Iran, in its nuclear declaration deal with Turkey and Brazil this month, has tried to gain a head start in forthcoming negotiations over the country’s nuclear programme.

It is also motivated to some degree by a desire on the part of Tehran to test the Obama administration’s resolve to impose a new wave of sanctions on Iran while at the same time overcoming domestic opposition to the transfer of enriched uranium abroad.

Representatives of the three countries on May 24 met the director general of the International Atomic Energy Authority, Yukiya Amano, to present a letter confirming the “Tehran Declaration”. In it, Iran agreed to deposit 1,200 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium, LEU, in Turkey in exchange for a formal agreement by the so-called Vienna Group - the United States, Russia, France and the IAEA – to give Iran 120 kg of approximately 20 per cent enriched uranium to be used for the operation of the Tehran Research Reactor, TRR.

The declaration was intended to alleviate concern that the LEU, if processed further in Iran, would be turned into high grade material without a more rigorous inspection regime instituted by the IAEA, and eventually used for nuclear weapons.

On May 26, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the declaration "a historic opportunity "for the Obama administration to show that “he (Obama) is in practice willing to make changes".

But reaction around the world to the agreement with Turkey and Iran was mixed.

US secretary of state Hillary Clinton declared that the United Nations Security Council would continue working on a new round of sanctions against Iran and called the deal with Turkey and Brazil “a transparent ploy”.

The threat of sanctions gave opponents of a fuel swap inside Iran - such as the editor of conservative Jomhuri-ye Eslami Massih Mohajeri - further reason to oppose the idea. He said it was not only unwise to trust a country such as Turkey with the safe-keeping of Iranian fuel, but also a tactical mistake because it is in the nature of Iran-US relations that any conciliatory move on the part of Iran will be met with more demands.

However, few others in Iran questioned the move and an overwhelming majority of members of parliament signed a letter of support, suggesting the threat of further sanctions would not dent Iran’s determination to defuse the nuclear issue by working at the level of the IAEA.

Iran’s calculations are both strategic and tactical. Strategically, an agreement on the transfer deal may open the way for further talks on core areas of conflict in Iran’s nuclear programme: uranium enrichment and inspections.

During the Bush administration, the US – buttressed by several Security Council resolutions - insisted on suspension of all enrichment related activities and the institution of an intrusive inspection regime that Iran said went beyond its treaty obligations.

Iran, in turn, refused both and with the initiation of the sanctions process at the Security Council it even suspended its voluntary implementation of a more intrusive inspection regime.

The Tehran Declaration is a variation of a swap proposed last year that Iran at first agreed to and then rejected. France and Russia were to have reprocessed the Iranian LEU but Tehran appeared hesitant in the face of a domestic backlash.

Opposition to the original nuclear transfer deal came from across the political spectrum in Iran and forced the government to back away from it.

In the fragile domestic climate following his controversial re-election last June, Ahmadinejad seemed to fear being accused of making unnecessary concessions on the nuclear issue to make up for a loss of legitimacy.

But after months of stalemate, the decision by the Iranian leadership to seek the intervention of Turkey and Brazil was seen by some as a clever move to overcome domestic opposition while taking the initiative in its conflict with the US, which since last October has insisted that the existing exchange offer was the only one on the table.

By bringing in the Brazilian and Turkish governments, the domestic focus moved away from the details of the transfer deal and highlighted a degree of diplomatic success in finding important allies despite concerted American efforts to isolate Iran.

The Turkish and Brazilian support makes it difficult for the US to reject the transfer offer out of hand, some analysts believe.

And it is here that tactical considerations comes into play for Tehran as it is expected to work hard to position itself so that it is not blamed if the swap deal falls apart.

Some in Iran, such as the hard-line editor of Kayhan newspaper, Hossein Shariatmadari, have already said they expect no breakthrough. But he believes that Iran will triumph because acceptance of the latest deal by the Vienna Group “would imply the dismissal of prior claims while opposition to it would mean that the Iranian nuclear programme is only a pretext used by the challengers outside of the legal and technical realms – which is certainly the case”.

Others more interested in the resolution of the nuclear issue hesitate to declare victory and point out that the process about to begin is delicate and dependent on Tehran’s diplomatic skills. Sadegh Kharrazi, a foreign policy adviser to former president Mohammad Khatami, for instance, while supporting the path taken, is quite clear that unless Iranian negotiators manage to persuade Washington to suspend its efforts to push for more sanctions, then there is no reason for the transfer deal to go through.

It is here that ambivalence begins to enter Iranian calculations. Once the Vienna Group responds to the Iranian letter, what will Tehran do? Will Iran be open to modifications to the deal?

For instance, will Tehran accept a limit on its own enrichment of uranium at five per cent? At present, it is still enriching up to a weapons-grade 20 per cent, a process that began after the previous swap deal fell through.

This is an important issue since in the previous October 2009 swap agreement which was ultimately rejected, Tehran had effectively committed to acquire its higher enriched uranium for the TRR from abroad. More significantly, in the modifications it proposed then, the issue of increased levels of enrichment was never brought up. In fact, the head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Akbar Salehi, publicly stated that Tehran’s interlocutors missed an opportunity given by Iran when it agreed to obtain its uranium enriched beyond 5 per cent from outside the country.

It is unclear whether Iran would be willing to limit its enrichment activities in exchange for suspension of the sanctions process at the Security Council. It is equally unclear whether the US would be open to such a bargain.

Even more critical is whether Tehran will be open to a breakthrough in the form of a nuclear fuel swap orchestrated through the IAEA if it still faces an intensification of the nuclear standoff at the level of the Security Council.

All these considerations make the upcoming talks regarding the transfer of Iran’s enriched uranium at the IAEA unpredictable. The only thing that is certain is that while at each step of the talks the question of whether strategic interests are addressed has to be evaluated by both sides, tactically neither can afford to be seen as the one that is rejecting a fair resolution of Iran’s nuclear dispute.

Tehran will be judged harshly if it is seen as merely engaging in tactical manoeuvring to delay UN sanctions while Washington has to worry about being seen as too flippant and bullying in its approach not only towards Iran but also other significant middle-sized powers which have now earnestly tried to work for a breakthrough.

Mitra Farnik is the pseudonym of an Iranian writer and political analyst based in Washington DC.