Command Responsibility Central to Croatian Generals' Trial

As the trial of ex-generals Mirko Norac and Rahim Ademi resumed in Croatia after the summer break, arguments continued to focus on which of the two men held the real power when their forces attacked a Serb enclave in 1993.



In the trial, which opened in June, the prosecution argues that both Ademi and Norac are culpable on the basis of command responsibility for actions committed by Croatian army soldiers during a military operation to regain control over a Serb-held area of Croatia known as the “Medak Pocket”.



At least 29 Serb civilians were killed and dozens were seriously injured during the operation, and the indictment also alleges that Croatian forces killed at least five Serb soldiers who had been captured or wounded.



The indictment was originally brought by the Hague tribunal, which referred the Ademi-Norac case to Croatia in 2005, making it the first case of its kind.



Testimony heard this week from individuals who were senior Croatian army officers and defence officials at the time centred on the nature of the military command structure during the Medak operation, with different witnesses arguing variously that one or other of the defendants was the real commander on the ground.



The indictment says that the then brigadier Ademi, as acting commander of the Gospic Military District, played a central role in planning, ordering and executing the operation on September 9-17, 1993. At the time of the events in question, Norac held a more junior position as a colonel in command of the 9th Guards Motorised Brigade, the main unit involved in the operation.



The indictment, and Ademi’s defence team, say Norac was additionally in command of the Croatian army’s “Sector One”, a combat group set up specifically to conduct the Medak Pocket operation. However, Norac’s lawyer Zeljko Olujic has previously claimed that Sector One did not exist at the time, and that it was invented after the operation was over, specifically to ensure Norac would be held responsible for crimes that occurred there.



The first witness of this week, appearing on September 3, was Zvonko Brajkovic, deputy commander of the 9th Brigade under Norac, who testified that Sector One did not exist.



Brajkovic said he had “no memory” of such a command structure.



In cross-examination, Ademi accused Brajkovic of not telling the truth, and said “this is unacceptable for a Croatian army officer”. Brajkovic responded, “In the end, it will be apparent who is an officer and who has spoken the truth”.



When it came to his turn, Norac asked Brajkovic a number of questions that judges deemed inappropriate and ordered to be struck from the record.



One statement that did go on the court record was Norac’s allegation that prior to giving testimony, Brajkovic had been encouraged – in front of tribunal’s investigators – to give evidence on matters that occurred after September 12, 1993, when he was no longer in the immediate area.



“I didn’t give such a statement, nor will I,” replied Brajkovic.



Next in the witness stand was Frano Primorac, the commander-in-chief of the Gospic area which included the Medak Pocket. Whereas previous witnesses have said either that Sector One did exist and Norac was in charge, or that it did not exist, Primorac said there was a Sector One, with Ademi in command.



Although Primorac was not in Sector One himself, he said he knew it constituted the main direction of the attack.



“According to military principles, strategies and operations, it’s usual for the commander to go with the first team to the main route of the attack, while his deputy goes to the secondary sector or some other one,” he said. “I think that on the main route, the commander was Ademi. That is how it should be, and that is how I’m assured it was, because I haven’t heard differently.”



As Brajkovic had done in his testimony, Primorac said he did not personally witness any war crimes taking place during the operation, and was not aware of alarm-bells being rung in that regard.



The second half of the week saw a new line of argument opening up around allegations that as well as the Croatian military’s formal hierarchy, there was also an informal, parallel and arguably more powerful chain of command.



The indictment says Ademi was acting commander for the Gospic area.Appearing on September 5, Rudolf Brlecic, formerly the commander of infantry forces in the Croatian army’s high command, told the court that the real commander in the Gospic area was Norac, who was getting his orders from a “second line of command”, specifically from the defence minister of the time, the late Gojko Susak.



“Ademi did not succeed in command. In Gospic, Mirko Norac was the real man in charge. He was young and bold, brave but unruly,” said Brlecic.



Brlecic said local commanders had tried to get Norac removed as far back as 1991, but the request was blocked by Susak.



“The defence minister told us to go to hell,” he said.



The existence of dual lines of command were, the witness said, “an open secret”.



In cross-examination, Norac angrily denied that such a parallel command system existed, and accused Brlecic of testifying against him out of “personal antipathy”.



The following day, former deputy interior minister Zeljko Tomljenovic, appeared as a witness and told the court that the dual command system did exist and that it reflected the tensions between the new officer class of the Croatian army and those who had served previously in the Yugoslav People’s Army, JNA.



“The official chain of command contained a lot of Croatian officers from the JNA, while the second one was led by newly-commissioned officers who lacked military experience; this [the latter] was commanded by ex-defence minister Gojko Susak,” said the witness.



Tomljenovic said Norac was part of the informal chain of command which took orders from Susak.



Ademi, he said, was a good officer who was loyal to Croatia’s then Chief of the General Staff, Janko Bobetko, whom he knew from their days in the JNA.



“The antipathy between the new officers and those who’d come to the Croatian army from the JNA was noticeable in the field, as well,” said Tomljenovic. “Bobetko and Norac didn’t like each other, and that was reflected in the relationship between Norac and Ademi.”



The final witness to take the stand this week, Mladen Seric, was serving as an assistant to Bobetko in 1993.



According to Seric, both Ademi and Norac were simply “sacrificial lambs” for their masters.



“The military and political leadership wanted to brush everything under the carpet, but UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] insisted on an investigation… and the solution was to find a sacrificial lamb,” he said.



In the state of euphoria following the Medak operation, neither Ademi nor Norac could have asked for an investigation, he said. “Had they done so, I think that would have been the end of them.”



He said Ademi had asked Croatian military police to carry out an investigation in the area but had received no response.



Seric said he personally first became aware of the war crimes allegations when the Serbs asked for the remains of their dead to be handed over, and he learned that Croatian forensic scientists had discovered wounds on the bodies which could not have arisen in combat.



“Actions contrary to the law should have been resolved by the immediate commanders, but there’s the question how much they were swayed by emotion,” said Seric, who argued that local Serb civilians were also well armed.



The trial continues on September 10, with two more former officers scheduled to appear as witnesses.



Goran Jungvirth is a regular IWPR contributor in Croatia.