Investigating the Deportation of Ukrainian Children

Yevheniia Motorevska in Ukraine

Ukraine justice editor

Thursday, 16 January, 2025

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Russia has forcibly transferred nearly 20,000 Ukrainian children since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kateryna Rashevska, a lawyer at Ukraine’s Regional Centre for Human Rights, told IWPR Ukraine justice editor Yevehniia Motorevska that significant progress has been made in investigating this illegal transfer, both within international institutions and at the national level. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for this alleged war crime; Rashevska said that further indictments could not be ruled out.

Yevehniia Motorevska: A mass deportation of Ukrainian children took place at the beginning of a full-scale invasion in 2022. Is there any evidence that the illegal transfer of children to Russia is ongoing?

Kateryna Rashevska: After Russia established effective control over the newly occupied territories, the need for the mass deportation of children to eradicate their Ukrainian identity or address certain demographic issues, including replenishing the mobilisation reserve of the Russian Federation, disappeared. Instead, similar objectives can be pursued with Ukrainian children in the newly occupied territories through formal or informal education systems.

However, cases of deportation still occur. When a child becomes an orphan or when parents are deprived of their parental rights, children may be forcibly transferred to Russian families in the Russian Federation or to occupied Crimea. For instance, in 2023, Inna Shvenk, the so-called Commissioner for Children's Rights of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic [a part of Ukraine's Luhansk oblast occupied since 2014], reported that 17 children from the oblast had been adopted by Russian citizens.

There are also instances of children being taken to Russia, for example, for studies, so that they complete their schooling in the Russian Federation and then enroll in Russian higher education institutions. This practice can also be seen as a form of deportation, as it aims to keep the children under Russian control permanently, given that they usually do not return to their homeland, the occupied territory.

How is the ICC investigation into the case against Putin and Lvova-Belova progressing?

According to the data at my disposal, the leaders of the so-called DPR and LPR, parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine occupied since 2014 - who have also been involved in the deportation of a large number of Ukrainian children, including from the newly-occupied territories - remain under the ICC's scrutiny.

The ICC does not rule out - and announced in September 2024 - that the court has jurisdiction over Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko and other high-ranking Belarusian officials. However, it's worth noting that this is not about the deportation of children to so-called re-education camps in Belarus, but about those cases when at the beginning of a full-scale invasion, children from the northern regions of Ukraine were “evacuated” to the territory of Belarus. In some cases, they were taken with their parents, but these actions had the hallmarks of deportation.

In September 2024, Lithuania submitted a notice to the ICC concerning these cases of deportation to Belarus. Given that arrest warrants have already been issued for deportation, the ICC does not rule out the possibility of expanding this list and increasing the number of arrest warrants in this particular case.

What is the current status of the Ukrainian prosecutor's office's investigation into these deportation cases?

In Ukraine, there is a primary case related to deportation. We can see regular charges being brought against the defendants in this case. Although the number of charges is limited, they are being brought with a high level of evidence.

For instance, in the cases of Denis Pushilin, the leader of the so-called DPR, and Eleonora Fedorenko, the so-called commissioner for children's rights of the DPR, a substantial amount of evidence has been collected, making it unlikely that the case will be dismissed in court.

There are cases involving Russian foster families with clear ties to the occupation authorities which are also under investigation. These are the so-called “good Russians with big hearts” who have taken in Ukrainian children. However, not all such parents are implicated. Simply having custody of the children is not sufficient grounds for law enforcement to take action against them.

There are two other primary proceedings: the dissemination of Russian educational standards in the occupied territories and the propaganda of service in the armed forces of the occupying state. Evidence is being collected, and charges are also being brought. For example, individuals holding leadership positions in the [Russian youth military-patriotic organisation] Yunarmia in occupied Crimea are being targeted. 

Are we talking about the militarisation of Ukrainian children? Could this be considered a war crime, leading to the Russian leadership being held accountable?

According to international law, specifically the Geneva Convention, propaganda promoting service in the armed forces of an opposing state is prohibited. However, the issue is that this violation does not constitute a war crime. As a result, the ICC will not investigate it. The Ukrainian authorities also have concerns about whether they can take action under the new version of the Criminal Code, which was adopted after Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute. Despite these concerns, the Ukrainian prosecutor's office is conducting an investigation.

In discussions about politicisation and militarisation, it is suggested that Ukraine should use alternative tools rather than criminal liability. We are told about tools such as sanctions. However, sanctions do not provide a form of liability.

Unfortunately, the international community underestimates the risks of militarisation. It fails to recognise that the threat extends beyond Ukraine, posing a risk to regional security at the very least. This is because these children, once re-educated, will be used to strengthen the Russian armed forces in the future.

What role does the public sector currently play in investigating war crimes, in particular the deportation of children?

Let’s begin with what our organisation does. We continue to document information from publicly available sources, also with the help of various OSINT tools. As a result, for instance, we have compiled a register of alleged Russian foster parents, comprising 85 individuals.

These are the cases that we were able to document. In the future, this can facilitate the return of the children and bring the perpetrators to justice. By tracing the connections from these parents, we can establish a chain of command that goes all the way up to Putin and Lvova-Belova.

We also interview children who return either from deportation or after being forcibly moved from the occupied territories. We are working to identify all the crimes that we have discussed or violations of international humanitarian law. We also submit complaints to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which enables these children to receive compensation and be acknowledged as victims.

Besides, we are part of the National Coordination Platform for the International Register of Damages. By the end of last year, a form for accessing this register had been developed. As a result, we will also assist deported children in receiving compensation through the International Register of Damages.

We also develop sanctions proposals and compile sanctions lists targeting individuals involved in the deportation of children. We have well-established contacts with the UK, the US and the EU, and sometimes these individuals appear on their sanctions lists before being added to national sanctions lists.