Tashkent Watchful as Kyrgyz Make Advances to Moscow
Tashkent Watchful as Kyrgyz Make Advances to Moscow
Newly-elected Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambaev’s stated policy of strengthening his country’s ties with Moscow is unlikely to please neighbouring Uzbekistan, analysts say.
In an interview for the Moscow newspaper Izvestia on November 17, Atambaev, who was elected on October 30 and will take office on December 1, called for closer economic and security ties with Russia.
He also spoke about a "single integrated Russian base" in Kyrgyzstan – a reference to Moscow’s desire to bring all its military assets in the Central Asian state under one umbrella. The four locations include an airbase at Kant outside the capital Bishkek, and more controversially, a planned “training base” in southern Kyrgyzstan – which for Tashkent, would place Russian troops uncomfortably close to its borders.
A 2009 memorandum signed by Bishkek and Moscow makes provision for the training centre, which is supposed to boost counter-insurgency efforts in a troubled region.
When that document was signed, Uzbekistan voiced strong objections.
The “integrated base” scheme would give Moscow a 49-year agreement – extendable by 25 years by agreement – for Kyrgyzstan to host its bases, and in exchange Bishkek would win much-needed financial assistance. The Russians are also pressing Kyrgyzstan to close the NATO supply airbase at Manas airport, also near Bishkek.
Atambaev has pledged to do so, although it is unclear whether this will happen before the United States pulls its combat troops out of Afghanistan and no longer needs the Manas airbase so much.
Atambaev has made his pro-Russian sympathies clear before now, but this early statement of intent as incoming president will not have pleased Uzbekistan.
"The first statements made by the new [Kyrgyz] president are more than pro-Russian," Farhod Tolipov, an independent political analyst in Tashkent, said. "The Uzbek authorities cannot ignore Bishkek’s behaviour."
Tolipov said that since the Kyrgyz leadership had not set out a clear strategy, the Uzbek government was likely to shape its response as the situation evolved.
A defence analyst in Tashkent, who did not want to be identified, said that as Kyrgyz-Russian security cooperation moved from discussions to practical implementation, Tashkent’s hostility to the idea was likely to grow stronger.
"[Uzbek president Islam] Karimov trusts neither the authorities in Bishkek nor Atambaev himself, and he makes no secret of his irritation with [Atambaev’s] drift towards Moscow. The mutual distrust and prejudice will thus only grow bigger," he said.
Relations between Tashkent and Bishkek have always been difficult because of disagreements about border demarcation, water, and energy. Last year’s violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and the substantial Uzbek community in southern Kyrgyzstan made Tashkent jumpier than ever.
Shortly before the presidential ballot, Atambaev visited Tashkent in what some analysts saw as an attempt to mend fences between the two states. Others, however, saw it as a ploy to win the confidence – and thus votes – of Kyrgyzstan’s own Uzbeks. According to some observers, the diplomatic move was successful in this regard, and many Uzbeks in the south voted for Atambaev. In a country where regional affiliation matters, Atambaev, from northern Kyrgyzstan, did fairly well in the south.
This article was produced as part of IWPR's News Briefing Central Asia output, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.
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