Kazak Early Election Presented as Democratic Option

Friday, 4 February, 2011

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Aitolkyn Kourmanova

Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbaev’s surprise announcement of an early election allows him to neatly sidestep a proposal to let him rule until 2020 without seeking a popular mandate. 

Nazarbaev issued a decree on February 4 setting the election date for April 3, just two months away. The previous day, he had approved legislative elections allowing him to call snap elections.

Supporters of Nazarbaev, who has governed Kazakstan since before it became independent in 1991, ran a campaign to gather signatures in favour of holding a referendum on prolonging his current term in office until 2020, obviating the need for the election scheduled next year. 

Campaigners gathered over five million signatures, more than half the voting-age population and far more than the 200,000 needed to trigger a referendum. But on January 31, Kazakstan’s Constitutional Court rejected plans for a referendum as unconstitutional.

Nazarbaev then presented his own plan for an early election as the best possible alternative.

“Instead of a dilemma that divides our society – a referendum or an election – I am proposing a formula that will unite us; I am proposing to hold an early presidential election,” he said in an address to the nation.

He said the decision not to hold a referendum was “a historic lesson in democracy, about staying true to the constitution”.

When the referendum campaign got going in January, opposition and civil society groups in Kazakstan as well as the United States government and the European Union warned that it would be a setback for democracy.

Nazarbaev’s alternative plan was thus designed to create the impression that he was adhering to democratic principles and the Kazak constitution.

In reality, it does not reflect a democratic impulse. If anything, it says more about him as a tactician who tries to stay one step ahead of any development that may present a threat to his solid grip on power.

All he has done is changed the method by which he pursues his ultimate aim of staying in power for as long as possible.

There are no signs that the current political set-up is moving in the direction of greater democracy. Last year, for example, Nazarbaev’s position was consolidated when he was awarded special status as “Leader of the Nation”, granting him considerable privileges even if he does step down as president.

The referendum campaign has also furnished him with a second political vehicle, in addition to the governing Nur Otan party. Coalition Kazakstan-2020, an umbrella group uniting over 600 organisations, had its trial run driving the campaign to gather millions of signatures and present the referendum as the real will of the people.

Kazakstan’s leadership has made it clear it intends to follows its own particular version of democracy, which includes putting pressure on the opposition, free media, and civil society groups.

It is hard to expect political liberalisation from a leadership that believes the country will plunge into revolution if people are granted too much freedom.

But why was so much effort put into the referendum campaign, only for the president to turn his back on it?

There are several possible reasons, one being that the idea of allowing Nazarbaev to rule without renewing his mandate may have begun looking distinctly unappealing in light of the recent turbulence in the Middle East.

The street protests that toppled the autocratic ruler of Tunisia and plunged Egypt into crisis have shaken any belief that resource-rich, predominantly Muslim countries have placid, accepting populations. These events have shown that as well as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – where presidents were brought down in “colour revolutions” – other kinds of state are also susceptible to popular unrest.

Domestic factors may also have played a part. Some hardline figures in Nazarbaev’s entourage may have been keen on the referendum as a way of perpetuating a system that provides them personally with power and wealth.

It is quite plausible that the wave of international criticism of the referendum plan forced the president to rethink and become more receptive to the arguments made by other supporters that such a patently undemocratic move was unnecessary when the right kind of election could deliver the same result.

The answer to why an election at such short notice is desirable is simpler. Nazarbaev is keen to secure victory now, at a time when he feels his position is strong, and avoid possible unpleasant surprises that a later election might bring.

Apart from anything else, holding an election so soon leaves potential opponents with hardly any time to prepare a campaign.

Although oil revenues have helped cushion the blow, the Kazak economy has been weakened by the impact of the global financial problems. Public protests are no longer confined to opposition groups, but increasingly involve various categories of people including investors in failed companies, people who cannot meet high mortgage payments, and the growing number of unemployed.

These circumstances require the government to take tough action to restore economic stability. But that will involve some painful medicine that will not go down well with the voters.

It is worth recalling that when an early election was called in 1999, it was swiftly followed by unpopular measures necessitated by economic crisis.

Nazarbaev was elected president of newly-independent Kazakstan in 1991, and a referendum five years later extended that first term until December 2000. The election was brought forward by nearly two years to January 1999 just as Kazakstan began to feel the effects of financial turmoil in Russia in 1998. a couple of months after the election, the government was forced to devalue the national currency.

Kazakstan’s massive oil revenues have undoubtedly allowed President Nazarbaev to maintain stability for many years. But having the spending-power to keep people off the streets cannot be used as an excuse for endlessly avoiding the serious political reforms that are needed.

The 18-year leadership of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reminds us that preserving a political system in a state of stagnation can have disastrous consequences. Long-serving presidents are not in themselves a guarantee of long-term political stability.

Aitolkyn Kourmanova is IWPR Country Director in Kazakstan.

The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of IWPR.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign Ministry of Norway.