Evaluating the Testimony of A Spy: Lazarevic exaggerates but implicates JNA in Croatian war

Intelligence officers, colloquially known as 'spies,' necessarily live in a shadow world where nothing is quite what it seems. Mustafa Candic, a high ranking officer with the Central Counterintelligence Group (KOG) of the Yugoslav Army for 15 years, testified that the KOG's goal in 1989 through 1991 was to infiltrate all levels of society, including the police and the authorities. Their operatives included the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), Goran Hadzic, who, according to another spy, Slobodan Lazarevic, declared himself only a 'messenger' to and from Milosevic.

Subterfuge and lies are essential tools of the intelligence trade. Intelligence officers do not wear badges declaring their real duties. So it is not surprising that a spy who testifies before the ICTY might be prone to misrepresentation and even prevarication. Slobodan Lazarevic, who provided important testimony about Serbian involvement in the Army of the RSK, was caught in a few prevarications by the accused and the Amicus, Branislav Tapuskovic, on his third and last day of testimony.

For example, Milosevic got the witness to admit that he was not present during the Belgrade briefings of international delegations from the RSK, as he had testified on direct examination. His diplomatic passport turned out to be a service passport, though it got him in and out of the country without trouble. Milosevic's reading of letters he received overnight from former colleagues of Mr. Lazarevic was less successful. They did little to sway the witness from his testimony. As unsworn out of court statements, they have no independent validity and can merely be used as a mechanism for questioning the witness. Once the witness answers, that's that. As Judge May often reminds Milosevic, he can call the author of the letter as a witness at the appropriate time.

Other tactics Milosevic used to discredit the witness included accusations that arrest warrants had been issued against him, that he was involved in fraudulent business dealings and that he worked for British Intelligence. Mr. Lazarevic denied all of these.

The Amicus, Mr. Tapuskovic, raised more troubling issues. Referring to the witness's 1999 statement to the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Tapuskovic pointed out that Mr. Lazarevic had not mentioned he was present when attempts were made to telephone Perisic, Stanisic and members of Milosevic's cabinet when the 21st Corps of the ARSK found itself abandoned and surrounded by Croatian forces at the beginning of Operation Storm. The witness gave no explanation for this omission, except to say he had given a very detailed description of events on the date of withdrawal from the Krajina.

Mr. Tapuskovic also confronted the witness with a discrepancy between his 1999 statement and current testimony concerning the incident where he was ordered to murder two Croatian émigré brothers. On the stand, he declared he found a way to avoid killing the two brothers, when one of the soldiers who was also assigned to the mission got drunk and exposed him in public. When Mr. Tapuskovic pointed out that his 1999 statement said he 'gave up the task of killing them' after the two brothers came and watched his house, Mr. Lazarevic agreed that the earlier version was true.

When confronted with other discrepancies between his 1999 statement and testimony before the Tribunal, Mr. Lazarevic said the statement contained errors that should have been corrected. After cross examination by the accused and the Amicus, there were several errors and discrepancies that the witness had not adequately explained. He also appeared to have exaggerated his importance, perhaps a bit mesmerized by the James Bond image of the business he was in.

It was left to the prosecutor, Dermot Groome, to rehabilitate the witness during redirect examination, a task he performed admirably. With rapid fire questions, Mr. Groome led the witness point by point through the assertions Milosevic and Mr. Tapuskovic had made, giving him the opportunity to explain or deny each of them. For example, Mr. Groome: 'Have you ever been a member of the British Intelligence Service?' Witness: 'No.' Mr. Groome: 'Have you ever been a member of any intelligence service other than KOS?' Witness: 'No.' Mr. Groome showed the witness his passport, indicating one entry into FRY in 1996 from Greece and three in 1997 from Malta. Yet no arrest warrants were ever served on him, making it unlikely they'd actually been issued as Milosevic claimed.

With regard to Milosevic's allegation that Mr. Lazarevic was nothing more than an interpreter and was unknown in KOS, Mr. Groome elicited the fact that there were many good interpreters who were natives of the Krajina, yet Mr. Lazarevic was chosen to accompany all four delegations to the international peace negotiations, though he needed a fake passport to disguise his Serbian origins. The witness said he was selected because he had been given a special task by KOS. Milosevic had asserted that JNA officers were not running the ARSK, as the witness testified, but merely returned to fight in their home countries and regions, following the break up of Yugoslavia. In answer to Mr. Groome's question, the witness stated that 99% of JNA officers in the ARSK had homes outside the RSK, their families were in Serbia and they had no current connections with the Krajina.

Another important point made by the accused was that the RSK's Supreme Defense Council was the organ in charge of the ARSK. On redirect, Mr. Lazarevic testified that he only once saw an order of theirs; he never heard the commanders of the ARSK or RSK police ever call or confer with them; no SDC members attended any of the four peace conferences; nor did delegations ever call the SDC during those conferences -- all the calls were made to Belgrade.

While some discrepancies in Mr. Lazarevic's testimony remained, they were not so great as to bring his entire testimony into question. In the end, they appeared more the result of exaggeration, a need to glamorize, the habits of a lifetime (e.g.g. calling his passport a 'diplomatic' passport, exaggerating his role in briefings with Belgrade) and the need to not appear in a bad light (e.g. not following through with the murder of two Croatian émigrés because they'd discovered the plot, rather than as a matter of principle). The most troubling issue is why Mr. Lazarevic failed to mention his presence during the frantic, last telephone calls to Belgrade as Operation Storm surrounded the abandoned 21st Corps. The witness did not adequately explain this. It will be up to the judges to weigh this omission with his detailed in-court testimony about the infamous phone calls.

Regardless, some important points remain from his testimony: The JNA trained, supplied and directed the ARSK through assignment of JNA officers to run it. Serbia, not the RSK, was in charge of negotiations with the international community concerning peace and war in the RSK. They funded the meetings, selected and briefed attendees, the delegations consulted with and followed directions from the JNA/VJ and Serbian authorities. The major directive was to obstruct the process. The 21st Corps of the ARSK and 20,000 Croatian Serb civilians were sacrificed to Operation Storm and a need for propaganda against the Croats. Several thousand Croatian Serb male refugees were held in 'retraining camps' where they were beaten and prepared for forced conscription to fight on the Croatian front (the witness briefly referred to lawsuits against the FRY and Serbia by relatives of refugees forced into military service on the front). Anti-terrorist units were formed to carry out 'dirty jobs,' as was 'PAUK,' a special, multi-organization unit made up of Serbian paramilitaries, JNA, and Serbian and local police. UN and ECMM personnel were recruited to provide intelligence to KOS. The Serbian police hired RSK police to assist in putting down anti-Milosevic demonstrations in Belgrade. Over everything that happened in the RSK, and everything that was ordered from 'Belgrade' hovered the specter of Milosevic.

To conclude the testimony, Mr. Groome asked Mr. Lazarevic a few final questions that may put his testimony into perspective, at least for his fellow citizens: Mr. Groome: 'Mr. Milosevic characterized your testimony as a betrayal of your colleagues and of Serbia. In 1991 and 1992 did you believe in the Serbian cause?' Mr. Lazarevic: 'Absolutely. With all my heart.' Mr. Groome: 'Did you consider yourself a loyal Serb?' Mr. Lazarevic: 'Even today, I consider myself a loyal Serb.'

Testimony from the second intelligence agent, Mr. Mustafa Candic, was interrupted by Milosevic's exhaustion and inability to attend court on Friday. Whether Milosevic will have recovered sufficiently by Monday will be up to his doctor. Thus far, Mr. Candic has testified to Serbia's widespread arming of Serb civilians throughout Croatia and Bosnia, the personal loyalty oath Milosevic demanded from JNA generals and the inability of the JNA's central intelligence service, the KOG, to penetrate the inner ranks of Milosevic's regime, at least initially.