Iraq's Shaky Government

Ammar Al Shahbander

IWPR’s late Iraq chief-of-mission

Thursday, 18 November, 2010

The link has been copied

A power-sharing agreement has finally been reached in Iraq, after eight months of political stalemate. With a government now due to be formed within 30 days, IWPR Iraq chief of mission Ammar al-Shahbander identifies the main problems facing the new authority.

What are the most immediate challenges confronting Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki?

This coalition came about because there were just no other choices – and it seems likely that its members are going to clash on some major policy decisions, not least security.

Disarming and integrating the militias is likely to be a fraught undertaking.

The followers of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who are the prime minister’s strongest allies, have secured an agreement to be given 25 per cent of senior positions within the security forces. This could pose problems for Maliki because they would be loyal to no-one other than Sadr. Sadr might in future use this fact to exert pressure on Maliki, possibly even threatening or staging a coup.

As a condition for supporting the coalition, the Kurds insisted that around 80,000 Kurdish peshmerga be integrated into the military. This is a daunting logistical and financial task: the total size of the Iraqi army was initially supposed to be around 300,000 and it is already almost double that size. Moreover, central government would have concerns over the loyalty of these troops in the event of a clash between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government, KRG.

There are likely to be tensions over foreign relations too. Maliki has been isolated by Arab neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia. His overtures to them in the months following the March election were rejected, while his backing from Iran has grown.

Meanwhile, Maliki’s arch rival for the prime minister’s post, Iyad Allawi, the leader of the secular but largely Sunni Iraqiya party, enjoys close relations with Arab countries.

The fear here is that - with Iran’s influence in Iraq perhaps slightly diminished, yet still greater than that of the Arab countries - Tehran may try to deepen the divisions between Maliki and the Arab world to further its own interests.

Then there is Article 140 of the constitution, which deals with a referendum to decide the fate of disputed territories such as Kirkuk. Maliki promised to push forward with this, a move which Allawi will definitely resist. Strangely, Maliki is being backed by the Sadrists who, like the Iraqiya bloc, are staunch nationalists, supporting a strong central government and oppose Kurdish independence. But the Sadrists believe that the referendum will show that Arabs – rather than Kurds - are a majority in Kirkuk, and most Arabs in the city are followers of Sadr.

As well as dealing with major differences on policy within his coalition, Maliki may face a serious challenge to his authority.

The new National Council for Strategic Policy has apparently mainly been created as a concession to Allawi, who will head it. It is as yet unclear just exactly what the composition and purpose of this body will be. Its mandate needs to be fixed within the next two weeks and approved by parliament, but it is anticipated that it will have a supervisory role regarding the performance of government ministers and include departments dealing with a wide range of issues, such as domestic, foreign and economic affairs.

US president Barack Obama reportedly phoned Allawi to reassure him that this role would not be merely symbolic and provide him with real authority. But if this is true, then it would be to the detriment of the prime minister. We could have two authorities with different strategies and both with executive power.

Iraqi citizens have spent the last eight months witnessing bitter disputes as the politicians they elected failed to form an administration to govern them. How much legitimacy does this new government have in the eyes of the electorate?

This government definitely has less legitimacy than the pre-election administration did. For example, there is the way Maliki and the government handled the recent attacks on Christian sites. The church siege, in which at least 52 people were killed, and which was followed by another string of attacks against Christians, were all clear indications of incompetence.

What has also cost Maliki credibility is the fact that he campaigned on an anti-Baathist agenda, but has agreed to suspend the Justice and Accountability Commission for two years until it can be turned into a judicial rather than political body – at which point only former Baathists found guilty of committing crimes will be punished.

What kind of future does this government face and how stable is it likely to be?

I think this coalition will break down within a year. Either there will be a plot to remove Maliki or it will just disintegrate. Maliki has been making enemies left, right and centre and while his alliance with the Sadrists is important, it is very unstable. Sadr can change his mind at any time, for strategic reasons or just in a fit of pique.

Despite the problems, what positives can be drawn from the formation of the new government?

Apart from some fraud, the elections were more or less successful. Violence was largely avoided and the parties engaged in a proper competition for votes. What became clear during the months the parties spent arguing and fighting over a coalition was that no single person or party can dominate the political scene here. The political process in Iraq is real.

Although we don’t know yet who will get the ministry of oil, I think they will be able to pass the oil and investment laws which are needed to develop Iraq’s natural resources. That doesn’t mean that there will be an immediate economic dividend, however, because foreign investors are deterred by the security situation despite assurances from the government. So we need to see security first, then development.

Who benefits most in this government?

All the parties are equally unhappy. But the most satisfied members of the coalition are the Kurds, who more or less got what they wanted – at least on paper. They came to Maliki with a list of 26 requests and he signed off on all of them. These included jobs for the peshmerga; ensuring action on Article 140 and the disputed territories; and a clause whereby the resignation of Kurdish ministers would force the entire cabinet to step down. But if the National Council for Strategic Policy is given executive power, then Maliki’s promises could become irrelevant.