Kosovo Review Update
Kosovo Review Update
When the Prosecution concluded its Kosovo case against Slobodan Milosevic in September 2002, they advised the Court a few additional witnesses might testify during the Bosnia and Croatia segments. One was NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, the other was former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President and Milosevic ally, Zoran Lilic. Both provided good support for the Prosecution's case. [Shortly after it closed, CIJ reviewed the Prosecution's Kosovo case. The article, 'Where's The Smoking Gun?' September 13, 2002, is available on CIJ's archive. CIJ will post a review of the Prosecution's case on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina following its completion on Thursday, February 19, 2004.]
While Mr. Lilic was more than willing to agree with nearly anything Milosevic said having to do with Bosnia or Croatia, he stubbornly resisted following the Accused's lead on Kosovo. He told the Court that Milosevic was fully informed of events on the ground in Kosovo, including crimes committed by Serbian reserve police who were seizing Kosovar Albanian property. Regular information was provided by both the State Security and Public Security Divisions of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), from the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and from civilian authorities, in addition to oral and written reports Lilic provided following two fact finding trips to the province. In other words, Milosevic knew those he controlled were committing crimes against the Kosovar Albanian population.
Another important piece of evidence the Prosecution introduced through Lilic was a July 1998 letter from the VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic, severely criticizing Milosevic for illegally exercising control over the situation in Kosovo outside the chain of command. In addition, Perisic charged Milosevic with subordinating the VJ to unqualified commanders, illegally ordering the VJ to supply the Serbian police (MUP) with equipment and goods, ordering the VJ to perform unconstitutional tasks, creating a separate and personal chain of command for the VJ unit known as the 'Guard's Brigade,' and promoting officers without reference to law, principle, or criteria of qualification.
Confronted in court with Perisic's letter, Milosevic called it a 'smokescreen' and accused the General of involvement in espionage. Mr. Lilic permitted himself a smile at the allegation. 'I would have arrested [Perisic] myself if he had been spying,' he told the Court, adding, 'I can hardly agree that [the letter] is a smokescreen.'
Milosevic tried to reclaim Lilic's loyalty by repeatedly asserting that he had taken Lilic's advice on Kosovo. Finally, the witness cut him short, 'Please stop saying you had agreed to what I had suggested.' In response to the idea that Milosevic had taken the best possible route towards ending the Kosovo conflict and protecting Serb interests in the region, Lilic was even more strikingly direct, 'There are fewer Serbs in Kosovo now than in the prisons of The Hague.'
NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, who negotiated with Milosevic over Kosovo, criticized his handling of ethnic tension in the province. Echoing what other witnesses have said, he testified that the Kosovo Liberation Army arose out of Serbian repression and unwillingness to find a political solution. The excessive response of Serbian forces to KLA actions created a humanitarian disaster, according to Clark. By autumn 1998, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians were living in the woods, exposed to the elements with no way to feed themselves. NATO threatened force to stop Serbian troops' cleansing the province of Albanians under the guise of combating terrorists. Throughout the negotiations, however, Milosevic made promises, which he had no intention of keeping, to pull back troops so people could return to their homes.
Milosevic, Clark testified, saw Kosovo as the key to his political future. The then-president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) told Clark it was more important than his head.
When Milosevic questioned Clark over the legality of NATO bombing, the former General told the Court it was made necessary by Milosevic's attack on an essentially unarmed civilian population and his unwillingness to abide by negotiated agreements. Whether NATO acted lawfully in using military force against Serbia is not at issue in the case against Milosevic. Even if it were illegal, it could not justify ethnic cleansing or other crimes against the civilian population of Kosovo.
The Accused sought to establish his position as peacemaker in the Balkans, but Clark wouldn't agree. Milosevic's leadership role, Clark testified, 'wasn't only about peace . . . it was a combination of . . . strategies using force, using intimidation, bullying, and then going to the international community and pursuing peace. It was this combination that marked his conduct during the entire period in question. . . .'
Though the Prosecution appeared to have made its case on Kosovo before Lilic and Clark testified, their testimonies strengthened and added perspective to it.
[Articles contemporaneous to the testimony of these two witnesses can also be found in the archive: 'Lilic Challenges Milosevic on Kosovo Strategy,' June 19, 2003; 'Clark Says Milosevic Had Foreknowledge of Srebrenica, Intention to Kill Albanians,' December 15, 2003.]
While Mr. Lilic was more than willing to agree with nearly anything Milosevic said having to do with Bosnia or Croatia, he stubbornly resisted following the Accused's lead on Kosovo. He told the Court that Milosevic was fully informed of events on the ground in Kosovo, including crimes committed by Serbian reserve police who were seizing Kosovar Albanian property. Regular information was provided by both the State Security and Public Security Divisions of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), from the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and from civilian authorities, in addition to oral and written reports Lilic provided following two fact finding trips to the province. In other words, Milosevic knew those he controlled were committing crimes against the Kosovar Albanian population.
Another important piece of evidence the Prosecution introduced through Lilic was a July 1998 letter from the VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic, severely criticizing Milosevic for illegally exercising control over the situation in Kosovo outside the chain of command. In addition, Perisic charged Milosevic with subordinating the VJ to unqualified commanders, illegally ordering the VJ to supply the Serbian police (MUP) with equipment and goods, ordering the VJ to perform unconstitutional tasks, creating a separate and personal chain of command for the VJ unit known as the 'Guard's Brigade,' and promoting officers without reference to law, principle, or criteria of qualification.
Confronted in court with Perisic's letter, Milosevic called it a 'smokescreen' and accused the General of involvement in espionage. Mr. Lilic permitted himself a smile at the allegation. 'I would have arrested [Perisic] myself if he had been spying,' he told the Court, adding, 'I can hardly agree that [the letter] is a smokescreen.'
Milosevic tried to reclaim Lilic's loyalty by repeatedly asserting that he had taken Lilic's advice on Kosovo. Finally, the witness cut him short, 'Please stop saying you had agreed to what I had suggested.' In response to the idea that Milosevic had taken the best possible route towards ending the Kosovo conflict and protecting Serb interests in the region, Lilic was even more strikingly direct, 'There are fewer Serbs in Kosovo now than in the prisons of The Hague.'
NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, who negotiated with Milosevic over Kosovo, criticized his handling of ethnic tension in the province. Echoing what other witnesses have said, he testified that the Kosovo Liberation Army arose out of Serbian repression and unwillingness to find a political solution. The excessive response of Serbian forces to KLA actions created a humanitarian disaster, according to Clark. By autumn 1998, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians were living in the woods, exposed to the elements with no way to feed themselves. NATO threatened force to stop Serbian troops' cleansing the province of Albanians under the guise of combating terrorists. Throughout the negotiations, however, Milosevic made promises, which he had no intention of keeping, to pull back troops so people could return to their homes.
Milosevic, Clark testified, saw Kosovo as the key to his political future. The then-president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) told Clark it was more important than his head.
When Milosevic questioned Clark over the legality of NATO bombing, the former General told the Court it was made necessary by Milosevic's attack on an essentially unarmed civilian population and his unwillingness to abide by negotiated agreements. Whether NATO acted lawfully in using military force against Serbia is not at issue in the case against Milosevic. Even if it were illegal, it could not justify ethnic cleansing or other crimes against the civilian population of Kosovo.
The Accused sought to establish his position as peacemaker in the Balkans, but Clark wouldn't agree. Milosevic's leadership role, Clark testified, 'wasn't only about peace . . . it was a combination of . . . strategies using force, using intimidation, bullying, and then going to the international community and pursuing peace. It was this combination that marked his conduct during the entire period in question. . . .'
Though the Prosecution appeared to have made its case on Kosovo before Lilic and Clark testified, their testimonies strengthened and added perspective to it.
[Articles contemporaneous to the testimony of these two witnesses can also be found in the archive: 'Lilic Challenges Milosevic on Kosovo Strategy,' June 19, 2003; 'Clark Says Milosevic Had Foreknowledge of Srebrenica, Intention to Kill Albanians,' December 15, 2003.]
