet within Kyrgyzstan, the general mood now that the demonstrations are over is not pessimistic.
In an opposition rally held on Bishkek’s main square from November 2 to 9, political leaders said their supporters would remain there until their demands are met – inter alia, for the resignation of the “tandem”, the alliance of southerner Bakiev with a prime minister from the north, Felix Kulov.
If there was a threat of destabilisation, it was came from an act of provocation on the part of the authorities. Towards the end of a week of opposition protests, public-sector employees were sent out into another big city square for a counter-demonstration. This did not amount to much: a small if vocal group of zealous individuals, assisted by a public address system, and completely surrounded by row upon row of police officers.
In response to this assembly, the opposition rally began to be swelled by people who up until that point had not joined the protests. Groups of pro-opposition and pro-government engaged in minor skirmishes as the former tried to question the latter about what they were up to. Young men from the pro-government camp threw bottles and sticks at their opponents, and police focused their attention on the opposition supporters, driving them away and firing tear-gas projectiles at them. Many young people, some of them children, sustained injuries.
Faced with a mounting threat of large-scale fighting and bloodshed, and fears that violence might be provoked by those who wanted to see the crisis ended by force, the two sides – government and opposition - sat down at the negotiating table and reached an agreement, so that the rally ended peacefully.
This peaceful conclusion of the political crisis is a victory for both sides, and a sign of political maturity and responsibility on the part of both president and opposition. The use of force would only have been countered with more force, and attitudes would have hardened. If that had been allowed to happen, any victorious outcome would have been illusory, and would have come at a high price.
Political leaders in neighbouring states may well have thought that President Bakiev should never have entered into talks with the opposition, still less made concessions to it.
However, they rule their countries under different conditions from those that apply in Kyrgyzstan. Any national leader has to take a realistic view of the extent of his power and the conditions in which he exercises it. Kyrgyzstan has no oil or gas to pay for meeting people’s material needs. Governments in Kyrgyzstan are under pressures that the presidents of more authoritarian states do not have – for example population groups are prepared to go to desperate lengths to protest against deprivation, extortion and injustice.
In some circumstances, making concessions is the wisest possible course of action. It should not be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of either the regime or the opposition that they agreed to hold talks with their fellow-citizens in order to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution.
Kyrgyzstan has again shown that it is able to live up to its reputation for democracy.
However, there are still plenty of problems ahead. The current leadership in Kyrgyzstan has shown itself incapable of adapting to new conditions, and continues to apply an authoritarian style of rule without effecting significant change.
What the government either underestimates or completely fails to understand is that the average citizen has already changed a great deal – he or she is educated, informed and keen to be part of the political decision-making process.
It is no surprise, then, that people are prepared to give the opposition a hearing.
What is interesting about opposition statements is that they contain not just criticism of the government, but also political and economic demands intended to address the central problems facing the country. That suggests that opposition leaders have progressed from personality-based politics to a more genuine search for legitimacy; in other words they are fighting for ideas, not for the victory or defeat of this or that individual or clan.
In fact, the opposition consists of people from both north and south, and the protests cannot be categorised as regionally-based. The north-south divide is actually more a feature of the Bakiev administration.
Because the new constitution was only one item on the protesters’ list of demands, the compromise deal can be seen as a considerable concession on the part of the opposition. Most other issues remain unresolved, leaving some potential for another crisis to emerge.
For the moment, then, we have a situation where the Bakiev government does not have the political will, competence or public support to properly address the problems facing Kyrgyzstan. The opposition, meanwhile, is more ready to come up with solutions, but it lacks the consistency and capacity to refine its ideas and put them into practice.
Despite these problems, though, both of these political elites – government and opposition – are continuing to behave in a responsible manner. They have avoided a descent into civil conflict, they place a value on the lives and well-being of their fellow citizens, and they are demonstrating a commitment to stability.
Gulnara Iskakova is legal expert and associate professor at the American University in Central Asia.
