Insider Links Milosevic to War in Croatia

Perhaps the highest level insider to testify against Slobodan Milosevic so far took the stand Monday as protected witness C-061. It was the first day of testimony that is likely to last well into next week. As a high official in the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina (SAO Krajina) in Croatia, C-061 met with Milosevic on more than 30 occasions and held at least ten telephone conversations with him. While much of his testimony about their direct interactions was held in private session to protect his identity, what he did say in public was damning. He provided the crucial link between Milosevic and the armed forces fighting the Croatian Army in Croatia. The link is necessary to establish that Milosevic, then head of the Republic of Serbia, had de facto control of the Yugoslav Army and other armed forces who took control of a substantial part of Croatia, cleansed it of non-Serbs and held it until a Croatian army come-back in 1995. C-061 may well be the Prosecution's 'smoking gun.'

Witness C-061 testified that Milosevic was involved in planning the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). His testimony was corroborated by an intercepted telephone conversation between Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, part of which was played in court: Milosevic: 'You see, they [Slovenia and Croatia] want to step out and are carrying out these things exactly the way we planned it.' According to C-061, the plan was to force Croatia and Slovenia to leave SFRY, while the part of Croatia occupied by Serbs and controlled by the Yugoslav Army (JNA) would remain. In that way, all Serbs would live in one state.

Milosevic has stated this was his intention, but has denied it can be construed as a plan for 'Greater Serbia.' His argument is that the state where all Serbs could live together was the SFRY. When Slovenia and Croatia seceded, he argues, Yugoslavia continued to exist. To include Croatian Serbs, he maintains that Yugoslavia was made up of constituent nationalities (people of the same ethnicity) and that they, not the republics, retained the right to secession. Therefore, when Croatia voted to secede, it could not take with it the territories where the majority population was Serb, unless they agreed – and he saw that they did not.

Milosevic's first obstacle in effecting the plan was to convince Croatian Serbs to hate and fear the Croatian government and their Croat neighbors, with whom they'd lived for centuries. C-061 methodically described a process by which Milosevic's police and the Belgrade media participated in a campaign of disinformation and provocation to incite fear and hatred among Croatian Serbs living in the Krajina. As Croatian extremists escalated their nationalist rhetoric, the Serbian media reminded Serbs of the mass atrocities Croat nationalists committed against Serbs in WWII. Milosevic controlled the Serbian media through his power to appoint and remove directors of RTV Belgrade and the daily newspaper Politika. C-061 said he was told this by some of the directors and by Milosevic himself.

While moderate Croatian Serbs formed a political party and sought to protect their rights within Croatia, extremist elements aided by Belgrade formed parallel structures. Witness C-061 testified that Jovica Stanisic, chief of Milosevic's security police in Belgrade, was at the center of the parallel structure. Members were drawn from the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP) and its public security sector, as well as local police in Croatian Serb municipalities, and included Milan Martic, head of the Knin police force in Krajina. At the same time, Croatian Serbs began to arm themselves with assistance from Serbs in Bosnia.

When the media reported that the Croatian Assembly had declared a state of war and that police were moving toward Knin, Serbs blockaded the road. The event became known as 'the log revolution,' and was often cited as the beginning of war in Croatia. C-061 testified that the media report which supposedly sparked the log revolution was inaccurate. It had been furnished by Serbian State Security. An earlier witness testified that non-local Serbs were paid by Belgrade to man the barricade.

As a result of the log revolution, in an escalating drama, the Croatian government cut off funding to its Serbian municipalities. The municipalities retaliated by retaining tax revenues. Since this was inadequate to provide services, Croatian Serbs turned to Serbia proper which incorporated them into its revenue system through the Yugoslav National Bank. Funding for the Krajina army and police was carried across the border in cash, at least initially. Witness C-061 said this system operated from 1991 up to Operation Storm in 1995. When asked whether the SAO Krajina (later the Republic of Serbian Krajina – RSK) could have existed without this support, the witness answered, 'No. Under no circumstances. The SAO Krajina and RSK were completely economically and financially dependent on Serbia.'

Asked if Milosevic knew about it, he replied, 'He could have known through the Government of Serbia which controlled the system. Whether he knew I can't say, but I believe he did.' C-061 earlier said Milosevic had de facto control over the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

Another obstacle to Milosevic's plan to have all Serbs in one state was the fact that the Serbian occupied territories in Croatia were also inhabited by Croats and others. The witness's description of how the plan was implemented on the ground shows how the problem was solved. 'In August 1991, the Yugoslav Army entered into war with Croatia. It engaged in combat operations in such a way that by moving the front line closer to the opposing party and using heavy artillery it forced the armed forces, the people and the government to withdraw and retreat from the territories. In this way, the JNA engaged in war so that the territories it captured would be left without any Croat inhabitants. Houses and buildings were destroyed. Property looted.'

Witness C-061 also testified that Milosevic was de facto commander in chief of the JNA and of all forces fighting the Croatian Army in Croatia. There were two parallel chains of command. One descended from the Presidency of Yugoslavia to the JNA and then to the territorial defense. The other was headed by the State Security Service of Serbia and the Ministry of the Interior. The local milicia, volunteer units, regular police of Krajina and groups belonging to the state security service were subordinated to it. At the head of both was Slobodan Milosevic. The two lines of command mostly operated together in the field under the JNA's overall authority.

In response to this testimony, Prosecutor Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff asked why Milosevic, then President of the Republic of Serbia, was at the top of the hierarchy, including having control over the federal army. C-061 answered, 'He was the main political figure, the most influential, the most powerful. He had the initiative and he subordinated all other structures to his initiative in Yugoslavia . . . .' Judge Robinson pressed the witness to clarify whether he understood the concept of commander in chief and whether he was in fact claiming Milosevic had that authority. C-061 said he did and that though the Presidency of the SFRY was formally commander in chief of the JNA, Milosevic had that power in fact (de facto). He stated further that Milosevic secured his power through his control over the rump Presidency of SFRY from summer 1991 on. Moreover, the witness claimed that Milosevic had influence over General Kadijevic, federal Minister of Defense, and General Adzic, JNA Chief of Staff. His sources, he said, were members of the rump presidency and Milosevic himself. He pointed out that Milosevic also used his political party to exercise control. Through it, he could appoint and remove leaders who were also party members.

At some point, Milosevic's plan to have all Serbs in one state changed, according to C-061. 'The territory was revised on which the state would be created. . . . Serb territories in Croatia were to be given to the Croatian authorities and the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be divided between Croatia and Serbia.' Though private session was declared immediately after, the witness acknowledged he was aware of the March 1991 meeting between Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, where the agreement to divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina was allegedly reached. This provides structure and corroboration to the vivid description by another prosecution witness, Slobodan Lazarevic, of Belgrade's abandonment of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina during Operation Storm. After going to such lengths to start a war, with all its death and destruction, Milosevic had no more need for the Krajina Serbs. At any rate, once the Croatian army retook the territory, the territory of the Serb nation no longer extended into Croatia. The plan to have all Serbs in one state could be revised without a change in rhetoric.

At the end of three days of this explosive testimony, Prosecutor Uertz-Retzlaff asked the Court for two more days for direct examination. The witness is a 'special type,' she argued. If he is allowed to testify more fully, the prosecution can drop other lower level insider witnesses. Given that C-061's public testimony directly links Milosevic to responsibility for the war in Croatia and given that his conversations with Milosevic have mostly been revealed in extensive private sessions, the witness may well have proved a huge piece of the prosecution's case. The Court, which hasn't ruled on the request for more time, is likely to grant it. Under the Court's informal guidelines, that will give Milosevic a week for cross examination, assuming he is up to it. At the end of it all, the prosecution may be able to end its Croatia case by the winter recess despite substantial delays occasioned by Milosevic's ill health. It may depend on how the insider's testimony holds up under cross examination by the man he says directed the events in which he played a major role.